Turkey and Iran, in recent months, have increased their strikes on areas occupied by Kurds in Iraq. The Turkish Air Force, on November 20, announced intense airstrikes, dubbed Operation Claw-Sword, targeting Syrian Democratic Forces and Syrian Army positions in Northern Syria and against Kurdistan Workers’ Party positions in Northern Iraq. Iran, at the same time, intensified its missile and drone strikes on locations that belong to Kurdish opposition parties, which Tehran claims to have been supporting the latest demonstrations across the country since September this year. The timing of these strikes raises questions about the intention of both regimes and the timing of their targeting of Kurdish rebels in Iraq.
Mutual Coordination
Turkey and Iran share a history of coordinating military activity in Iraq and Syria, where they have mutual interests and security concerns. This prevents unintended confrontation, which may spiral into a full-on military encounter with devastating consequences for both sides. In Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey and Iran have had a presence for many years: each has shaped strategic geopolitical interests and considers Kurdish fighters a threat. Therefore, military coordination could be observed in two key areas:
1. Exchange of roles
The latest operation reveals a subtle yet significant shift in the roles being played by Turkey and Iran in northern Iraq. In the past, Turkey has invaded Iraqi territory and carried out military operations in Kurdistan, where it has deployed troops to fight the Kurdish insurgency. Yet, in this instance, Operation Claw-Sword was limited to airstrikes.
Moreover, Iran concurrently launched a ground operation using special forces in the Kurdish territories. The official reason the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces gave for the operation was to ‘prevent terrorist infiltration’ to Iranian territory. According to reports by American media, Ismail Qani, Commander of IRGC’s Quds Forces, has threatened during a visit to Baghdad on November 18 to launch a sweeping operation in northern Iraq to disarm Kurdish fighter groups if the Iraqi military doesn’t secure the border region.
2. Past alignment
Turkey and Iran have a history of military coordination in northern Iraq. For instance, the June 2020 Operation Claw-Eagle saw Turkish and Iranian forces shell in tandem Iraqi-Kurdish areas that belonged to Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Kurdistan Free Life Party (PKAK). In June 2007, both Turkey and Iran launched a large-scale bombing raid on Kurdish rebels in the same region. The offensive targeted PKK Kurdish rebels and was a major showdown of Turkey-Iran cooperation in cross-border raids and artillery fire.
Yet, Turkey and Iran cooperation hasn’t existed without divergence in interests and aims at certain occasions. As each regime pursues its own geopolitical strategy in Iraq, they often have had bouts of confrontation on the ground. For instance, on more than one occasion, Iran-backed militias have targeted Turkish military bases in the Kurdish region.
Common Goals
Kurdish rebels have been blamed for the recent bombing attack in Istanbul in November and the waves of protests engulfing Iran over the past few months. In placing blame on Kurdish opposition groups, both Turkey and Iran have found a common enemy to target in the wake of internal instability and unrest. Seen as such, targeting Kurdish rebel groups in Iraq serves strategic goals for both Ankara and Tehran, which may be summarised as follows:
1. Preventing the establishment of a Kurdish state
Turkey and Iran's strategic aim is based on the securitisation of the Kurdish demographic component of their respective populations. Both Ankara and Tehran are aware of the Kurdish people's ideological and national ties across the region, especially in Syria and Iraq. Recognising the common perceived threat in the possibility of a Kurdish state and the destabilising effect it may have on their demographic security, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring, both Turkey and Tehran have aligned their strategy to prevent a Kurdish state from turning into a reality.
Turkey and Iran were compelled to put aside their differences in favour of a common strategic goal following the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum that took place in Iraq. In October of that year, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ali Khamenei, received Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who, in a statement, said that their countries had to work together to prevent the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. President Hassan Rouhani also announced a trilateral mechanism involving Iran, Iraq, and Turkey to limit the possibility of Kurdish autonomy. Thus, the ongoing Iran-Turkey coordination seems to have emerged from a shared vision concerning the Kurdish question.
2. Increasing the pressure on the PKK:
Turkey and Iran have targeted the Kurdish rebel group for its fundamental role in the growing Kurdish separatist identity, especially across the region and in Iraq. The PKK is considered a regional threat to both regimes and thus has opted for an intensified military operation in northern Iraq and Syria.
And while Iran may have been reluctant to join the Turkish military offensive in the past, the Iranian leaders have shifted their stance in recent years. Tehran has become more aligned with Turkey in its aggressive strategy towards Kurdish rebel groups, such as the PKK, the PKAK and their supporter group, including the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan in Iran, or the People’s Defense Units in Iraq. Both Turkey and Iran have pressured the federal Iraqi government to dismantle some of these groups and their activities in the region.
3. Domestic goals:
The recent escalation is indicative of the domestic challenges facing both regimes. In Iran, popular demonstrations continue to challenge the cleric regime, which has been unsuccessful in containing it. Tehran accuses Kurdish opposition parties in Iraq of stirring instability and arming protesters across the Kurdish majority regions. Thus, it seeks to pressure the Kurdish and Iraqi governments to expel Kurdish insurgents by heavily shelling their sites in northern Iraq. Therefore, escalation has become a necessary strategy for Turkey and Iran.
The Kurdish file continues to be a source of deep concern to President Erdogan. With presidential elections looming next year, he aims to bring about relative stability in the face of what he considers a ‘Kurdish threat’ to Turkey’s security.
In summary, what’s been described by the Turkish and Iranian regimes as a ‘Kurdish threat’ has produced a common strategic interest for both countries to forge a military alignment. By escalating against the Kurdish presence in Iraq, they seek to undermine the Kurdish insurgency in the region and weaken their allied groups in Iraq. Escalation also forms a vital pressure card on Kurdish and Iraqi governments to expel rebel groups and restrict their activity, and ultimately securing border regions in the north. The Iraqi government eventually responded to the Iranian demands, as it deploys more troops in the north of Iraq.
