A policy of “depopulating cities” or districts within cities is on the rise in several regional countries for a variety of reasons. These include targeting areas under the control of the armed opposition, pursuit of terrorist groups, limiting the control of sectarian militias, removing residents who are not supporters, increasing the psychological impact of domestic conflicts, raising hatred between civilians and armed factions, deepening domestic tensions among armed factions, some regional powers taking advantage of demographic shifts, neutralizing regional powers involved in domestic conflicts, growing armed conflicts economics, increasing hatred by terrorist groups towards minorities, opening foreign military bases and erasing bad historic memories.
This occurs in different forms, including against civilians, combatants, minorities, groups and weapons. There are also various means utilized by official and unofficial players. For example, the Syrian regime’s forces rely on heavy air strikes to destroy infrastructure, water and electricity supplies, politicizing humanitarian aid by blocking their delivery, and obstructing the movement of medical caravans. They also target hospitals, schools, markets and bakeries, which leads to the displacement of civilians and expulsion of combatants, whether through armed force or local agreements. This is especially since domestic conflicts have not resulted in definitive victories or political settlements despite losses in human life, material cost, and psychological impact. Meanwhile, the armed opposition and terrorist groups respond with comparable military methods.
Vacating combatants and civilians from cities could have opposite results of regional dimensions that serve the interests of terrorist groups and militias. The International Institute for Strategic Studies warned in its annual report Strategic Survey 2016: The Annual Review of World Affairs that the policy of vacating cities in Syria could serve the interests of the Assad regime, with the armed opposition losing cities and shifting to urban warfare, especially in rural areas. This would serve terrorist groups, especially ISIS, taking into considering the group’s losses since the first half of 2015 until the last third of 2016. There are several factors explaining why regimes, or even terrorist or political groups, resort to “depopulating cities” in the Middle East, as follows:
Truncated regions:
1. Removing populations that are not supporters. This is apparent in the new societal engineering of the Assad regime in Syria – supported by Shiite militias and Russian air cover in most instances. It adopted a strategy of dividing Syria into provinces and depopulating strategic regions such as Al-Qoseir, Homs, Aleppo, Darya, Madaya, Al-Maadamiya through “slow truncation” to fragment fronts and accumulative control – beginning with a small village, then moving onto the next village, then taking full or partial control of the road then eventually taking complete control, etc. Also, continuing the plan to remove opposition combatants in the areas of Al-Hama and Qadsiya in north Damascus through local agreements.
Assad’s regime and its regional and international allies aim to achieve military and propaganda gains from these policies, known as “publicity through action” especially by focusing on the capital Damascus and its parameter, and Homs and some areas in Hamah close to the coastal strip, by preventing displaced residents from returning to their homes. This happened to the residents of Zabadani who were replaced by residents from the Shiite towns of Kafriya and Al-Fouaa in rural Idlib. The New York Times reported on 26 September, 2016, that “depopulating Aleppo from its residents is the goal of Bashar and his Russian allies.”
2. Growing psychological impact of domestic Arab conflicts. The decision of forcefully displacing residents in certain areas and towns in Syria is based on psychological considerations, especially since some cities that were depopulated were characterized by strong resistance against Assad’s regime, such as Darya. This cost the regime heavy losses for more than four years, which triggered feelings of revenge against the population and combatants. The same is true of attacks by Assad’s forces against Aleppo residents using explosive barrels, which reflects the psychological impact of resistance by the population of Syria’s economic capital.
ISIS intentionally depopulated areas where there was notable local resistance against the group in Iraq, and replaced natives with foreign immigrants, as in the case of Al-Bonmar and Al-Shaetat tribes in Al-Anbar province in Iraq. The group justified the move by saying that the two tribes were selling oil for personal gain, and accused members of both tribes of apostasy. This created popular support for the move and helped IS recruit more terrorists.
Manufacturing hate:
3. Fanning hatred between civilians and armed factions. Especially in extended domestic armed conflicts, such as Syria, by showcasing armed factions as the party responsible for the suffering of besieged civilians. Especially by targeting first responders and destroying humanitarian aid caravans attempting to help people stay alive. For example, UN efforts failed to deliver aid after the Russian-US-sponsored truce in September, 2016. This created animosity towards armed factions, Assad’s forces and terrorist groups.
Tension between civilians and armed groups is also rooted in the fact that many armed factions considered to be opposition refused to intervene to help afflicted cities, such as Darya. These factions chose to hold on to what ammunition they have, especially since they were concerned that supplies across the border will halt. Accordingly, pressure by Assad’s forces on Darya combatants and residents mounted, forcing them to agree to leave their home city on 25 August, 2016. Combatants headed to Idlib while civilians went in several directions, including to neighboring Al-Moademieh.
4. Deepening domestic tensions among armed factions. As seen in tensions between armed opposition forces and the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG), especially after regime forces coordinated with the YPG ahead of the attack on districts in eastern Aleppo. The Kurds control Al-Sheikh Maqsood district in northern Aleppo, wedged between areas under government control and others controlled by the opposition. Assad’s forces had previously cooperated with YPG troops in taking control of Al-Castello region and blocked supplies to Aleppo several times.
