On November 7, the Libyan High Electoral Commission announced launching the candidacy registration process for the presidential and parliamentary elections, in addition to announcing the criteria for running for the presidential elections. Emad al-Sayeh, Head of the High National Election Commission (HNEC), indicated that the country will be a single electoral district in which all presidential candidates will compete. The victory of any candidate in the first round requires obtaining 50% + 1 of the total number of votes. In case this percentage is not obtained by any of the candidates, there will be a second round of competition between the two candidates who obtained the highest number of votes in the first round.
A Scene of Disturbance
Despite the support of the international community for the completion of the elections on their scheduled date on December 24, there remain a number of challenges that may hinder that, namely:
1. Security liquidity in the West:
Despite the relative stability that the Libyan interior has witnessed since the ceasefire decision in October 2020, and the associated freezing of military confrontations between the East and the West, this has not resulted in cessation of hostilities amidst the armed militias deployed in Western Libya, which erupt from time to time.
The security conditions have begun to deteriorate increasingly during the past period, which is associated with the attempts of disrupting holding the elections, or the attempts of ensuring control over areas with a relative weight influencing the voting process, or even to enhance hegemony and gains and impose a fait accompli policy.
2. Severe political struggles:
The relations between members of the caretaker authority are witnessing exacerbating internal crises. In addition to the typical tensions between the Government of National Unity and the House of Representatives in Tobruk, disputes erupted between the government and the Presidential Council, which were clearly reflected in the dismissal of Najla Mangoush, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Further struggles are noticed within the government of Dabaiba itself, as in the disputes between Dabaiba and Hussein Al-Qatrani, First Deputy Prime Minister of the GNU.
3. Disagreement over the election law:
There are still severe tensions amidst the Libyan parties regarding the parliamentary and presidential elections laws. Despite the High Elections Commission’s approval of the two laws issued by the Libyan Parliament, the High Council of State, which is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, continues to reject the laws, as part of the endeavors to obstruct holding the elections.
Matters got more complicated after the intervention of the UN, and its request for amending some terms of the laws regulating the elections, including removing any obstacles to the candidacy of holders of transitional positions in the state, in reference to Dabaiba, who revealed his intentions to be a candidate. This comes in addition to a request for amending the date of the parliamentary elections, so that both the parliamentary and presidential elections are held in parallel on their scheduled dates, which paves the way for a new legal crisis.
4. The attempts to remove mercenaries:
The current variables reflect a European-US consensus on settling the Libyan crisis, particularly with regard to the elections and the removal of mercenaries and foreign forces. This is clearly reflected in the joint statements repeatedly issued by the embassies of these countries, although the US does not exert any practical pressure on Turkey to expel the Syrian mercenaries. Washington also seems to be using the Turkish role as a bargaining chip for Russia to get its mercenaries out of Eastern Libya.
Thus, while France is preparing to host an international conference on Libya on November 12 to come up with a unified European-US position to expel the mercenaries, the conference is not expected to yield any results other than international appeals to expel them.
Possible Scenarios
Based on the previous input, three possible scenarios can be put forward regarding the paths of the next phase relevant to the elections:
1. The scenario of postponing the elections indefinitely:
Despite the intense internal moves made by the Electoral Commission to hold the parliamentary and presidential elections on schedule next December, several indications reflect the possibility of postponing them. Of the key indicators are the attempts of members of the caretaker government to obstruct holding the elections despite the official announcement of commitment to the due date.
Key indicators of the possibility of postponing the elections are the following factors:
A report issued by Africa Intelligence confirmed the pressures exerted by the Al-Dabaiba family to postpone the elections. This was also confirmed by Qatrani, Deputy Prime Minister of the GNU, who hinted that "everyone in power does not want elections to be held".
Furthermore, the electoral law poses another problem, particularly in the case of accepting the lawsuit submitted by Khaled Al-Mishri, Chairman of the High Council of State, to challenge the constitutionality of the presidential election law, with the possibility of submitting an appeal, even if the elections are held.
