In August 2020, a group of soldiers led a military coup and overthrew the government of late president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, which was democratically elected and was backed by France. The then commander of the special forces, Colonel Assemi Goita, led a second coup in 2021 and installed himself as interim president. However, the military government did not meet the internationally-agreed deadlines for holding national elections. Instead, it proposed to stay in power for five-years. Viewed as a regression of democracy, the move raised fears in other fragile West Africa countries that are vulnerable to similar coups.
As a result of pressure from France, which became aware that its influence in its traditional strategic space in Africa, regional states attempted to isolate the Malian junta. In January, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) imposed tough sanctions and announced the closure of air and land borders between Mali and other member states and imposed a blockade on trade with the landlocked country. The crisis of political instability, the faltering democratic transition, as well as the country’s moving closer to Russia, all pushed France to opt for confrontation with, and escalation against the Malian military government.
International and regional divisions over Mali’s future are likely to jeoperdize efforts to combat terrorism and deliver humanitarian aid to the Sahel region. Overall, these developments raise questions about the prelude to the escalation of the crisis, and the resulting security risks in a region hit by a complex conflict, on the one hand, and how Russia took advantage of the void resulting from French re-deployment, on the other.
Context of the security void
1- Change in France’s public opinion
Evidently, more French people now oppose Operation Barkhane (42% were against the operation in late 2019, compared to 51% in 2021). Additionally, the French elections, which will be held in 2022, are likely to be impacted by the French military presence in Mali. Accordingly, France’s decision to withdraw from the region can be explained by President Emmanuel Macron’s attempt to increase his chances of re-election. Within this context, it can be said that the French withdrawal from Mali was a step in this direction. Additionally, the flow of humanitarian aid to Mali, which started along with the intervention, does not seem to produce the desired effect because of persistent and rampant corruption in the state institutions as well as the Malian’s army lack of sufficient training and equipment. This is perhaps what prompts many writers to invoke the situation in Afghanistan when addressing Mali. They even call Mali “the Afghanistan of the African coast”.
France is likely to think twice about keeping its military presence in this region. Yet, there are remaining questions being asked about whether France will be prepared for confronting the risk of Mali’s turning into a hotbed for terror organizations, or will lose its influence and regional role to Russia.
2- Rising popular anger against the French presence
The deeply rooted anti-French sentiments are expressed by crowds taking to streets in the capital Bamako. In fact, some 5000 French soldiers were stationed across the Sahel region back in 2013, after French and Chadian troops launched an offensive to force violent jihadi groups out of the north of Mali. Despite France’s success in liberating the north, the prolonged conflict and fight against violent and armed groups has pushed the country into a quagmire similar to that in Afghanistan. The extent of the conflict spilled over into Niger and Burkina Faso. A large segment of the population of the Sahel region believe that France is unable to resolve the crisis. Others argue that the conflict has to do with underdevelopment and stagnation caused by a century of France’s political and economic dominance over the region. Popular resentment built up across the Sahel region resulting in widespread protests against a convoy of French soldiers in November 2021. Protestors surrounded and chased the convoy across the border between Burkina Faso and Niger.
The rising popular anger in Mali against France can be justified. The French intervention, according to former president Franciose Holland, was aimed at helping Mali in the fight against terrorism. Yet, the crisis in the region later turned into a domestic ethnic conflict. In the Mopti region, a conflict is ongoing between the Fulani and the Dogon ethnic group, and between the Fulani and the Bambara. In Timbuktu and Gao, another conflict is ongoing between the Tuareg and Arabs, on the one side, and the Tuareg and the Songhai, on the other. This means that the French troops, deployed mainly to the heartland and urban areas have failed to protect civilians and eliminate terror groups, which have turned into a cross-border force. In addition, many Malians accuse France of protecting and backing armed separatist groups in Kidal town, north of Mali.
3- Russia and filling the void
A reduction of France’s military presence in the Sahel region is likely to cause a change in the structure of alliances with and between violent and terror groups. That is, France’s plan of downsizing its military force in the Sahel in February 2022 has prompted Mali’s military leaders to resort to Russia to fill up this security void. They signed an agreement with Russian security group Wagner to take over Bamako, which might well lead to confrontation with French troops and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission deployed to the region. This would push the French to completely withdraw from the whole region.
