Libya failed to hold presidential elections on December 24 as scheduled. This was clearly reflected in the map of alliances there. Recently, for example, presidential candidate and speaker of the House of Representatives Aguila Saleh and Chairman of the so-called High Council of State Khalid al-Mishri held a clandestine meeting in Morocco on January 2, 2022. This indicates that Libyan politicians are attempting to form new alliances.
Shifting alliances
The Libyan map of alliances has witnessed certain changes over the past few weeks, which can be summed up as follows:
1. The Saleh-Mishri meeting:
According to a report by Russia's Sputnik News, parliament speaker and presidential candidate Aguila Saleh secretly met Chairman of the so-called High Council of State Khalid al-Mishri in Morocco on January 2, with the aim of resolving conflicts between the two parties and drawing up a new roadmap.
On December 18, al-Mishri had announced that a meeting with Saleh was being arranged so that the current political crisis could be resolved. Though sources from the House of Representatives and the High Council of State denied that their leaders agreed to meet in Rabat, al-Jazeera website stressed that Saleh and al-Mishri arrived in Morocco in response to invitations from Moroccan mediators.
The reason why the meeting was clandestine is that the two parties desired to reach a preliminary understanding before arranging more extensive meetings between members of the parliament and those of the advisory council. This can be regarded as an indication that Libya is likely to find a way out of its current political crisis and reshape its roadmap through reaching new understandings.
2. The Haftar-Fathi Bashagha meeting:
On December 21, former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha and Vice-Chairman of the former Presidential Council Ahmed Maiteeg (who are both presidential candidates) unprecedentedly visited Benghazi, where they met Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army, who is also a presidential candidate.
The meeting bears testimony to the changes which have imposed themselves on the current political situation in Libya. It is significant that the meeting took place in Benghazi, in Eastern Libya. Moreover, the past few years saw a bitter conflict between the two parties of the meeting; Bashagha and Maiteeg are from the city of Misrata, which has always been opposed to the 'Eastern camp', led by Haftar. This, together with the fact that the meeting was attended by several presidential candidates from Southern and Western Libya, means that attempts are made to put an end to the deep divisions among Libyan politicians.
The motives behind the current changes:
A number of motives may be behind the momentum towards change in the Libyan political scene and the tendency to reshape old alliances. These motives can be summed up as follows:
1. The need to avoid reviving the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum:
Since Stephanie Williams was appointed Special Adviser of UN Secretary General on Libya, endeavors have been made to revive the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum. The Forum was originally founded under the auspices of Williams when she was Head of the United Nation Support Mission in Libya (till January 2021). This is why Williams hopes to be able to rely on the members of the Forum, many of whom she had chosen herself. Furthermore, the Forum played an important role in choosing the current transitional authority and drawing up the roadmap according to which the time of the election was decided.
As Williams may seek to dispense with them in favour of the Forum, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State have come to realize that it is important to resolve the old conflicts between them so that they can keep their roles as key players in the Libyan political scene, especially as far as the new roadmap is concerned. This was reflected in statements by Khalid al-Mishri, who recently said that he and Aguila Saleh have reached an understanding concerning working independently of the UN mission.
2. The changes in the map of alliances:
As soon as presidential bids began to be registered in November 2021, it became clear that the existing alliances were fragile, hence the need to restructure these alliances. Therefore, long-time adversaries decided to lay aside conflicts and consider the possibility of working together, so that they can continue to play a role in the Libyan political scene.
These changes have to do with the return of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi who announced his candidacy for the presidential election. As there have been indicators that Gaddafi Jr. enjoys great popularity and is therefore likely to win, many parties found it necessary to rethink their alliances so as to avoid loss.
3. The rise of the Presidential Council:
The Libyan Presidential Council is apparently gaining more power; it has recently relieved General Abdul Basit Marwan, Commander of the Tripoli Military Zone, appointing Abdel Qader Mansour as his successor. This decision has caused division within the militias of Western Libya; some of these militias support the new Commander, whereas others support the former Commander.