On another front, the worsening security situation in Western Libya, with the armed militia dominating the scene, as well as the attempts by Brotherhood members, headed by the leaders of the State Consultative Council, to threaten to use armed violence to prevent elections from being held in Western Libya, all suggest the likelihood of a postponement. This is even more possible, after the moves made by Khaled Al-Mishri to incite a number of mayors and dignitaries of cities in Western Libya to prevent the elections in their regions.
These all come in addition to the external factors of obstructing the holding of the elections. Here, Turkey comes as a particular example, since it will seek to preserve its areas of influence, as it may lose its military presence there in case a president who does not belong to the Muslim Brotherhood is elected.
Views indicate that postponing the elections without setting a specific time frame will prompt some internal parties to question the legitimacy of the GNU after December 24. This will lead to the return of a parallel government in Eastern Libya, thus enhancing internal divisions, and increasing the possibilities of the return of the armed conflict between East and West. This is the scenario that Libyan Foreign Minister Najla Mangoush had warned against.
2. The scenario of amending the UN map:
This scenario is based on the intervention of the UN, backed by international powers, proposing a new initiative that includes a new time frame for parliamentary and presidential elections which does not exceed six months, preceded by the resolution of most of the controversial issues, mainly the laws regulating elections and conditions for candidacy, as well as the file of mercenaries and foreign forces.
This scenario may be supported by the call made by the UN envoy, Jan Kubis, last October 30 regarding the introduction of some amendments to the laws regulating the presidential and parliamentary elections. This also came in parallel with the initiative of Abdullah Al-Lafi, Deputy Head of the Libyan Presidential Council, which includes a detailed proposal for a new political roadmap, including postponing the date of the elections to the spring of 2022 instead of the date set for this December 24.
3. The scenario of holding the elections on time:
Some indicators may enhance the possibility of this scenario, mainly the continuation of logistical preparations in preparation for the voting process. Moreover, may internal players have announced that they are running for elections, led by Khalifa Haftar and Fathi Bashagha, with some indications that Saif Gaddafi is ready to announce his candidacy. Dabaiba’s intense moves in preparation for announcing his candidacy in the elections reflect a possible indication that the Brotherhood may abandon the approach of obstructing the elections, particularly since Dabaiba is considered to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood movement. However, the legal aspect regarding Dabaiba’s candidacy has not been resolved so far.
International pressures, mainly by the US and Europe as well as the UN, may represent another indication towards the possibility of holding the elections on time, particularly after the announcement made last October 22 by the UN Deputy Secretary-General, Rosemary DiCarlo, regarding the arrival of a group of international observers to Libya.
Existing Challenges
Even if Libya succeeds in holding the elections on time, it still faces several challenges that can be portrayed as follows:
1. Attempts to obstruct voting in the West:
In case the elections are held on time, there are no guarantees regarding the prevention of the breakdown of security, which would obstruct or impact the flow of the electoral process, particularly in Western Libyan, where the state’s authority regresses in favor of a wide range of militias, whether those affiliated with the government or those that are rebellious against it.
2. Rejection of election results:
There is another problem pertaining to the extent of expected acceptance of the results of the voting process. The losing party will probably reject the election results, which may pave the way for the scenario of division and the eruption of a civil war, particularly since the Brotherhood leader, Khaled Al-Mishri, had threatened to resort to violence, should Haftar win the presidential elections.
3. The risk of fragmenting the votes of the electors:
There is another dilemma relevant to the map of potential candidates for the presidential elections, which may lead to the fragmentation of the votes among parties supported by the popular base itself, which applies mainly to Haftar and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi as well as Aguila Saleh, which may lead to the loss of these parties and the victory of another party, should there be no coordination amidst them.
In conclusion, it seems that there are intense international and regional movements seeking a consensual formula regarding the Libyan crisis in order to avoid going back to square one. Although the current information seems to reinforce the scenario of making amendments to the road map which include a new time frame for the parliamentary and presidential elections, the international and regional intense movements by all actors may yield a new consensual formula that pushes towards holding elections on time.
