The April 7, 2017 US missile strike on Syria's Shayrat airbase, launched in retaliation for an April 4, 2017 chemical attack on the town of Khan Sheikhun has obviously confused Iran's policy towards the recent political and battlefield developments in Syria. This is primarily because it coincided with escalating regional pressures on Iran over its persistent interference in various regional crises as well as the widening rift with the Trump administration over the Iranian nuclear program and other regional issues.
It is perhaps safe to say that Iran believes it is one of the parties directly targeted by the recent US escalation. This is mainly due to the fact that Tehran cannot dissociate this escalation from assertions by some US officials that the withdrawal of Iran and its militias from Syria has become one of the Trump administration's priorities in the coming period.
In other words, Iran now believes that the most significant message the Trump administration sought to send through the missile strike on Assad’s most important military installations, is that it is pursuing a new policy. This policy is a departure from the policy pursued by former President Barack Obama's administration, and that it can carry out its threats into actions that are similar to the recent military strike.
Overlapping Issues
Iran was quick to voice sharp criticism against the US military strike in Syria describing it as a move that serves the interests of terrorists. Moreover, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was also quick to call Bashar Assad to reaffirm that Iran continues its support for his regime. Most importantly is the strong warnings from Iran and Russia sent to the United States on April 9, 2017. A joint command center made up of the forces of Russian, Iran and allied militia supporting Bashar Assad said the U. strike on the Shayrat air base crossed "red lines" and it would now respond to any new aggression and increase their level of support to their ally, the regime.
Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that the US strike on Shayrat airbase was conducted at a critical time for Iran. It may possibly impose on Tehran limited choices in dealing with new developments caused by the new trajectories of the conflict, after the U.S. role had remained limited throughout Barack Obama's presidency opening the door for Russia to intervene and helping Iran establish its influence. This was particularly evidenced when the former US administration walked away from President Obama's red line and failed to follow through his 2012 threats to retaliate and use force against the Assad regime. That was when the Syrian regime, on August 21, 2013, launched rockets laden with sarin against the rebel-held Eastern and Western Ghouta suburbs near Damascus, killing some 1,400 civilians, including a large number of children.
Iran's disorientation was evidenced by three main indications. The first indicator shows that Iran is now associating the recent US escalation over Syria with the US measures against Iran, including the fresh sanctions imposed on Tehran over test-firing medium-range ballistic missiles. Most recently, on March 21, 2017, the United States sanctioned a group of eleven entities and individuals for transfers of sensitive items to Iran’s ballistic missile program, and for Iran's destabilizing activity that serves to escalate regional conflicts further and poses a significant threat to regional security, in Middle East crisis-hit states in particular.
This was reflected by statements made by Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani in which he claimed that there was a pre-planned conspiracy being carried out after it found a pretext in the region. This claim means Iran expects to undergo regional and international pressure in the coming period, where several powers have a keen interest in curtailing Iran's regional roles and putting pressure on it to force it into complete compliance with the nuclear deal struck on July 14, 2015.
Pushing Russia Out
The second indication is that Iran believes that one of the main goals of the recent US strike is to expand the American-Russian disagreement. More specifically, the goal is to alienate Russia by working towards bringing about a major change and tilting the balance of power on the ground in favor of the interests of the United States. The expected change would, according to this view, impose a new equation for the conflict where major understandings are between Washington and Moscow, and not between Moscow and regional powers such as Iran and Turkey. This would increase the possibility that Iran's role in the conflict in Syria will decline. This envisaged trajectory has already started when the level of understanding between Russia and Turkey began to rise after the battle for Syria's northern city of Aleppo was settled in mid-December 2016.
Hence, Iran expresses no satisfaction over forecasts that the recent US military strike might impose indirect consequences that can ultimately contribute towards efforts being made by several parties to reach a settlement to the Syrian crisis, where the Iranian interests are not guaranteed. Iran's support for Assad has already severely drained its military, financial and human resources in the recent period.
Backing Moderates
The third indication is that there are some inside Iran who have embraced a narrow perspective on the potential consequences that the US strike can impose on Tehran. According to such a view, this is linked with the Iranian domestic balance of power ahead of the presidential elections due on May 19.
In accordance with this view, the recent US military escalation in Syria can eventually serve the interests of Iran's moderates who in turn can seize the opportunity to boost the chances of their candidate, President Hassan Rouhani, in winning a second term in the upcoming elections.
The best statement of this view came from Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of the Iranian hardline newspaper Kayhan, in an interview with Fars News Agency, which is close to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on April 8, 2017. Shariatmadari said the US military strike against the Assad regime can add some weight to the claims by Iran's moderates that the signing of the nuclear agreement has led to the neutralization of the military option. He added that the United States could have resorted to option in its dispute with Iran over the Iranian nuclear program, which was not the case in its recent approach to the crisis in Syria. This can possibly help the moderates mobilize support of some Iranian political elite and counter pressures from their political opponents who are strongly criticizing the nuclear deal and the Iranian government's policy, towards relations with the United States in particular.
Conditional Shift
In conclusion, it can possibly be safe to say that Iran's efforts to shape clear positions on the recent US military escalation in Syria will basically hinge on two variables. The first variable revolves around further potential measures that the US can take against Syria's Assad regime and its allied militias in the coming period, amid threats from the US that a similar military strike can be launched. The second variable is concerning the options that are available to Russia, the main proponent of both Iran and the Assad regime, in its bid to counter the US escalation, where it can be said that Tehran's fears are not limited to the consequences of the recent US military strike, as they also include a potential shift in Russia's policy towards the conflict in Syria that can possibly be contrary to Iran's calculations.
