أخبار المركز
  • د. أحمد أمل يكتب: (تهدئة مؤقتة أم ممتدة؟ فرص وتحديات نجاح اتفاق إنهاء الخلاف الصومالي الإثيوبي برعاية تركيا)
  • سعيد عكاشة يكتب: (كوابح التصعيد: هل يصمد اتفاق وقف النار بين إسرائيل ولبنان بعد رحيل الأسد؟)
  • نشوى عبد النبي تكتب: (السفن التجارية "النووية": الجهود الصينية والكورية الجنوبية لتطوير سفن حاويات صديقة للبيئة)
  • د. أيمن سمير يكتب: (بين التوحد والتفكك: المسارات المُحتملة للانتقال السوري في مرحلة ما بعد الأسد)
  • د. رشا مصطفى عوض تكتب: (صعود قياسي: التأثيرات الاقتصادية لأجندة ترامب للعملات المشفرة في آسيا)

Traditional Mechanisms

How Does the Iranian Regime Handle the Bazaar Protests?

03 يوليو، 2018


The Iranian regime insists on adopting the same mechanisms, it has already used in the December 2017 protests, to handle the current wave of protest. These mechanisms are to hold the government’s influential institutions responsible for not adopting a resistance economy, as the Supreme Leader calls it, which worsened the international situation. In addition, the regime has portrayed the economic crisis in Iran as part of a foreign conspiracy, especially with president Trump tightening the economic sanctions on Iran. Finally, the regime toughens penalties against protesters by increasing the number of years of imprisonment or by imposing harsher punishment on those accused of manipulating economic conditions. However, unless these procedures followed by serious measures aimed at addressing the deteriorating economic situation, they will eventually face recurrent wave of protests across the country. This is an expected consequence unless Tehran succeeds in dealing with the new US sanctions against it, especially those related to the curtailment of Iranian oil exports.

The crisis facing the Iranian regime in the current period has taken a new turn after a group of the bazaar traders joined the protests, which erupted in the capital Tehran and spread to several cities and provinces, such as Isfahan, Kermanshah and Arak. The protests erupted due to the collapse of the national currency and the rise in gold prices. The participation of this class in the demonstrations is significant because of its role at the political and social levels, given its economic clout and historical alliance with the clergy, which has had an obvious influence on the political transformations in Iran.

The current protests coincide with the growing external pressures on Iran due to its continued support for terrorism and interference in the internal affairs of countries of the region, exacerbating the various regional crises and impeding settlement efforts. Yet, the regime insists on the same traditional mechanisms it has adopted in dealing with previous political and social crises in past years, the most recent was the massive protests that began in December 2017 in Mashhad and spread to the capital, Tehran.

Key Mechanisms 

Faced with the new crisis, which has compounded internal pressures, the regime constantly adopts three main mechanisms: 

1- Holding the government responsible for the worsening internal situation through a vigorous campaign against the policies adopted by the government in the past period. Numerous estimates close to the fundamentalist conservatives have indicated that the root cause of the present crisis lies in the government’s reluctance to implement the instructions of the Supreme Leader, who called for adopting the so-called “resistance economy” to solve the internal economic problems, rather than relying on foreign investments.

Accordingly, the numerous measures taken by the government to create favourable conditions for foreign investment after reaching the nuclear agreement and lifting the international sanctions were ultimately counterproductive, as foreign companies scrambled to withdraw from the market to avoid the US sanctions, throwing government policies into disarray.

One of the main reasons that rushed the citizens to buy the dollar was the US sanctions that would be imposed on Iran in the coming period, which contributed to the fall of the national currency against the dollar, which reached 9000 Tomans, more than twice the official price set by the government, 4,200 Tomans. Although the exchange rate subsequently improved, reaching 7800 Tomans against the dollar, this did not halt the ongoing campaign against the government.

The fundamentalist conservatives have been keen to assert that the government’s economists are responsible for the deteriorating of economic conditions to this dangerous state, which requires a change before the situation aggravate and hence placing unprecedented pressure on the citizens.

Thus, on June 26 the Shura Council conservative MPs signed a statement calling on President Rouhani to make a cabinet reshuffle, including economic and financial portfolios, after they seemed to weak to take preventive measures that could have prevented the escalating crisis in Iran. The MPs began exerting pressure on Rouhani to respond to their demands, after they threatened, on July 1, to summon the economy minister for questioning on the reasons for the collapse of the exchange rate and the government’s inability to hold it in check.

2- Promoting foreign conspiracy: The fundamentalist conservatives are keen to promote the existence of a foreign, specifically American, conspiracy aimed at fuelling the internal economic crisis, to exert strong pressure and lay siege on Iran, in collaboration with internal parties. Based that on their view, the aim is to coerce Iran to accept new negotiations on the numerous controversial issues, foremost among them is the controversial nuclear program, especially after the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the re-imposition of US sanctions on Iran, and the Iranian regional role in crisis -ridden countries, such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon.

That may help explain the reasons why the supreme leader Khamenei was keen, on June 30, to link external pressures with internal protests. “American economic pressure is aimed at turning Iranians against their government…They bring to bear economic pressure to separate the nation from the system ... but six US presidents tried this and had to give up” Khamenei said on his website. However, the most important thing is his assertion that “Iran will triumph over its internal and external enemies’, referring to the existence of internal anti-regime parties.

Iranian conservative media took advantage of the big conference organized by the Iranian opposition in Paris, beginning on June 30, attended by prominent foreign figures, such as President Trump’s lawyer Rudy Giuliani, to promote the existence of a conspiracy aimed at undermining the regime and forcing it to re-engage in new negotiations to reach agreements that correspond to the vision and policies of the international powers concerned with the outstanding differences with Iran, foremost among them the US.

3- Implementing strict measures against protesters: The Iranian authorities deliberately labelled the protests as “riots” aimed at sabotaging public facilities and spreading chaos in Iran. This was the same justification it has previously used for imposing harsh sentences on some protesters, which ranged between one and five years of imprisonment for some of the university students who participated in the December 2017 protests. These sentences were in parallel with government measures against pro-Gonabadi dervishes band, which was accused of “compromising public security and engaging in deceptive propaganda activities against the Islamic Republic”. At present, the head of the judiciary, Sadeq Larijani, threatened the protesters, who labeled them as “violators of economic affairs in the country” with severe punishment, including execution and imprisonment for 20 years.

Adverse Consequences

The mechanisms adopted by the regime to handle the new wave of protest may eventually backfire. The purpose of relying on them seems to avoid shedding light on the main cause of the continued outbreak of protests, namely the regime’s persistence in its foreign policy of directing the Iranian funds to support terrorist and armed organizations present in crisis-ridden countries, rather than supporting their economy. 

However, this policy is no longer popular at home, which will eventually lead not only to the continuation of protests, but also to their spread nationwide, from one city to another, evolving from a narrow economic to a wider political space. This is likely after some pro-regime segments of the society have begun to join these protests, as the multiple repercussions of the current economic crisis affect their economic interests and influence. Even if the momentum of the current protests is gradually reversed, as in the December 2017 protests, this does not diminish the prospects of their renewal, especially since their real causes remain unaddressed.