Sufficient Russian support seems to have encouraged Mali’s military leaders to delay the presidential elections, due to be held on February 27, 2022. The move prompted ECOWAS to impose sanctions against Mali. Since it seized power, the military junta led by Colonel Assimi Goita wooed Russia, viewed by them as an alternative to failing Western and international military approaches. There were reports that Russian elements were stationed in Mali as early as 2019. Today, hundreds of Russian soldiers were deployed to the capital Timbuktu to train the Malian army in a military base abandoned recently by the French.
The Wagner Group
The Wagner Group is not exactly a private military group, as some describe it. It is closely linked to the state in Russia and trains in a complex next to the training center of the special operations unit of Russia’s military intelligence agency. Western media often describe Wagner as a mercenary group, but its members are not like any other paid mercenaries. Although they fight for money on contract, they proclaim allegiance to the Russian state despite the fact that some of them are not even Russian citizens. Some of them hail from Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and Serbia. In fact, the Wanger Group has undergone a great deal of change with time, so much so it is viewed as a loose entity and not a distinct entity with an organizational structure. The best alternative name for it can be “a semi-official security group.”
In addition to its interference in Libya, Russia signed a deal with the elected president of Central Africa, Faustin-Archange Touadera, in 2018, to help counter threats posed by the Seleka extremist Islamic group. Some 400 Wagner elements were deployed in the north of Central Africa. Russian Valery Zakharov has become national security advisor to President Touadera. Later, Foreign Minister Charles-Armel Doubane was deposed because of his opposition to Russia’s increasing presence, which he described as unneeded.
Although Wagner elements were deployed to Sudan, when Omar Hassan al-Bashir was president, as well as Mozambique, it is not by chance that these areas are home to a multi-billion mining industry extracting gold and precious stones and the country’s wealth of natural gas reserves.
Anyway, Russia officially denied having any official role and the existence of Russian mercenaries in these areas. Often only hundreds of troops are deployed, in relatively low-cost operations that can be easily paid by host countries from fees and revenues from the mining industry. In this operation, Russia is having more influence in a region in which it previously had no presence.
Strategic consequences
Wagner operates across Africa in countries such as Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique and most recently in Mali. The deal signed with the interim military council in Mali provides the partnership and protection that Colonel Goita is looking for, while taking advantage of rising resentment against the French and Western presence. With an interim military council reeling under regional and international pressure in a country suffering from political volatility and uncertainty despite abundant natural resources, Mali is more like the grand prize for international rivals competing for a share in Africa. In this context, Russia seems to be using Wanger to fill the void in this region. But this does not necessarily mean that Wagner will win the battle against terror groups and violent militias. That is because the Russian company suffered a number of setbacks, as in late 2019 when it pulled its elements from Mozambique after it suffered casualties in battles with Ahlu-Sunnah Wa-Jama fighters in Cabo Delgado, a province rich in natural gas.
While the future of political transition in Mali remains murky, the presence of Wagner will only cause further complication of the crisis. For Wagner, and Russia in general, Mali is just another tool used in mounting strategic tensions with the West, which mounted today in the conflict over Ukraine. The irony referred to by several writers is that whenever Wagner is deployed to oppress the opposition and violent groups challenging the state, instability is likely to persist. As an entity seeking to make profits, Wagner has a strong motive to keep a certain level of instability that it can keep under control. Because these arrangements often mean that Russia gains access to natural resources, pushes arms sales and increases its political influence, Russian interests in Africa are expanding because of persistent instability.
Russia’s intervention in Mali means that Moscow has the ability to create humanitarian and political crises for Europe while at the same time challenging the influence of Europe, and France in particular, in Africa.
In conclusion, the biggest challenge to Russia’s penetration of Africa, as shown in its experience in Mali, is regression of democratic transition in the continent. This can be attributed to Russia’s “political clientele” approach to its relations with African leaders, as reflected by ambiguous security and trade agreements that are not in the interests of involved African countries.
As part of this process - in which the ruling elite benefits from nepotism and favoritism and tightens its grip on power using international sponsorship from states such as Russia- popular involvement is marginalized and leaders who go beyond their constitutional mandate on the pretext of guaranteeing stability in involved countries. It was not, therefore, surprising that Russia backs states isolated by the West. Accordingly, resorting to Russia to take revenge on Western dominance is at core a quest to replace a force seeking to dominate and gain influence with another. Africa remains a chess board under the control of ambitious and influential powers from the east and the west in what is more like a second cold war.
