It seems that the continuing involvement of the Syrian regime -whether in the military confrontations with the armed opposition forces and terrorist organizations or the ongoing negotiations of the 5th round of Syria peace talks in Astana, sponsored by Russia, Iran and Turkey- did not diminish its interest in monitoring the developments of the Qatari crisis. 

Undoubtedly, this attention can be primarily attributed to the fact that the relations between Doha and some terrorist organizations, now expanding their role in Syria, was a major point of contention between the two parties, in a way that may affect, in any case, Qatar’s potential positions on the crisis during the next phase. This will also affect the positions of the Syrian regime and hostile forces in the balance of power in Syria. Thus, the continuation of the crisis makes Assad's regime a winner or rather a free rider.

The Syrian regime view the outbreak of this crisis as something that could have multiple repercussions that impact the potential paths of the Syrian conflict  in the near future, most notably are: 

Confirm the Charge

1-Lend special relevance to the accusations against Qatar of supporting terrorism: the Syrian regime views that the Quartet’s charges against Doha of supporting some terrorist organizations lend more importance and momentum to its stance on the role played by Qatar on the Syrian arena. Over the past six years, since the eruption of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, Syrian officials have consistently accused Qatar of supporting terrorism in Syria.

In this context, the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, on June 4, 2017, one day before the outbreak of the crisis between Qatar and the Quartet countries, stated that "We are not the ones who brought the terrorists, we are not supporting terrorists, nor support this ideology, Qatar began this conflict".

Some estimates indicate that the Syrian regime and its allies have -sometimes- turned blind eyes to the entrance of some terrorist elements to Syria in order to "dilute" the crisis, to turn it from a crisis of the regime to a war on terror.  As a result, Damascus used this to put pressures on international powers, particularly the European countries, to reopen communications channels with the regime. Similarly, Damascus has now moved to exploit this issue to support the accusations against Qatar.

In a more specific and revealing expression of this stance, the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad, told the Syrian newspaper “al-Watan”, on June 12, 2017, in response to a question about the impact of the crisis on the situation on the ground in Syria: "I think it is good, and I think that this farce we are witnessing in the Gulf region proves to everybody that Syria was always right".

Possibly, the Syrian regime reasons that this might encourage some international powers to re-initiate communication channels with it in the coming period, given their growing fears of new terrorist operations by those organizations, principally "ISIS", which probably plans to escalate its attacks, in response to the approaching defeat in Raqqa, after Mosul.

Degrading Muslim Brotherhood

2- Weaken the Muslim Brotherhood: the Syrian regime believes that this crisis could help weaken the Muslim Brotherhood even more during the next period, given its ties with Doha and endeavor to implement its agenda. That is why the Syrian regime was deliberately accusing Qatari leaders of having "Brotherhood leanings", where President Bashar Al-Assad, on May 11, 2017, said "ISIS and al- Nusra Front and Erdogan-and he belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood- have the same doctrine, of course with Qatar. All those have extremist doctrine".

This is inseparable from the fact that the crisis will impose, according to the Syrian regime, tough choices on “Hamas”, the Palestinian movement, and perhaps force it to re-calibrate its position toward the Syrian crisis. Amidst tense relations with some countries in the region, the current crisis may push the movement toward upgrading its relations with Iran during the next phase.

Diminished Interest

3-Diminished Qatari interest in regional issues: the mounting pressure from the Quartet countries forced Qatar to reduce its focus on other regional issues, and concentrate instead on defending its position in the face of the accusations leveled against it, at the political and security levels. It was remarkable that Qatari diplomacy has focused, since the outset of the crisis, on rallying regional and international support for Doha's position. This has coincided with Doha media's arsenal, like Al-Jazeera, dedicating a large chunk of their programs to promote the Qatari stance, and launch media campaigns against some states in the Quartet, in a manner that may diminish Qatar's interest in political and operational developments in Syria.

Tehran Alliance

4-Enhance the prospects of upgrading Qatari-Iranian relations: this might have positive implications on the Syrian regime, as it means that the two countries will upgrade their political and security coordination with regard to the developments in the Syrian conflict, similar to the understandings reached by the two parties and set the stage for the conclusion of the four towns agreement.

In this context, it cannot be excluded that Doha may change its position toward the conflict in Syria, specifically toward the President of the Syrian regime, on the hope that this could help cement its relations with Iran during the next phase. This would be expected if Iran continued to shore up the Qatari position and participate in efforts to rally international support as did the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohamed Jawad Zarif, when he visited Germany and Italy at the end of June 2017, where the crisis with Qatar was one of the most important topics discussed.

New Balances 

It was against this backdrop that the Syrian regime has taken many steps with the aim of sending direct messages to the relevant powers regarding the Syrian crisis. The first message is that the regime is gradually regaining control on the ground, such as reprinting new banknote, 2000 Lira, featuring the portrait of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. The second message is Al-Assad’s tour in some Syrian cities, such as Hama, where he performed Eid al-Fitr prayers on June 25, in the first announced visit to the city since the onset of the crisis.

All these steps imply that the Syrian regime is evidently satisfied with the current regional developments, including the Qatar crisis, especially as it coincides with the emergence of numerous reports indicating that the U.S. administration of President Donald Trump may put the fate of Al-Assad in the hands of Russia, with all its associated impacts on the balances of power in Syria during the next stage.