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A Likely Failure

What are the prospects of success for African Union’s effort to mediate in the Tigray War?

18 أكتوبر، 2022


Weeks into resumed fighting between the Ethiopian government and regional rebel militias, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), rivals have agreed to the African Union’s (AU) invitation to sit at the negotiation table, set to be held in Pretoria, South Africa. The first round of negotiations has been delayed, however, indicating tensions and the possibility of returning to armed conflict again.

 

AU’s Mediation

Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, invited the Ethiopian government and the TPLF to commence peace negotiations in South Africa on October 8. The context of this round could be outlined as follows:

 

1.    Ethiopia agreeing to negotiate:

Redwan Hussein, national security advisor to Ethiopian president, Abiy Ahmed, said his government accepted the AU’s invitation having maintained a preference to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. He added that his government welcomed any initiative to commence peace talks without prior conditions.

 

2.    TPLF cautiously agreeing:

By the end of September 2022, the TPLF said they were prepared to join AU-mediated peace talks. Yet, when the AU announced the initiative, TPLF spokesperson, Getachew Reda, did not make any comments until the Ethiopian government officially accepted the AU’s invitation. The TPLF then sought clarifications from the AU on the nature of the negotiations, agendas, security arrangements for their delegations, and whether third parties, regional or international, would be involved, either as participants or as observers.

 

3.    Excluding Eritrea and the Amhara people:

The AU’s invitation did not include Etriteria despite having previously admitting the need to include it in any future peace talks.

 

Also, the AU did not extend an invitation to the Amhara people who have been disputing land in Tigray. The Amhara Association of America has criticised the AU from not having extended an invitation to one of the most victimised ethnic groups in the ongoing war.

 

4.    American support of AU’s mediation efforts:

US special envoy for the Horn of Africa, Mike Hammer, began a tour from October 3 – 18, during which he is set to meet key officials from Kenya, South Africa, and Ethiopia, having endorsed the cease fire deal and peace talks brokered by the AU. Special Envoy Hammer has been vocal about the US support of the cease fire and organising direct negotiations between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF.

 

Ongoing Challenges

The AU’s efforts to kick off the first round of negotiations on October 8 has been postponed without any new dates set. The derailment of the peace talks is the result of a series of developments, summarised as follows:

 

1.    Logistical issues:

The TPLF said they were discussing with AU new dates for peace talks, citing logistical issues as the reason behind the postponement.

 

Similarly, former Kenyan president and one of the “troika of negotiators”, Uhuru Kenyatta, had said on October 7 he would skip the peace talks due to “conflict in his schedules”. He has asked the AU for new dates, though he did seek clarity on how the talks will be arranged in future and an immediate ceasefire by all warring parties, underlying the real reason for skipping the original date.

 

2.    Biased mediation:

Warring sides have accused one another of bias. The TPLF have blamed the AU of bias towards Ethiopia, and Addis Ababa has accused former President Uhuru of siding with the TPLF. These accusations have played a significant role in derailing the peace talks.

 

3.    Absence of international mediation:

The AU talks would be mediated by “a troika of negotiators” including the Horn of Africa envoy Olusegun Obasanjo, former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, and former Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. Sources have said there were talks to invite EU and UN representatives to join the negotiations as observers. Yet, without confirmation from international actors, the trust between warring parties and mutual accusations of bias has halted the talks.

 

4.    China-Russia support of Addis Ababa:

While the US continues to push warring parties to reach a peace agreement, China and Russia have been giving support to Addis Ababa, allowing the Ethiopian government to back out from negotiations and opt for settling the conflict by military means.

 

To that effect, China and Russia have used their influence to leave out the Tigray War from UN Security Council agenda. And although France, who holds the council presidency for this month, has endeavoured to prioritise the conflict within Council chamber, it only managed to broker unofficial dialogues on the war.

 

5.    Ongoing military mobilisation:

Although Ethiopia welcomed the AU’s initiative it continued to mobilise its military troops in the region. Reports have claimed Eretria and Ethiopia are preparing for an offensive deep in TPLF controlled areas, being heralded with airstrikes in Shire north of Tigray on October 6.

 

The Tigrai TV also reported airstrikes carried by Ethiopian armed forces which landed in a camp for displaced people in northerwestern Tigray, killing 57 civilians, just a week after a similar airstrike not far from the area that killed 10 civilians. Western reports have said Eritrean Meg-29 jet fighters have conducted more than 4 airstrikes in less than a week, marking the first of its kind attacks on the region since this year.

 

The TPLF also announced multiple attacks on Eritrean and Ethiopian troops, killing thousands of army infantry and destroying equipment. TPLF claims could not be verified by independent sources, however. On October 3, TPLF troops withdrew from parts Amhara regions, describing the move as a ‘tactical’ deployment of its forces to counter an Ethiopian-Eritrean joint ‘invasion’ from the north.

 

What’s next for Tigray?

Given the recent developments in the region, three possible scenarios may be summarised as follows:

 

1.    Negotiation failure:

The recent rounds of unofficial discussions between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government which took place in Seychelles and Djibouti did not bear much result, and both sides haven’t committed to agreed outcomes. Warring sides continue to escalate militarily, casting fear over the prospects of future peace talks considering the ensuing violence and unwillingness to make any concessions.

 

2.    Military escalation:

The prospects of more violent clashes are growing. Both TPLF senior general Tsadkan Gebretensae and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, along with Ethiopian President Abiy Ahmed, have been accused of fuelling the war.

 

Parallel to the ongoing war in Tigray, Ethiopia has been fighting the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Western reports have claimed President Abiy has adopted a strategy that aims at recruiting former OLA fighters in his war against the group. This way, Ethiopia could lift some of the pressure on its own army and shift its resources to fighting the TPLF.

 

3.    Ethiopia-Kenya coordination:

On his first tour of the region following election, Kenya President William Ruto met President Abiy on October 6, in a bid to strengthen bilateral relations. Later that week, Ethiopia’s Finance Minister Ahmed Shide said his country had given Safaricom the licence in one of Africa’s largest telecoms markets as the company formally switched on the first privately-operated network in the country. The deal, which allows the Kenyan telecoms operator to launch a mobile financial services platform in Ethiopia, ends a long-standing monopoly by state-run Ethio Telecom. The blossoming relations between the two neighbouring countries will have an increased pressure on the TPLF as their ties with Kenya diminishes under the new president.

 

It may be concluded that the latest developments in the Tigray region are contributing heavily to the failure of the AU’s peace talks initiative. The risk of a total war outbreak seem more probable as the Ethiopian government pursues its military operation against the TPLF while banking on support of its neighbouring countries, thus destabilising the entire region and threatening more civilian lives.