On June 28, the US launched military strikes on both sides of the Iraqi-Syrian border. The Pentagon officially announced that the targeted facilities are utilized by Iran-backed militias, who were engaged in the recent unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks against American personnel and facilities in Iraq. This incident, which is the second of its kind during the Biden administration, reflects military repercussions relevant to the future of the US military presence in Iraq and Syria, surrounded by a congressional controversy over the administration's motives for repeating military strikes in those sites. Moreover, observers express doubts regarding the possibility of a setback in the Vienna talks between Washington and Tehran over resuming the nuclear deal, within the imminent end of the term of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and the arrival of a more stringent administration towards Washington.  

Possible Escalation

The US strikes coincided with holding of the international conference in Rome for the war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This prompted US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to comment on those strikes, saying that “we took necessary appropriate deliberate action that is designed to limit the risk of escalation but also to send a clear and unambiguous deterrent message”.[1] Similarly, Pentagon spokesman John Kirby, indicated that “The United States took necessary, appropriate, and deliberate action designed to limit the risk of escalation”[2]. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said that the defensive airstrikes conducted by the Department of Defense on operational and weapons storage facilities in the Iraq-Syria border region appear to be a targeted and proportional response to a serious and specific threat. She also mentioned that the President took this action pursuant to his Article II authority to protect US personnel in Iraq, which reflects the American insistence to respond to attacks by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria against US forces.

On the other hand, the Iraqi army opposed the attacks on the sites of the 14th and 64th Brigades of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization forces (PMF), whose members are deployed on the borders with Syria, deeming these strikes a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. The Iraqi Foreign Ministry announced the start of an investigation into the circumstances of those strikes. That tone was diplomatic compared to the threatening tone used by the Iraqi armed factions against the US, especially from the Iraqi Hezbollah and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada militias, whose members and leaders are likely to have been struck. Meanwhile, the PMF militia confirmed the retention of the right to retaliate on Iraqi soil. On the Iranian side, Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh declared that the US is playing a destabilizing role in the region, the victims of which will include the US itself. 

Such declarations suggest a growing path of armed escalation over the coming period on the Iraqi and Syrian arenas between the US forces and the Iran-backed armed factions. This has already begun on the Syrian arena in the wake of the US strikes, as the US forces in Eastern Syria were exposed to a missile attack according to OIR Spokesman Col. Wayne Marotto, who also confirmed that these strikes did not result in any losses. In response to these strikes, SDF forces attempted to launch an attack with heavy machine guns on the outskirts of the town of Al-Shuhayl, and targeted a Syrian army checkpoint in the town of Baqrus in the Eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. 

Possible repercussions

What is remarkable about both strikes is the focus on the Syrian-Iraqi borders and the militia movements, reflecting a US attempt to narrow the scene of confrontations. Conversely, the Iran-backed militias traditionally expand the range of targets against US forces in Iraq and Syria. Thus, the rules of engagement remain unchanged on both sides, without negating that there is a change in the level and intensity of strikes. However, at the military level, there are several possibilities suggesting repeated military escalations on both sides, perhaps even over a shorter span of time. Nevertheless, this will depend on several factors, including the extent of Iranian escalation in the next stage in light of the previously mentioned threats. This is in addition to the nature of Iranian military reinforcements for both Iraq and Syria, as revealed by US intelligence reports regarding the development of Iranian offensive capabilities using advanced drones that can evade monitoring and jamming operations carried out by US forces in those areas.

On the other hand, this will depend on the nature of the SDF's role over the next stage in confronting the concerns regarding Iran's endeavors to support the expansion of the areas of control by moving to the areas East of the Euphrates, which will reduce the influence of the SDF. It will also depend on Washington’s stance towards re-supporting military capabilities of the Kurds after the decline of this support since 2019 with Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria. This support will require fresh congressional action to support this direction.

On the political level, perhaps the second US strike represents a new test for the Vienna nuclear path. The first strike carried messages to the Rouhani government that Tehran must retreat from regional activities in general. However, the second message seems to be directed specifically to the newly elected Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who commented immediately after his victory in the elections that his administration would not negotiate about its regional project. Therefore, there is a major separation between the nuclear talks and Tehran’s regional activities. This is in addition to Raisi being closer to the Revolutionary Guards compared to the Rouhani administration, particularly Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who sought to show a degree of diplomatic balance. Thus, an impasse is conceivable between the two administrations in terms of the possibility of finalizing the nuclear negotiations on the one hand, and not having a new US strike launched over that coming period, which may lead to the collapse of these negotiations.

However, a third path is proposed by some views, which tackles a compromise so that Iran does not retreat regionally. But this solution requires Tehran not posing a direct threat to the US military presence and interests, which cannot be guaranteed. 

Finally, it can be articulated that a qualitative breakthrough is not expected to occur in the US-Iranian relations, considering the constant engagements between the two parties. Iran will seek to adopt a policy of separating files, with the aim of making gains from the nuclear deal and regional advantages simultaneously. Washington, in turn, will pursue the tactic of minimizing losses as much as possible. Politically, Iraq has undoubtedly become the weak party in that circle, along with Syria, which has become a major arena reflecting excessive clashes between the two parties.