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Rojava State

Regional reflections on the Syrian Kurds' Federal state

28 مارس، 2016


On March 17, 2016, Syrian Kurds announced the establishment of a federal regime in the areas under their control in northern Syria (Rojava in Kurdish). This announcement raised several reactions. Both the Syrian regime and opposition reject such a step, as well as regional countries (Turkey at the lead), and international powers (the US in particular). This rejection is due to the expected consequences of such an announcement not only within Syria’s territories that could see the beginnings of dividing the country but also in surrounding states where a Kurdish population is present.

It is apparent that Syria’s Kurds are serious about this announcement, where some administrative measures have taken place to consolidate the announcement of the Federation of Northern Syria. Measures include forming a 31-member constituent assembly and electing two chairpersons, namely: Hedeya Youssef (Kurdish) and Mansour El-Salloumy (Arab). The Assembly’s mission is to lay the foundations for the Federal State in Northern Syria within six months and the demarcation of geographic borders which are expected to include Ein El-Arab (Kobani) in northern Aleppo; Afrin north-west of Aleppo; Jazira in Hasakah; Tell Abyad in Raqqa; and the areas controlled by Syrian Democratic Forces in Hasakah and Aleppo.

Hence, several questions are raised about the motives of the Kurdish declaration of a federal state in northern Syria, the circumstances leading up to this step, its connotations and the future impact on the Kurdish issue in the Middle East.

Kurdish motives to establish a federal state

The Kurdish announcement of the formation of the Federation of Northern Syria – Rojava is the result of several accumulations which paved the road for this step, including the following:

  1. Strong military support for the Kurds includes the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the armed wing of the Democratic Union Party, estimated to include 50,000 fighters; the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which include Kurdish and Arab militias; and the Asayish (Kurdish paramilitary police force). All the above play a vital role in establishing the autonomous administrations in Jazira in Hasakah, Kobani in northern Aleppo, Afrin in the north-west of Aleppo, and Tell Abyad in Raqqa, along with its significant role in facing ISIS in the north of Syria.
  2. Availability of Economic Resources due to Kurdish control over oil fields in Ramalan, gas facilities in Swedia, cotton ginneries in the Hasakah countryside, tax and customs’ revenues from Fishkhabour and Derbasiyah crossings, and the revenues of service institutions.
  3. Establishment of administrative bodies and organizations similar existing state institutions, especially in the major provinces (Kobani, Jazira, Afrin, and Tell Abyad). The most significant of which are Board of Education, the YPG (similar to Ministry of Defense), and Asayish forces (analogous to the Ministry of Interior).
  4. Establishing cultural bases and educational systems which support Kurdish identity in Northern Syria. The Board of Education under the Kurdish autonomous administration changed most curricula and imposed teaching the Kurdish language in schools under its control.
  5. Kurds apply the policies of demographic change, ethnic cleansing, and forced displacement of Arabs and Turkmen in Northern Syria. Changing demographics as a result of policies are confirmed by various international reports, including Amnesty International’s report ‘We Had Nowhere Else to Go': Forced Displacement and Demolition in Northern Syria.
  6. Exploiting US-Russian rivalry to support Kurds since both parties know that the Kurdish forces are the most qualified party which can succeed in on the ground battle if backed by air force cover. The international alliance, led by the USA, following the Russian intervention in Syria, focuses on helping the SDF regain areas controlled by ISIS, especially Tell Abyad in Raqqah and Hasakah. Russia has provided military support to Kurds particularly in the western Euphrates, along with political support through opening a Kurdish Representative Office in Russia.
  7. Utilizing the recent Russian call to establish a federal system in Syria. It is clear that Moscow’s encouragement of the Syrian Kurds to take this step is part of its punitive procedures against Turkey, following the mutual tensions after the Turkish Air Force shot down a Russian jet last November.
  8. Utilizing the Iraqi Kurdistan insistence on declaring independence from the central government. President Massoud Barazani has repeatedly announced his intent to organize an independence referendum. Besides, the exploitation of Turkish Kurds violent attacks against the Turkish government, which is currently occupied with this issue.

Indications of the announcement of the Federacy

Announcing the federal state by the Syrian Kurds carries connotations, the most important of which are as follows:

  1. Kurdish forces, which met in Ramalan, are keen on discussing the details of forming a Kurdish region. These discussions reflect a confidence in establishing a Kurdish region in Syria, paving the road to imposing a federal system on other parties, and making it the framework for the future of the Syrian state. The Kurds are also ensuring Arab representation in chairing the constituent assembly, in an attempt to ensure the support of the Arab minority in Northern Syria, which consolidates the Kurdish position.
  2. Through this step, the Syrian Kurds placed themselves as a principal party in any future Syrian equation. This conveys a message to other parties in the conflict, and, regional and international forces, whereby excluding Syrian Kurds from participating in the path to a political solution path and associated conferences, in particular, the Geneva negotiations.
  3. Kurdish announcement of the Federal State could be the beginning of similar steps to be taken by other groups and sects in Syria. This could establish a general trend towards federalism. Alawi’s are the most prepared sect to follow this path to protect their presence if the political solution path between Bashar al-Assad and the opposition fails.
  4. Kurds depend on a strong economic, military, cultural, and social base in Northern Syria, which enhance their success opportunities in establishing the federal regime.

Reflections on the Kurdish agenda in the region

Undoubtedly, the Syrian Kurds’ announcement will directly reflect on other Kurds in the region. It will provide increasing momentum to the Kurdish agenda in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran and will threaten each of the states' sovereignty.

Turkey is the most affected state following the announcement of the federacy since Syrian Kurds are geographically adjacent to the Turkish borders. This will increase tensions and violence between the Turkish Government and Kurds, which will consequently lead to internal instability. Ankara is expected to intensify its efforts in the next period to thwart Kurdish endeavors to establish a real federal regime, which Turkey sees as a red line. This stance could be developed to include military interference in Syria to hinder this step.

President of Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barazani, is expected to take advantage of these developments. This is clarified through repeated announcement of his intent to organize an independence referendum, that declare the Kurdistan region independent from the Central Government of Baghdad. However, his fundamental objective is to disperse attention from internal issues, the most important of which is Presidency of the region, and fragmenting the efforts of those who oppose him remaining in his position.

In the same context, Syrian Kurds’ step inspires their Iranian peers. During Nayrouz Feast, on March 23, 2016, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (which has broad relations with other armed Kurdish Iranian parties, such as the PJAK) announced from its headquarters in the Kandeel mountains that it will resume armed activities against the Iranian government, after a 23-year hiatus. Separatist movements of Syrian Kurds will give momentum not only to Kurds within the region but also to other sects in the Middle East, to discuss separation trends and propagate it regionally and internationally.

Finally, Syrian Kurds are the primary beneficiary from the Russian military intervention in Syria. Their movement is serious, since they have strong economic, military, and cultural infrastructure in Northern Syria. This may lead to their success in imposing the Federal regime as a new form of the State, without waiting for the results of the political negotiations between the Assad regime and the Opposition, which are meant to lay the foundations for the new form of the state.