أخبار المركز
  • أحمد عليبة يكتب: (هاجس الموصل: لماذا يخشى العراق من التصعيد الحالي في سوريا؟)
  • محمود قاسم يكتب: (الاستدارة السريعة: ملامح المشهد القادم من التحولات السياسية الدرامية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • السيد صدقي عابدين يكتب: (الصدامات المقبلة: مستقبل العلاقة بين السلطتين التنفيذية والتشريعية في كوريا الجنوبية)
  • د. أمل عبدالله الهدابي تكتب: (اليوم الوطني الـ53 للإمارات.. الانطلاق للمستقبل بقوة الاتحاد)
  • معالي نبيل فهمي يكتب: (التحرك العربي ضد الفوضى في المنطقة.. ما العمل؟)

Radical Shifts

What is Next After Ali Abdallah Saleh’s Assassination?

06 ديسمبر، 2017


Just hours after the former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh declared his split from the alliance with the Houthis and taking control of the capital Sanaa, the Houthi militias assassinated him. Saleh’s death signals a significant turning point in Yemen’s civil strife, with a complete collapse of the Houthi alliance with supporters of the General People’s Congress party. Saleh's pro-tribes declared their intention to turn against the Houthis in parallel with the Yemeni and Arab coalition forces stepping up their military operations to restore Sanaa, which means a complete siege on the Houthis by the majority of Yemeni forces and movements.

Pressing Changes

Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh had lost a large proportion of his influence, before he was killed. He was stripped of his military power due to the dispersal of the Republican Guard Brigades, distributing them on war fronts under the command of Houthi leaders, rather than their central commanders. In addition, a large number of his aides were either prosecuted or suffered from harassment, but Saleh and his party did not step in to protect them, which clearly demonstrated his diminished capacity and influence.

Perhaps the most prominent example in this regard was the attack on his son Salah by the Houthis and murdering his personal escort, Colonel Khaled Al-Reday in August 2017. Moreover, the Houthis stormed the house of Brigadier Tareq Saleh, his nephew, in early December 2017, killing three of his bodyguards. In addition, the Houthis had openly threatened to kill Saleh more than once, using abusive words against him and his family.

Yet, Saleh was keen, at every television interview, to stress that he was not in disagreement with the Houthis, angering Yemenis who see this a failure and a weakness in their confrontation with the Houthis. It seems that Saleh had missed that the Houthi group did not forget the murder of its leader, Hussein Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi, who was killed in clashes with the army in 2004. Thus, the Houthi militias liquidated Saleh in the same way that their commander was killed.

Saleh’s statement in December 2017 expedited the Houthis’ decision to kill him. He called upon his followers, the army and security forces to not execute the orders of the Houthi militias and to resist them in every region as the latter have wreaked havoc on earth for three years. He further accused them of being responsible for the starvation, killing, displacement and siege of the people. Then, Saleh announced dismantling his alliance with the Houthis. However, it seems that Saleh was not aware of the vulnerability of himself and his followers and his exclusion from the political scene.

The Imbalances 

The killing of Saleh is likely to cause internal imbalances and the Houthis will assume the sole control over their territorial gains, relying on excessive force against all their opponents. It is expected thought that leaders of the General People’s Congress will rearrange their cards and try to make up for the losses caused by their alliance with the Houthis. It is noteworthy that most of the General People’s Congress leaders and popular bases were totally dissatisfied with the alliance, which led to the exclusion of a large number of their leaders and the control of Houthis over state institutions, which was deemed unconstitutional. However, this period is expected to stretch for some time, as Houthis will seek to weaken members of the Congress party.

Some members of the General People’s Congress party may try to rally against the Houthis, particularly that they are the largest community segment that has suffered from the harassment of the Houthis, in addition to their leaders' long experience in governance and administration of state institutions for at least 33 years. They have continued in these institutions under the legitimate authority of the president Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and were only excluded by the Houthis. Most importantly is the desire of some members of the Congress party to avenge the killing of Saleh, since they regard him as a leader and an inspiring commander.

The military leaders of Saleh’s Republican Guard troops faced unprecedented humiliation by the Houthis. On one hand, some of them were forced to move from their camps and stay home after stripping them of their financial and moral rights. On the other hand, some of them gave up loyalty and allegiance to military units and leaders and joined the ranks of the Houthis.

Possible Scenarios

There are three possible scenarios for post-Saleh era:

1- Houthis’ control: The Houthi militias may assume sole control through excessive use of coercive force, following their usual practice of executions, house demolitions and displacement of families. The Houthis may force citizens to go to war fronts by force, thereby prolonging the crisis.

2- Popular Resistance: Some members of the Congress party are likely to form regional resistance cells after they declare a unified command to counter the Houthis and avenge their leader. In doing this, they may enlist the help of the military and security commanders who suffered under Houthi control, being excluded from the political scene. In addition, they may forge alliance with some groups of people, who suffered due to the Houthi methods of imposing royalties under different religious names or under the pretext of supporting the war effort. Chiefly among those affected groups are civil servants and military and security personnel, who were deprived of their salaries for one full year, leading to discontent and resentment. An organized mobilization by well-trained security forces against the Houthis is likely to inflict heavy losses on the latter.

3- Retaliation: Leaders of the Congress party may opt to team up with the legitimate forces, declare their allegiance to them and stand ready to fight under their banner. This may prompt military and security leaders to follow suit, especially since Congress party’s leaders might like to avenge by any means after the Houthis’ execution of many elders of the party, some of whom belong to Touq Sanaa tribes. Furthermore, these tribes may cooperate with the legitimate forces, which will tip the balance to their advantage in Sanaa. If this scenario happens, it will herald the total elimination of the Houthis.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the killing of Ali Abdullah Saleh by the Houthis will radically change the balances in the battlefield to the disadvantage of the Houthi militias, which could result in their loss of control of Sanaa and their retreat to their strongholds in the north of Yemen. On the other hand, the Houthi militias will ramp up repression and physical liquidation of Congress party members and supporters of Saleh, as well as deportations, house demolitions and the targeting of civilians to cement their hegemony over Sanaa.