On November 19, Russian sources revealed that Moscow is seeking to make Iran leave T4 airbase in central Syria, after the airbase was attacked several times by Israel. The two parties have reached an understanding whereby Iran's militias must withdraw from the airport, which was expected to happen within days. These developments occurred after Iran admitted, on November 16, that Quds Force commander Jawad Ghafari left Syria.
The Potential Decline of the Iranian Presence
Several sources stressed that in the past few weeks, IRGC leaders, forces and militias (especially Afghan, Pakistani, and Iraqi ones) have been redeployed in various regions in Syria. This is manifested in the following:
1. Jawad Ghafari was withdrawn from Syria:
Iran withdrew Jawad Ghafari (commander of Quds Force) from Syria. In 2016, Ghafari was designated (by the then-commander of the Quds Force Qasim Soleimani) for leading and coordinating Iranian operations in Syria. Succeeding General Hossein Hamadani who was assassinated in Syria, Ghafari primarily worked in Aleppo. A few months ago, his operations command center was moved to southern Syria.
Iran admitted that Ghafari was withdrawn, but it said that the reason was that he has successfully accomplished his mission in Syria. However, the real reason is that Russia asked Iran to withdraw him, as he caused many problems for the Syrian government, by carrying out several attacks against the US initiated in Syria. Some of these operations could have caused an unwanted war in the Middle East. A case in point is the attack which occurred on October, 20.
Ghafari also clashed with Syrian top security officials, refusing to obey their orders or even to coordinate with them, and even clashing with a Russian commander in southern Syria. Most importantly, however, is that Iran fears that Israel may assassinate Ghafari, especially after it transpired that an Israel-affiliated spy ring which has been found out lately, was in fact spying on him.
2. Iranian militias were expelled from Southern Syria:
The Syrian army, especially the Fourth Division, exerted pressure on the Afghan and Pakistani militias, as well as on armed groups affiliated with Lebanese Hezbollah, so that they should leave southern Syria (especially southern Damascus and the Golan) under the pretext of preparing for the battles of restoring Idlib and besieging the fractions in the north.
It is noteworthy that the South Syria Deal of July 2018, which was struck under the auspices of international parties, entailed that demographic change be forbidden, IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah be kept away from the Golan by 85 kilometers, and Iran-backed forces to be prevented from expanding their presence in southern Syria.
3. Iran pulled out of military sites:
Iran withdrew its forces from military industrialization sites in the north and east of Syria. The reason for the decision was to protect Syrian military industrialization from Israeli attacks.
4. Houthis were made to leave Syria:
Syria cancelled the visas of certain Houthi military figures, who have been going in and out of Syria lately with the aim of being trained by IRGC and Hezbollah experts in Syria, especially on assembling drones.
According to several sources, IRGC was training Houthi fighters who used to arrive in Syria in successive batches, each of which amounting to about 100 fighters. They used to receive their training in camps in Bosra and Izraa in southern Syria.
5. Syria’s aim to eliminate demographic changes:
Almost at the same time of these developments, it became known that the Syrian government is resentful about some of the practices of Tehran-backed militias in Al-Hasaka, Deir ez-Zor and Rif Dimashq, which are more than likely to change the demographic make-up of the population there- namely, the militias' attempts to take possession of the houses of people who fled the fight in Syria, as well as their keenness to offer social aid to the Golan inhabitants and establish good relations with them. These steps were meant to secure an environment where the armed groups can live and prosper, so that it can be later used in conducting attacks against Israel.
Multi-level Pressures
We can understand why Iran had to accept the aforementioned changes if we bear in mind the following factors:
1. Damascus insists that its sovereignty must not be violated:
Some top security officials in Syria object to the smuggling operations taking place through Syrian territories; Iran smuggles arms and fuel to Lebanese Hezbollah through Syria without consulting with the Syrian government about it. Such smuggling is facilitated due to the fact that Iran-affiliated (Shiite) militias have control over certain border crossings between Syria and Iraq, notably Al-Bukamal city. The militias even tried to prevent Syrian security forces from restoring control over these border crossings. As a result, resentment arose among Syrian leaders, who demanded that such practices be stopped at once.
2. The Arab world is welcoming back Syria:
Lately, many Arab countries have adopted friendlier attitudes towards Syria. Perhaps the most important of these recent attitudes is that of Jordan, which has become more open to cooperation with Syria provided that the Syrian government limits its relationship with Tehran. It seems that Damascus has started to respond to such Arab demands, which is manifest in the fact that it decided to stop exporting goods from certain Iranian companies, such as Iran Khodro and Saipa for automobiles, and to terminate certain reconstruction contracts which were previously given to Iranian firms.
It is noticeable that the steps taken by the Syrian government to limit Iranian forces will be highly approved by Arab countries, many of which, consequently, will tend to be more open to cooperation with Damascus. It is not insignificant that Syrian and Saudi officials have held several meetings together, apparently to explore ways of restoring friendly relations between Damascus and Riyadh.
3. Israeli penetration is a possibility:
The fact that several Iranian top security officials in Syrian military sites were withdrawn strongly suggests that Israel may have succeeded in penetrating these sites. More than once were these sites attacked as soon as Iranian leaders arrived, or Iranian weapons were assembled. Therefore, we can conclude that withdrawing Iranian commanders from these sites may have been carried out with the aim of protecting them from the danger of being assassinated by Israel.
4. Russia supports the withdrawal decisions:
It is noticeable that Russian president Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett have agreed, among other things, to limit Iranian threats to Israeli security as far as Syria is concerned. Early in November, Israeli Minister of Construction and Housing Ze'ev Elken, who did the translation during the Putin-Bennett meeting, said that the Russian president and the Israeli prime minister 'agreed to work together to take Iran out of Syria'.
In the light of the foregoing, we can understand why twenty Iranian military commanders, in charge of centers of Iranian forces and Tehran-backed militias (especially in Aleppo, T4 airport, Homs, Tadmor and southern Syria) were withdrawn from Syria. Russian military leaders held meetings with IRGC leaders to discuss the future of the T4 airport, in the rural areas of Homs, especially as it was repeatedly shelled by Israel. The two sides agreed that the militias must be withdrawn from the airport. Russia has reached such an understanding with Iran with the aim of restoring control over the airport. In other words, the decision eventually serves the interests of Russia, which believes that all foreign forces, including Iranian ones, should leave Syria.
To conclude, Iran seems to incline to Syria's demands, due to the pressures on Iran. Economically, Arab countries are showing more openness and acceptance in dealing with Syria. In addition, Israel is conducting one intensive attack after another on the Iranian sites in Syria. Furthermore, the Syrian leadership is keen on removing all factors that can result in tension and conflict between the Iranian and Russian forces in several regions, which, moreover, can be used by Israel as pretexts for launching attacks on Syrian strategic sites. It can be said that the new attitude of the Syrian leadership is, in fact, in line with the Russian viewpoint.
