Iran and Turkey have been long seeking to play a leading role in the Arab region and the Middle East, using several tools to achieve their goals. Although the two countries are considered to be among the middle powers and possess economic and military capabilities for assuming such a role, their quest has always reached a dead end over the years, or, at most, achieved a minimum of their set goals.
Iran began this endeavor as early as 1979 upon the declaration of the Islamic Republic, and since then, it adopted the policy of “exporting the revolution” and promoting its ideology in neighboring countries. After some five decades of inaction due to its war with Iraq, Iran revived this policy and backed it with military tools. This included direct military intervention as was the case in Syria, as well as support to local proxies as was the case in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. This intervention was not approved of by the public opinion of the involved countries, but rather became a source of tension and instability.
In the case of Turkey, this quest for regional dominance gradually took shape after the Justice and Development Party and its founder Recep Tayyib Erdogan assumed power in 2002. In late 2010 in particular, the Arab uprisings broke out and received political support from Ankara. Turkey’s intervention took a military form in Syria, Libya and Iraq. In Sudan, Turkey sought to establish a military base. Yet, as was the case with Iran, Turkey’s policy faced various stumbling blocks and caused its relations with many Arab states to be strained.
The gap between Iran’s and Turkey’s possession of assets that are supposed to qualify them for playing a leading regional role and their inability to perform this role in reality, can be explained through IR theories, regarding the concepts of regional order and regional leadership. In light of that, several factors provide a favorable or unfavorable environment for a certain state to play such a role. In the case of Turkey and Iran, the following four factors can be highlighted:
1. Legitimacy of being a member of a regional order:
Playing a leading regional role requires the existence of a clear-cut regional order with perceivable borders, the extent of the involved state’s contribution towards a common identity of this order, the effectiveness of regional institutions in bringing its members together and regulating their interactions. In the case of our region, an evident controversy is underway between the supporters of two concepts: the pan-Arab regime and the Middle Eastern regime.
The Pan-Arab regime has its roots embedded since the establishment of the Arab League back in 1945 and the subsequent creation of scores of pan-Arab popular and inter-governmental organizations and unions revolving around Arabic language and a common cultural identity. Based on the definition of this regional order, Iran and Turkey cannot be considered as members, but rather as two peripheral states lying on its margin, and interacting with it.
Furthermore, historically, the feeling of Arab identity took a political shape to counter the Turanist Turkinization policy embraced by the ruling Union and Progress Party in the Ottoman Empire in the first decade of the 20th century. In a majority of Arab Gulf countries, the rising Iranian influence in the region, was a major concern, in the lead up to World War II and up to their independence.
The concept of Middle East regime, by extension to the wider or greater Middle East, can accommodate Iran, Turkey and other states such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, as members. However, what blocks the use of this concept as a tool to analyze regional relations is that there are no common regional organizations. Even organizations such as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum include European state members such as Italy, Greece, Cyprus and France, with the United States and the European Union as observer members.
Under the current regional conditions of lacking any regional order, organizations or security architecture, “Middle Easternism” cannot be perceived as a common identity or affiliation. However, there are only some examples of having bilateral relations with Iran and Turkey.
2. Power proliferation in the regional regime:
Regional leadership is correlated to patterns of power distribution and proliferation among member states. As such, a state playing a leading role possesses the capability to deter rivals and offer incentives to allies. The forms and demonstrations of this distribution vary from one regional order to another. In some cases, a hierarchy led by a certain state facilitates the leading role of this state. In other situations, power is distributed between two regional states, which eventually leads to rivalry. In a third scenario, multiple states enjoy the elements of power, but none of them can single-handedly play a leading role and has to create alliances with other states.
Accordingly, in our region, multiple states share the elements of power. In general, the elements of military and soft power are owned by more than one state. In some cases, the human resources, represented by the population, is not proportional to its economic and organizational capabilities, causing concentration of the elements of power in that state. This means no single state can play the role of “regional leader” solely, and therefore has to focus its efforts on the area in which it enacts as a leader, or it will have to enter into alliances with other states in order to assume a leading role.
Iran and Turkey are out-populated by some Arab states, while others surpass them in terms of financial capabilities or social cohesion.
3. Other states’ acceptance of the leading role:
Regional leadership involves interaction between the ambitious state and other states of the region. This relationship cannot be achieved by coercion or it will become some sort of domination or colonization. Rather, approval of such a leading role can be reached through the acceptance of other states.
This approval is, in some cases, given in exchange of financial returns or gains, such as increased economic aid, investment, technology transfer, among others. Other reasons include the need for other states to provide a security umbrella to protect themselves from regional incursions or intervention in their internal affairs. Additionally, in other cases, a state seeking a leading role presents a successful role model in economic and political development, and its government achieves a high level of political legitimacy, social stability and respect for public freedoms and human rights. According to this factor, neither Iran nor Turkey stands a good chance to play a leading regional role.
Military and financial assistance offered by Iran go to its proxies in involved states to help it achieve its regional goals. Additionally, Iranian rough intervention in other states backfires and leads to quite the opposite of the goals it seeks to achieve. That was the case in Iraq, where, in the parliamentary elections held in October 2021, Iran-allied parties including the Popular Mobilization Forces, lost a significant part of their voter base. Before that, popular protests broke out against Iran’s interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. In Yemen, Tehran’s support for the Houthis caused a humanitarian crisis and severe famine that struck millions of Yemenis.
In the case of Turkey, its policies caused suspicions and unfavorable sentiments. In Iraq, it established military bases without seeking approval from the Iraqi government. Its warplanes violate Iraq’s airspace to attack the Kurdistan Workers' Party on Iraqi territory. In Syria, its forces occupied areas in Idlib province as part of its attempt to “Turkificate” the province and change its identity and demography. In Libya, it carried out direct military intervention by sending advisers and trainers and transferring mercenaries from Syria.
Such practices caused concern among Arabs and animosity towards both Iran and Turkey, as well as growing suspicions about the two states’ intentions and plans.
4. The relationship between the regional order and the international political landscape:
This factor implies two levels. The first represents the relationship between the regional order and the world’s major powers. The second represents the relationship between the state seeking a regional leading role with the power that has the strongest presence and influence on regional states.
At the first level, the Arab region and the Middle East are characterized by intense relations with the international regime that revolve around oil, Israel and vital shipping passageways and supply lines. Although the United States is following a policy to divert to Asia while gradually withdrawing from the Middle East, where it carried out military intervention and continues to keep troops in some regional states to prevent a war in the region, it is not willing to give up its huge economic and financial interests in the Middle Eastern region. On the other hand, Russia and China are following an active pragmatic policy aimed at bolstering relations with regional states, regardless of the existing system of governance or foreign alliances. This means that any vacuum caused by US withdrawal would be filled up by other great powers that are ready to do so, giving little space is left for Iran and Turkey, except when their regional role is being played to serve the interests of one of the great powers.
At the second level, alliances with the world’s most influential state provides any regional states seeking a leading regional role with favorable ground for maneuvering. However, in this case, this is not available for Iran or Turkey. That is because Iran is involved in a lengthy conflict with Washington and the West over the nuclear deal and its missile programme. Turkey too is involved in a prolonged disagreement with Washington and the European Union over several regional and global issues. The result is that neither Tehran nor Ankara enjoy support from the world’s greatest power for their quest for a leading regional role.
The conclusion would be that the factors that enable any state to carry out a leading regional role are not available for Iran or Turkey, although this does not mean that either state can achieve dominance in a certain situation due to a lack of military power parity with other states or parties. It also does not mean that money and arms cannot be used by them to find local proxies to try and carry out their own agendas.
