The establishment of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), or the ‘Organization for the Liberation of the Levant’, on January 28, 2017, constituted a significant transformation in the position of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Nusra Front). JFS succeeded in forming a merger of a number of small-armed factions into HTS, due to political and military developments. Such developments include the Astana conference, which took place on January 23 and 24 of this year between the Assad regime and various factions of the Syrian opposition. Other developments include the escalating and widening conflict between JFS and other armed factions, such as the Islamic State-affiliated Jund al-Aqsa. In addition, there is an increasing armed confrontation between HTS and the militant group Ahrar al-Sham. The conflict became evident when HTS sought to take over positions, previously controlled by Ahrar al-Sham in Darat Izza, only five days after Ahrar al-Sham had established itself in these locations. However, HTS eventually withdrew from these positions after intermediaries between the two parties intervened.
A New Coalition
In addition to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, the coalition, which makes up Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, includes the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, which is active in Aleppo, Liwa al-Haqq in Aleppo, Idlib and Hama, the Ansar al-Din Front, and Jaysh al-Sunna in Homs. It is worth noting that HTS appointed Hashem al-Sheikh, a former prominent leader of Ahrar al-Sham, also known as Abu Jaber, as its commander. This indicates that HTS is seeking to recruit commanders and prominent members from other rival militant groups, in order to alter the balance of power in its favor in the coming phase.
Al-Qaeda Dominance
Despite the fact that Hay’tat Tahrir al-Sham is made up of numerous entities, al-Qaeda in Syria remains the predominant active component of the alliance. Al-Qaeda in Syria is represented by JFS, despite the latter group’s insistence that they broke off formal ties in July 2016. Al-Qaeda’s dominance is due to its organization and militarily strength. Furthermore, its ideology is perceived as being the most appealing among the main armed groups. There are a myriad of individuals in leadership positions, both organizational and legal, within the structure of HTS who have adopted al-Qaeda’s ideology. These leaders collectively formulate the organizational and legal vision of HTS.
There are numerous reports indicating that, despite the appointment of Hashem al-Sheikh, the former leader of Ahrar al-Sham, as the commander of the new alliance, the lion’s share of power resides in the hands of JFS’ leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani. These reports expect al-Julani to take military command of HTS, which will give him the capacity to influence the course HTS will take and its positions regarding developments on the ground and in the political sphere. At the forefront of these developments are the negotiations between Assad regime and the opposition, and the commencement of further military confrontations between HTS and other armed factions that oppose it.
A List of Goals
Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, by forming Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, seeks to attain numerous goals, which can be outlined as follows:
1. Enhancing its capabilities: This is of particular significance for JFS, after it previously failed to convince the stakeholders in the Syrian crisis that its split from al-Qaeda was genuine. JFS needed to form HTS in order to establish a broader military coalition, which JFS can utilize to demonstrate its capacities to sabotage any attempts to reshape the political and security arrangements in the coming phase.
It can be said that JFS is preemptively preparing for any possible trajectories the Syrian crisis may take. JFS is aiming to lift the pressure imposed on it in case the negotiating parties may prioritize military operations against both JFS and ISIS.
2. Changing the balance of power: JFS is striving to change the balance of power between the different militant and terrorist organizations in Syria, in a manner conducive to its own interests. This is significantly true after JFS entered into armed confrontations with some rival militant organizations. These organizations had previously refused to concede to JFS’ demands of not to participate in the Astana negotiations.
In this context, JFS believes the Ahrar al-Sham movement is of particular significance. Ahrar al-Sham is considered, after ISIS, to be JFS’ main rival in terms of leading various terrorist and militant factions. This is especially true given the extreme weakness exhibited by other groups, such as the Free Syrian Army. After the conclusion of the Astana negotiations, Ahrar al-Sham succeeded in preventing the escalation of attacks by JFS against some smaller factions. Such factions include the Army of Mujahideen, and the Levant Front, and both groups have had their weapon stockpiles seized. Another such group is the Suqour al-Sham, or Falcons of the Levant Brigade, which has come under repeated attacks by JFS.
In this regard, analysis indicates that JFS is attempting to splinter Ahrar al-Sham through forming a new entity. Its aim is to gradually weaken the latter, and entice more of its leadership and cadres to join the new coalition. JFS has partially succeeded in these attempts, as many leaders have defected recently from Ahrar al-Sham. Abu Saleh Tahan, one of Ahrar al-Sham’s most prominent military leaders, recently left the group. Another noteworthy defector was Abu Yusuf al-Muhajir, the military spokesperson for the group.
3. Expanding JFS’ power in northern Syria: Many analysts believe that JFS’ success in weakening Ahrar al-Sham will be beneficial for the new HTS alliance to take over vital areas in northern Syria, with the exception of the zone controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition that have been carrying out Operation Euphrates Shield since August 24, 2016. This is especially pertinent given the weakness of some armed factions, such as the Free Syrian Army.
4. Exploiting the retreat of the Islamic State: JFS appears to be trying to take advantage of the ISIS’ retreat, given the escalation of military operations against ISIS in both Syria and Iraq. This advantage will allow JFS to establish supremacy inside Syria and might enable it to convince some ISIS members to defect and pledge their allegiance to JFS, especially if al-Raqqah, the ISIS’ main stronghold, falls. Should that scenario occur, it will have direct repercussions on the unity and cohesion of ISIS.
Hard Choices
JFS has carried out a series of actions in response to the pressures imposed upon it by developments in the battlefield and in politics. Such actions include its split from al-Qaeda in July 2016, and its own dissolution in January 2017 in order form the coalition of the HTS. These actions indicate that JFS is facing difficult choices in the upcoming phase of the conflict, although it has succeeded in allying with smaller groups, the group has failed to convince larger militant groups to join their cause. This failure in turn indicates that there is a broad conflict between JFS and these factions, and increases the likelihood of escalating armed clashes between the different parties in the upcoming phase of the Syrian crisis.
