Syrian and Israeli fronts have witnessed an exchange of missile fire on May 9, the first of its kind and the most violent incident between the two sides after intermittent hostilities took place in September last year and February. Additionally, a series of limited strikes were conducted, the latest of which struk al-Kiswa area south of Damascus. This was followed by an announcement that some 20 missiles and projectiles were launched from Syria on the Golan Heights. Israel responded by launching 50 missiles striking five Iranian bases and said that it had destroyed Iran's entire military infrastructure in Syria and had set back Iranian military capabilities in Syria by “many months.”
Main Target
It can be argued that the recent strikes have imposed a new variable on the rules of engagement between the two sides. It is represented by shifting from the use of “proxies” to direct confrontation. But this does not negate that the Israeli counter-attack remains one of the preemptive strikes aimed at impeding Iran’s influence in Syria.
According to the strategy declared by Israel, at both the political and military levels, launching a strike against the Iranian military sites in Syria, is better than waiting until its influence becomes greater. This indicates that confrontation between them was “inevitable”, according to several views.
This was reflected by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's statements during the last cabinet meeting before the strikes, saying that Iran was preparing for a battle and that in recent months, the “Iranian Revolutionary Guards transferred to Syria advanced weaponry in order to attack us both on the battlefield and the home front.”
Despite this, there are other views that Israel is exaggerating its assessment of the results of the strike. Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman said that the strike destroyed Iran’s entire military presence in Syria, while assessments by the army, following the strike, indicate that it set back Iranian military capabilities in Syria by “many months", which means there its results were clearly limited.
An analysis of assessments made by the relevant Israeli institutions would reveal that Israel was focused on the goal of preventing any Iranian-Syrian operations from being carried out against Israel, through targeting the missile infrastructure, and preventing the Golan from being transformed into a “volatile region” and a launching pad for missiles as was Southern Lebanon in the past. This would explain why an intense barrage of missiles was launched on Khan Arnaba as part of the strikes.
Potential Scenarios
The following are the three main scenarios that can be considered for the potential confrontations between Israel on the one side, and Iran, the Syrian regime and Hezbollah on the other.
1- Yaldin’s Scenario, which outlines goals set by Amos Yalsin, former chief of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate who now heads Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies. In early May, he said that the Iranian expected response can take either one of three options: launching missiles from Iran and Syrian on Israel and, launching land attack from Lebanon’s territory or the non-occupied territories of Golan Heights; and launching attacks against Israelis abroad. But he was keen to downplay the potential of scenarios that are most annoying for Israel by asserting that that the Iranians do not prefer to launch missiles directly from Iran because this would lead to a war that they don't want to break out at this time.
2- Rezaei’s Scenario. The scenario includes, according to statements made by Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei, strong and direct strikes against Tel Aviv. He said, “If Israel carries out the slightest unwise move against Iran, we will level Tel Aviv to the ground and will not give any opportunity to it to flee.”
But there are views that Iran issues exaggerated threats against Israel, give, in particular, that it is still keen to avoid entering into any direct confrontation with it because it is busy countering pressures imposed by the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal.
3- Exchange-of-Strikes-Scenario. The next strike that would be launched from Syria may reveal 'the level of absorbing' the Israeli strike, especially because of the increasing likelihood of more exchanges of missile fire between the two sides. But the level of escalation may be less lower due to the keenness of both sides on not getting involved in an all-out war that can damage their interests. That is, a theater of operations is still there, but opening a new front will increase the cost of war if it expands and proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas were involved by Iran.
That is why, currently, the potential of Israel conducting strikes inside Iran to target nuclear facilities in particular, as it did in Iraq and Syria, is not a strong one, because of several difficulties facing it. These revolve around the positions of thee facilities and Iran’s possession of Russian-made S-300 missile systems as well as its reaction to such action.
In conclusion, it can possibly be argued that assessment of an exchange of strikes continues to be subject to a strict process by all involved parties, especially because they are related to other important issues. These include the nuclear deal which witnessed a new stage of escalation after the United States withdrew from it and imposed powerful sanctions on Iran. They also include the results of the elections in Lebanon and Hezbollah’s position on them, as well as Russia’s reaction to potential strikes in the next stage. Understandings reached between Israel and Russia before the latest strikes are expected to be a main topic during Russia’s talks with Iran and the Syrian regime, especially after several reports indicated that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to allow free strikes against Iran in Syria. This means that the current escalation is set to impose new consequences not only on the trajectories of the crisis in Syria and the positions taken by the involved parties, but also on the strong relations between Moscow and Tehran, which is currently re-assessing its the directions of its reactions with those parties in light of Washington's recent decision to back out from the nuclear deal.