Doctrinal change:
5. Regional powers benefit from demographic shifts. Assad’s regime is protecting the areas it wants to annex into its state, with a new population of a certain sect from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan to become an incubator. The families of Shiite families were brought from Lebanon via border villages into Sunni areas in Al-Qoseir.
Seminaries are also playing a role in demographic change by buying real estate from Sunnis at high prices and replacing them with Shiite families. This explains the rise in Shiite conversions in Aleppo rural areas, especially after Assad’s militias and Iran-backed militias took control there. It converted many mosques into Hussainiyas (Shiite congregation halls) which aims to change the character of Arab cities culturally, socially and demographically. Thus, Arab territories are truncated in favor of Iranian residents and other Shiite militia elements. Secretary-General of the Arab League, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, declared that, “The latest Darya agreement contradicts international law, and could pave the way for similar settlements that change the demography of Syrian cities”.
6. Neutralizing regional forces involved in domestic conflicts. Trapping residents in hotbeds of chronic conflict – such as Syria – for years could force them to flee the country, especially to primary destination countries such as Turkey or others that oppose Assad’s regime staying in power. The impact of the influx of refugees weakens resolve to oppose Assad staying in power, because of the unintentional repercussions of growing numbers of Syrian refugees.
That could also cause regional powers to have a serious discussion with international powers interested in the Syrian crisis, such as Russia, to reach understandings on several other regional issues, either political or economic, especially since Russian military intervention in Syrian was a decisive factor in supporting Assad forces and assisting them to implement the strategy of “depopulating cities”.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Russian military intervention in Syria over one year caused the death of 9,364, including 3,800 civilians of which 906 are children. It also killed 2,746 IS members and 2,814 in the opposition, including Fath’ Al-Sham Front (formerly known as Al-Nusra Front before severing ties with Al-Qaeda), and 60 medical centers were destroyed.
7. Escalating war between regular armies and armed groups. As seen in routine confrontations between the Turkish army and PKK forces, where border villages in Kurdistan are depopulated because of intensive Turkish bombing under the pretext of PKK bases there. As a result, civilians in some villages fled, such as from Nero and Rikan in Amedi, in the province of Duhok. This explains Turkish interest in the Euphrates Shield operation that started on 24 August, 2016, to curb the influence of Kurdish fights in border areas – not to fight IS, as Ankara claims.
Privatizing depopulation:
8. Growing domestic armed conflict economics. Armed domestic conflicts in some Arab countries, especially after the outbreak of revolutionary protests in 2011, created “domestic conflict economies”. Interest groups on both sides of the conflict fan the flames to sustain it because it is a source of vast profits for them, and feel threatened if these armed conflicts end, or even de-escalate. Some literature states businessmen close to Assad’s regime want to start profitable economic projects by taking advantage of the destruction of many areas surrounding the capital, as seen in Darya, and take advantage of potential differences in prices if the domestic power balance tips in favor of Assad’s regime.
9. Hostility by terrorist groups towards minorities. This occurred in the province of Mosul after the intentional displacement of Christian residents in northern Iraq as a result of IS threats in mid-2014. The group gave Christians three choices: leave the city, or pay jizya (tax for non-Muslims) for protection, or convert to Islam.
Strategic locations:
10. Establishing foreign military bases. Assad’s regime depopulated the athletic compound in Latakia province and transported families to rural Haffah in order to convert the compound into a Russian military base, according to many Western analysts, especially since the compound is in a key strategic location overlooking the sea and surrounded by Al-Murooj, Damsrakhu, and Ras Shamra which are of Alawite majority. It is also located across from a regime radar station and missiles launch pad.
11. Avoiding military risks in residential areas. This is true of the Iraqi situation after Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abbadi decided on 4 September, 2016, to remove weapons depots from residential areas in the capital and city centers, since they require specific storage conditions that are not available inside cities. The decision came after the explosion of a weapons depot in a residential area in eastern Baghdad, killing six and injuring 11. The depot belonged to Popular Mobilization militias, according to one report.
12. Erasing bad historic memories. This is the case in Turkey after the failed coup attempt in mid-July, 2016. The Turkish government completed relocating military units from city centers including Istanbul and Ankara on 16 September, 2016. This is based on a decree by Prime Minister Binali Yildirim after coup leaders used Akinci air base in the capital as their headquarters. “We do not want to see a single tank or jet fighter or helicopter in Ankara,” Yildrimi said later. “We will take every precaution. All military units will be removed from cities.”
New fronts:
The dynamics of the Middle East, especially resulting from armed hotspots, intertwined conflicts, collapsed states, infiltrated borders and proxy wars, have given rise to a policy of “depopulating cities” whether within a country itself or alongside joint borders. This is achieved by using humanitarian aid as a weapon to punish combatants, besieging cities, installing military check points, or planting anti-personnel landmines. But this will not resolve the regional armed conflict or eliminate threats from terrorist groups. Instead, it will create a new front that will play a role in escalating the impact of regional instability.
