Although Rouhani will not run for the upcoming presidential elections, which will take place in 2021, as the current period is his second, this does not negate that his position within the regime is facing significant challenges, which will have repercussions on the influence of the Moderates stream in general. It is worth mentioning that Rouhani leads the Moderates in Iran, which enabled him to return to power again after he left it in 2005.

This is primarily due to the diminishing positive impacts of the nuclear agreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 group on July 14, 2015, which led to lifting the international sanctions imposed on Iran on January 16, 2016. Now, the US withdrawal from the deal has dealt a strong blow to Iran, given the international weight of the US, which has re-imposed the sanctions, forcing major foreign companies to withdraw from the Iranian market to avoid such sanctions and shield their interests in the US from any harm.

Direct Messages

The efforts made so far by the Iranian government, particularly with European countries, as well as Russia and China, or the so-called in Tehran as (4+1 group), have not succeeded in enhancing the chances of the continuation of the nuclear deal, since the European countries do not have many options in this regard, not to mention that that companies remain the governing variable that can determine the chances of success or failure of those efforts.

Thus, President Rouhani is under strong pressures from several political forces and parties in the country, which are illustrated in a petition submitted by the Economic Committee of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) to question him on the economic situation, particularly the crash of the national currency toman against the dollar.

The government is still trying to prevent this questioning, since it is an uncommon practice in Iranian political interactions. Although the Vice-President for Economic Affairs, Mohammad Nahavandian, called on the Economic Committee to withdraw its petition as it does not comply with the instructions of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the proponents of the petition refused. Now, they are seeking to garner the support of 74 MPs to refer their petition to the Presidency of the Assembly to pass it. 

A remarkable convergence  

To reduce these pressures, Rouhani resorted to two main mechanisms: the first is appointing Abdolnasser Hemmati as the central bank governor to replace Valiollah Seif, who had come under severe criticism in the past period, after many people blamed him for the collapse of the toman and the emergence of a black market for the dollar.

Some officials close to the president also hinted at the possibility of another change in the economic group, which the parliament accuses of taking measures that proved to be counterproductive. Moreover, several MPs have made a request to question the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Masoud Karbasian on some economic issues, on top of which the nosedive of the national currency’s exchange rate.

Therefore, various estimates do not exclude that the aim of that move was to suggest that the former governor of the central bank is responsible for the outcome of the current crisis. This comes at a time when Iran is facing unprecedented external pressures as a result of the increased likelihood of the collapse of the nuclear agreement and the US insistence to leave Iran with limited options, forcing it to yield to its demands for the conclusion of a new agreement that would accommodate the numerous reservations made by Trump’s administration, particularly with regard to the ballistic missile program and Iranian support for terrorist and armed organizations in crisis-ridden countries.

The second is the gradual leaning towards the hardline policy of the IRGC, particularly with regard to the response to the new US policy towards Iran. President Rouhani was the first Iranian official to hint at Iran’s possible move to block the Strait of Hormuz, if the US succeeds in bringing the Iranian oil exports to zero or significantly reducing it to such extent that the Iranian regime cannot bear.

It was striking in this context that the influential institutions and their media outlets were keen to quickly reiterate their support for the president in his warnings of a response to the US policy. The supreme leader Ali Khamenei, the commanders of the IRGC and the Quds Force, Mohammad Ali Jafari and Qassem Soleimani, confirmed Iran’s ability to threaten international navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, as part of the ongoing escalation with the US administration.

The mainstream media, close to the IRGC and the fundamentalist Conservatives, have not only changed their positions towards the president and curtailed their strong criticism against his policies, but they have started to assert that the president has already begun his real program, the most important of which is not to count on the nuclear agreement and adopt the so-called “resistance economy”, as the supreme leader Khamenei advocated.

Some even went to great lengths to say that Rouhani has always been a very conservative figure and loyal to the regime, as evidenced by his assumption of senior political and security positions over the last three decades, before assuming the presidency.

Possible Consequences 

However, this marked shift in Rouhani’s positions may come at a price. The first is that Rouhani may gradually lose the support of the forces that previously supported him and enabled him to assume the presidency for two consecutive terms, after defeating senior political and religious Conservative figures. 

Some of those forces may see that Rouhani has made accommodating the Conservative pressures a top priority, in parallel with his disregard for discussing the multiple contentious issues that included the house arrest on Mr Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the leaders of the reformist opposition movement over the results of the presidential elections held in June 2009 (It is important to note that their house arrest ended and the Iranian government recently approved their release on July 29, 2018).

The second is the overall weakening of the Moderates, who will face difficult tests in the coming period, given the difficulty of reaching a consensus over a central figure that would be able to maintain its influence within state institutions during the next phase.

The third of such consequences is the growing pressure on Iran, after it became clear that the hopes, which many forces and movements pin on the possible influence of the Moderates to tone down the Iranian decision, run counter to the realities on the ground, which suggest that the divergence between Moderates and Conservatives is not significant, especially with regard to foreign policy issues, which have near-unanimity, as evident in Rouhani’s recent threats to block the Strait of Hormuz.

In conclusion, the constant pressures and cross-cutting moves all mean that the current crisis facing Iran will significantly affect both the map of Iranian political balances, and the dynamics between its forces and its main institutions.