Prior to his first visit to the US on August 27, in which he met President Joe Biden, Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett stressed that his talks with the US president will primarily focus on the Iranian nuclear programme. He said that he expects that both the US and his country will have the same viewpoint and will work together to confront Iran’s malicious activity in the Middle East, its violation of human rights, and its very likely success in having nuclear weapons. 

White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said that the first talks between Biden and Bennett will focus on essential issues pertaining to regional and international security, including Iran. Therefore, the key topic in the talks, at least from the Israeli point of view, was Iran’s nuclear program, which Israel regards as a major threat to its national security and its very existence. 

Despite that the Iranian nuclear programme was undoubtedly Bennett’s prime concern, Biden actually focused on the situation in Afghanistan and US efforts to revive the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. In order to understand the implications of this meeting on the way US and Israel deal with the developments of the Iranian nuclear file, a number of remarks need to be noted: 

            1.    Bennett is following in Netanyahu’s footsteps: 

The significance of the Iranian nuclear programme in the discussion reflect that Bennet could not, and perhaps will not be able to, get rid of Netanyahu’s legacy, as far as Iran is concerned. It is known that the former prime minister always used Iran as a scarecrow for Israelis so that he could remain in office. Bennett, however, is facing a challenge in this respect, as Biden’s administration is seeking to conjure up the same policies adopted by Obama in dealing with Iran, which had previously strained the relations between the US and Israel.  

In other words, Bennett is currently talking in Netanyahu’s voice, so to speak, with an American president who is completely different from the one Netanyahu talked to – namely, Trump. Therefore, it is expected that differences between Trump’s viewpoint on the one hand and Biden’s viewpoint on the other hand will most probably upset Bennett’s efforts to impede the revival of the nuclear deal with Iran. Bennett is keen on tipping the scale against Iran as this would give him leverage when compared to his predecessor. 

            2.    Bennett is adopting a ‘death by a thousand cuts’ strategy:

It was obvious from the beginning that Bennett believed that he would not be able to deter the US from resuming the Iranian nuclear deal negotiations. Thus, he tried to find key points of agreement with the US president in his first round of the talks with Biden. This was manifest in what he said following his meeting with Biden, as he stressed that he will not ask the US to send forces to defend Israel or to lay siege to Iran or to carry out operations there. 

However, according to an Israeli official quoted by journalist Barak Ravid, Israel’s strategy to deter Iran is ‘death by a thousand cuts’, based on a series of small-scale activities using various methods other than conducting traditional military campaigns. The official explained to Ravid that Israel must always be a thorn in Iran’s neck, even if this plan takes time to bear fruit. In short, Bennett’s plan is based on causing ‘slow death’ to Iran’s attempts to own nuclear weapons, by carrying out certain operations and steps, perhaps with the aid of the US, aiming to exhaust Iran and gradually destroying its nuclear potential.          

            3.    Netanyahu is still accusing Bennett of submissiveness: 

Since Bennett formed the cabinet in June, war has raged against him by former PM Netanyahu, with the aim of bringing down the government. Netanyahu is using Iran as leverage over Bennett, whom he always accuses of submissiveness and lack of decisiveness due to various reports indicating that Iran is about to have nuclear weapons. On July 27, Netanyahu, in an interview by Channel 20, said that his government succeeded, for years, in hindering the Iranian nuclear programme, whether through political and economic pressure on Tehran, or by conducting "countless" military operations there. 

Perhaps the most important of these was an intelligence operation in which secret documents pertaining to the nuclear programme were leaked from Tehran, which helped Israel in pressuring the US to impose further sanctions on Iran. 

From day one, Bennett sought to distinguish himself from Netanyahu so that the Iranian issue cannot be used against him. On June 19, he overturned Netanyahu's decision, which bans Israeli officials from engaging in discussions about the details of the new deal that may be struck between Washington and Tehran in order to dissociate Israel from this deal. 

Besides, Bennett has taken to criticizing Netanyahu and his policy towards the Iranian nuclear program. On July 15, for instance, he accused his predecessor of being negligent and irresponsible in dealing with the Iranian nuclear programme, which allowed Iran to proceed with it uninterrupted. This is perhaps why, on his first meeting with the American president, Bennett stressed that he will not repeat Netanyahu's mistakes in dealing with Iran's nuclear ambitions.  

            4.    Improving relations with the USA is an Israeli priority: 

Though Bennett desperately wanted to focus on the Iranian nuclear programme, he was also keen on not letting this issue be a point of disagreement with the US. Bennett realizes that the current US administration intends to resume the negotiations. Consequently, he is fully aware that openly disagreeing with the US regarding Iran (which would be the case if Netanyahu remained in office) will negatively affect American-Israeli relations. Bennett knows better than to lose favour with the white house at the beginning of his term. 

In the light of the foregoing, we can understand Bennett's insistence on stressing that he will not do what Netanyahu did. Most probably he was referring to the clash between his predecessor and Obama. Bennett, therefore, wanted Biden to understand three issues. Firstly, he will not openly attack the Iranian nuclear deal. Secondly, he believes that dialogue between the US and Israel on Iran will have better outcomes and achieve a compromise, despite any different viewpoints. Lastly, he implicitly stresses that his policy will be based on 'not surprising' the US as far as Israeli reactions to Iran are concerned; in other words, he will always coordinate policy on Iran with the white house. 

It is generally obvious that the Bennett government's attitude towards Iran will not be much different from Netanyahu's attitude. The National Interest described the current Israeli prime minister as a new Netanyahu, without the old Netanyahu's partisan affiliations. The American magazine said that Bennett will replicate his predecessor's policy on Iran, in a manner that should not negatively affect Israel's relationship with the US. That is because Bennett believes that maintaining good relations with the US is his most important guarantee of remaining in office and of eclipsing Netanyahu.

This can help us understand the reaction of Bennett's cabinet to Iran's targeting an Israeli ship in the Arabian Sea, and even predict its reaction to any future actions partaken by Iran. In this respect, one can say that there are three approaches that Bennett's Israel is expected to choose from. The first approach is to retaliate against Iran's 'agents' in the Middle East. The second is to target Iranian ships. The third is to mobilize the international community against Iran, just like Netanyahu used to do.  

Overall, Israel sees Iran's nuclear deal as highly likely, and believes that Israel can only try to influence the nature of the deal by consulting with Biden, who, in his first meeting with Bennett, pledged to protect Israel's security.