Moreover, over the past few weeks the Presidential Council has engaged the services of militias from Misrata, Zintan and Zawia in an attempt to keep the current divisions in the Libyan capital under control. According to estimates, the Presidential Council is most probably planning to restructure its militias by dissolving some of them and altering the leadership hierarchies of the rest. It seems that the Presidential Council is seeking to enhance its legitimacy inside and outside Libya through attempting to achieve a degree of progress as far as the issue of the militias is concerned. However, it is doubtful that the Council can achieve tangible success, given the highly complicated nature of the militia issue.
4. Global and regional moves:
The global context plays an important role in the current developments in the Libyan political situation. Washington strongly objects to the candidacy of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, whereas Moscow insists that he should run for the presidency. Moscow's attitude coincides with the West's growing concern over the Russian role in the African continent, notably in the Sahel and the Sahara regions. Therefore, it is expected that the coming period will witness more moves from the Western countries in Libya with the aim of making new arrangements and forming new alliances capable of excluding Ghaddafi Jr from the political scene so as to counter Russian hegemony in Libya.
Significant implications
Given the aforementioned circumstances, a number of implications pertaining to the likely developments of the situation in Libya can be identified. These implications can be summed up as follows:
1. The new alliances may be fragile:
Fragility and instability will most probably be the main characteristics of the new alliances. In other words, the resultant alliances may be temporary as the parties involved in them may decide to retreat from them sooner or later. In this respect, it seems that Russia's endeavor to bring about an alliance between Ghaddafi Jr. and Haftar did not bear fruit. Furthermore, the coordination between Haftar and Aguila Saleh is losing momentum. New alliances are beginning to form. For instance, there has been talks about a new alliance comprising Haftar and former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, who may be joined by former Vice-Chairman of the Presidential Council Ahmed Maiteeg. Another potential alliance is expected to comprise Parliament Speaker Aguila Saleh and Chairman of the High Council of State Khalid al-Mishri. However, it is highly unlikely that these new alliances will be strong enough to last long and weather circumstances.
Abdelhamid Dbeibeh, Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity, is seeking to keep his post through enhancing his alliances, against the wish of several parties, who believe that Dbeibeh must step down as Prime Minister not only because his term ended on December 24, 2021, but also as his presence would constitute a threat to the other candidates in the coming election.
Therefore, in an attempt to avoid internal divisions in his government, Dbeibeh decided that his First Deputy Prime Minister Hussein al-Qatrani should return to Tripoli and join the meetings of the Government of National Unity after a long period of conflict between them. In addition, Dbeibeh is making extensive contacts with the international powers so that he can secure their support and, consequently, remain in his post till the elections are held. As for Gaddafi Jr., he is seeking to enhance his hegemony inside Libya through focusing on tribal alliances.
2. A new roadmap:
Given the current circumstances, it is not likely that the elections will be held on January 24 as suggested by the High Electoral Commission. A committee comprising members of the House of Representatives has already been formed to draw up a new roadmap. This committee is still consulting with several parties. For example, the committee members had a meeting with members of the High Council of State on January 2. They also listened to the briefing of the Head of the High Electoral Commission, Emad Al-Sayeh, before the parliament on January 3. Thus, it is clear that neither the discussions of the committee nor the moves of the UN mission have resulted in a well-defined plan for the future of the electoral process.
It is highly likely that the coming period will witness more consultation on the UN mission's part. This was strongly suggested by Stephanie Williams's statement, in which she said that she has returned to Libya in order to proceed with consultation with all the concerned parties in Libya, so that a new roadmap can be reached.
In conclusion, it can be said that a state of confusion still dominates the current political situation in Libya. In addition to the absence of security in Western Libya, the political process has become murkier, as all players are attempting to rethink their relations inside and outside Libya so that they can have a better chance in any future arrangements. This makes it more than likely that the elections will be postponed for months, to be held no later than next June. Besides, it is expected that policy makers will focus on achieving progress on the economic and military paths, and that other challenges will not be addressed until all parties have reached an understanding.
