أخبار المركز
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Ousting Ennahda

Will Kais Saied's decisions help solve the crisis in Tunisia?

28 يوليو، 2021


On the Tunisia’s 64th Republic Day -Sunday, July 25, 2021- the so-called 25 July Movement called for massive protests all over the country. Consequently, many responded and started protesting in Bardo Square, near the parliament, in the capital Tunis. The protests soon spread across other governorates, such as Sousse, the coastal governorate, Sfax (in the south), and El-Kef (in the northwest).

 In response, President Kais Saied announced, on July 26, 2021, the dismissal of Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and his cabinet, which consisted of 25 ministries. Saied decided to take charge of executive power until he chooses another politician to form a new government. He further suspended the current parliament and lifted the parliamentary immunity of all its members. Besides, he decided to rule by issuing decrees instead of the laws, which the parliament was supposed to pass.

These decisions were announced after the emergency meeting that was chaired by president Saied, and attended by military leaders and security officials on the day the protests and rallies broke out.  The protesters demanded reforming the economy, combatting corruption and terrorism, dismissing the Mechichi cabinet, and dissolving the parliament.

Reasons behind the protests

The protests taking place in Tunisia nowadays can be interpreted through a number of reasons, such as:

1.    Escalation of power struggles: since last January, Tunisia has faced a serious political and constitutional crisis after president Kais Saied rejected a cabinet reshuffle proposed by Prime Minister Mechichi. Saied insisted that several members of the proposed cabined are facing accusations of financial and administrative corruption, and accordingly must not be part of the new cabinet.   

The Prime Minister insisted on the reshuffle, supported by Ennahda Movement and two political parties- namely, Heart of Tunisia and Dignity Coalition (Al-Karama). This has escalated the power struggle and tensions between the head of the state, the government, and the parliament. The crisis was intensified   by the internal dynamics in the parliament between the various blocs, due to the failure of Parliament's Speaker Rachid al- Ghannoushi's to run the legislature effectively.

As all national initiatives proposed in the past few months to resolve the political crisis did not bear fruit, the crisis has become more complicated, negatively affecting political stability in Tunisia. As a result, citizens took to the streets demanding putting an end to this crisis.  

2.    Deterioration of government performance:  another reason causing the protests is lack of efficiency on the part of Mechichi and his cabinet. The cabinet was unable to resolve any of the exasperating economic and health crisis in the country, evident in the following:

a)    Exacerbation of the economic crisis: Tunisia has faced an economic crisis on account of the lack of effective policies and solutions necessary for improving the economic situation and living conditions. Unemployment and poverty rates have escalated, while state revenue from many important economic sectors has declined. This particularly applies for the tourism sector which witnessed in July 2021 an 80 per cent decline in revenues, compared to July 2020. This economic deterioration is an implication of the power struggle between the various governmental institutions, coupled with the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has had a profound impact on the lives of Tunisians.

The crisis was particularly manifest in decisions by international economic institutions to downgrade Tunisia's credit rating, and issuing warnings against imminent bankruptcy due to Tunisia's inability to repay its debts, and the government's failure to carry out an economic reform program under the supervision of IMF, which, consequently, has lately refused to give Tunisia a four billion dollars loan.

b)   Health crisis:  the government's inefficiency was also evident in dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. Infection rates have increased dramatically lately reaching 569 thousand cases.

Despite the fact that the vaccine rollout began in March 2021 but has been undermined by the ineffectiveness of the vaccine centers and also the vast majority of Tunisians remain unvaccinated, with only 13% of the population having received one dose and less than 6% fully vaccinated with two doses as of 13 July.  

The situation was worsened by the deplorable condition of the health sector and health services in Tunisia, and shortage in medical oxygen. Therefore, Mechichi's government has faced severe criticism, which culminated in the protests against it.

c)    The increasing influence of Ennahda Movement: Tunisians also protested against plans by leaders of Ennahda, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, to control all state institutions. Among these plans is Ennahda’s calls for dismissing the technocratic government led by Mechichi in favour of a new cabinet representing their party and its parliamentary allies (i.e. Heart of Tunisia and Dignity Coalition).  Meanwhile, Ennahda Movement refused to mitigate the conflict with the President, which made the political crisis in the country even more convoluted. Protestors broke into some of the headquarters of Ennahda Movement, and even burned down some of them, demanding to hold the movement's leaders accountable for the deteriorating political and economic situation in Tunisia over the past year.

Potential scenarios

Given the current circumstances, one can suggest a number of possible scenarios pertaining the future political scene in Tunisia, as per the following:

1.    Kais Saied success in bringing about stability: the President will probably be able to restructure the political system, and Ennahda Movement may adapt to the changes to maintain their presence in the Tunisian political landscape.

In this scenario, one of the solutions that Saied may resort to is designating a non-affiliated and neutral politician to take the position of prime minister and form a new government, hopefully more capable of handling the deteriorating situation in Tunisia.

Another possible solution is to call for early legislative elections that are likely to bring into power other political forces than the current ones. The elections may be preceded by approving a new constitution to change the political system in accordance with president Saied's (and liberal and secular parties) views. However, it is unlikely that Ennahda Movement will agree to adapt to this scenario.

2.    Tunisia may descend into chaos: Ennahda leaders may retaliate for storming their headquarters in Touzer, Sidi Bouzid and Kairouan. Some of them already threatened president Saied and accused him of orchestrating the protests with his supporters.

Rachid Ghannouchi, head of the movement, also accused Saied of plotting a coup against the revolution. He said that Ennahda’s proponents will defend the revolution by protesting against the president's decisions.

As changing the parliamentary system into a presidential system will prevent Ennahda leaders from remaining in power, they may desperately seek to make rearrangements to be part of the new political scene. This means that instability, especially in the short run, is likely to prevail.  

In conclusion, judging from the current situation, it is likely that president Saied will be able to carry out the political reforms necessary for putting an end to the state of political stagnation and economic deterioration, which Tunisia has lately been facing.

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