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Change or Gambit

The debate over Iran’s morality police abolishment

19 ديسمبر، 2022


In a remarkable development amid ongoing violence in Iran, the public prosecutor, Mohammad Jaafar Montazeri, said on December 4 that the country was abolishing the ‘morality police.’ Montazeri has also commented that the parliament will review laws concerning women’s head veil, indicating the regime has succumbed to popular demands. Yet, the Iranian public remains skeptical about the underlying reasons and the timing of such an announcement. 

Heated Debate

The role of Iran’s ‘Guidance Patrol,’ the country’s religious police squad, entails enforcing the Islamic dress code laws in the country. Since Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi announced the enforcement of the laws in August 2022, many violent incidents committed by the morality police have circulated on social media, sparking country-wide waves of peaceful demonstrations that have been met with the brutality of security forces. The death of young Irani woman Mahsa Amini fuelled public anger at the cleric regime, and thousands of Iranians joined protests, including teenage schoolgirls, teachers, academics, and even members of parliament. MP Jalal Al-Rashidi Al-Koshi points out: “the police were damaged because of the guidance patrol,” and “there are no results but losses for the country.”

The morality squad is not new, having been established 15 years ago under former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, the latest bout of violence is the worst in the squad’s history, encouraged by the “hijab and chastity” laws which remained unenforced until later this year when President Raisi ordered the law to be enforced at public and private spaces by the Patrol. The morality police subsequently gained a dirty reputation for brutality and became subject to international sanctions. 

A Gambit 

The Iranian regime’s decision to abolish was as surprising as the enforcement of its role. It comes three months following unprecedented waves of riots and demonstrations. To understand the reasons behind this sudden decision, we may look at four key factors, summarised as follows:

1. Shift focus to controlling regional borders: 

The Iranian regime worries demonstrations in Kurd-majority regions, Sistan and Balochistan in particular, might spur separatist movements that could get out of control. In the city of Zahedan, a prominent Iranian Sunni cleric Abdul Hamid Ismail Zhi, demanded a general referendum for independence, which would become under UN mandate. Iran has been isolating other Kurdish-majority regions bordering Iraq, cutting supplies from Iraqi Kurdistan, where Iran has been heavily shelling anti-Iranian rebel groups for many weeks. 

As the situation worsens in peripheral regions, the regime expects to calm protestors in central areas by offering a seemingly agreeable compromise. That way, security forces could realign their resources to deal with the growing risk at the borders.   

2. Polarise and divide the Iranian public: 

This announcement may aim at dividing the public opinion of Iranians. Historically, the clerical regime never listened to public demands and often resorted to violence – which usually works. This time, however, the regime may resort to a different tactic given the unprecedented level of demonstrations it has had to deal with. Inadvertently, the security forces’ brutality has united the Iranians, and so by announcing the abolishing of the Guidance Patrol, many Iranians would opt for stability than to continue demonstrating. This tactic, combined with an official narrative of Western conspiracy and claims of ISIS threats in regional borders, might lead to the disintegration of demonstrations. 

3. Buy time: 

The Iranian regime may be buying some time to reassess its approach in the face of widespread historic unrest. After all, women’s dress during the upcoming winter season is considered ‘acceptable’ by the religious government so the regime may take the opportunity in the coming months to ‘re-brand’ the morality police. It is doubtful that the regime would completely abandon the morality police considering the religious influence of the country’s leaders, as well as the persistence of state institutions, including the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, the Basij, and other police and security forces, which sole purpose is the supervision of women in public and private spaces. 

4. Dodge the constitutional referendum predicament: 

More than regime change and abolishing the religious state, the Iranian people are demanding a referendum on the country’s constitution. The regime, of course, would never entertain such demands. Yet, the magnitude and the widespread unrest of new social and economic classes like merchants and oil workers may compel the state to rethink its position. The scale of this year’s demonstrations has become an immense source of pressure on the government. Similar to the revolution leading up to the end of the Shah regime, new classes joining the demonstrations deeply worry the Iranian, and thus it has looked for new ways to deal with new alliances within the Iranian society. Although, small merchants joining demonstrations have undermined the government’s efforts to contain the total paralysis caused by the general strike. 

At any rate, the regime hastes to nip in the bud any demands for a constitutional referendum. Iranian officials have been making statements asserting that the regime sees the constitution as ‘untouchable.’ For instance, the speaker of parliament, Mohammad Baqir Qalibaf, has said that any change would have to be considered within a constitutional framework and not by changing the constitution itself. 

Limited Effect

In an article titled “Iran’s rattled government may be backing down,” the Economist maintains that the announcement to disband the morality police is being met with broad skepticism by the Iranian public. But the backing down, the reports speculate, would reflect the regime’s weakness and may embolden demonstrators. Therefore, despite the unclarity surrounding the decision to ‘shut down’ the morality policy, it is seen as a win for the Iranian public.

We may say that the decision has not had the effect the regime had hoped it would. Protests continue across the nation, and new social classes join protestors in demanding a regime change. Teachers, university students, and industry workers have joined as well. More than 500 oil workers have joined strikes in Arab-majority regions of Mahshahr in Khuzestan Province. Despite the internet blackout, people have found creative ways to voice their demands in street graffiti. 

Amid skepticism and mistrust towards their government, protesters have called on their government to attempt to absolve its responsibility for the morality police brutality. The international community has been vocal about human rights breaches: the UK, US, Canada, France, and the EU all have issued statements condemning the way in which the regime has dealt with the protestors. Civil rights activists are downplaying the announcement’s significance, warning it may be a mere tactic to navigate the historic public unrest. The Iranian people still feel that no real change could come without a regime change. 

In conclusion, Iran’s announcement of disbanding the morality police remains a simple tactic to navigate unprecedented public anger. The regime tries to buy time as it revises its approach to dealing with the protestors as internal and external pressure intensifies.