Initiatives proposed by the European Union to solve the dispute between the United States and Iran over the nuclear deal are unlikely to succeed. Reasons revolve around several factors. Most importantly, Iran is aware that feasibility of keeping the nuclear deal in place without the United States will be limited, due to the success of sanctions in preventing European firms from investing in Iran. Other reasons include the recent appointment of Mike Pompeo, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as Secretary of State, viewed by Iran as a prelude to US withdrawal from the deal. Additionally, there are views in Iran that any Iranian response to these initiatives will be perceived as a sign of weakness that may prompt Washington to escalate pressure to get more concessions from Tehran. A third reason is that the most recent EU initiative does not show a clear position on pending issues, and especially the ballistic missile program in particular. These factors altogether make it likely that Iran will convey more escalatory messages in the coming period.
Efforts to keep the nuclear deal, reached between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers on July 14, 2015, in place are facing several challenges. Such challenges may impose multiple potential and even conflicting trajectories for the deal, after the US Administration of Donald Trump set May 12, 2018 as a deadline for deciding whether to waive or re-impose sanctions on Iran.
Hence, all powers involved in the deal, and especially those having a keen interest in keeping it alive, are aware that the coming period before the ultimatum expires will be the hardest. The reason is that there are several hurdles that might undermine their efforts to persuade both the US and Iran to show relatively flexible stances required to reach points of compromise that can possibly prevent Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal.
What stood out in this context were new European initiatives and ideas that emerged shortly before a gathering of the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Joint Commission, or JCPOA, held on March 16 in Vienna. Most importantly, a set timeframe was proposed for the current nuclear deal, while all parties commit to hold new talks during the eight years to reach another agreement that is acceptable by all and addresses all disputed issues in the current deal. Parties that adopted this initiative proposed an eight-year duration starting from when the current deal was sealed on July 14, 2015, and ending on July 13, 2023.
Multiple Goals
It can be argued that the goals that this initiative seeks to achieve are not limited to only improving the chances of keeping the nuclear deal alive. Rather, it aims to support current efforts to reach settlements for other regional and international crises. The European initiative further aspires to avoid facing more difficult commitments, if bets placed on the deal- that was signed more than two years with Iran and led to the lifting of international sanctions against the country- turn out to be misplaced.
According to this view, the collapse of the deal will increase the odds of a new war breaking out in the Middle East, especially if Iran restarts its efforts to proliferate its missile capability. In fact, Iran has already threatened to do this, since the US Administration announced its potential withdrawal from the deal.
The latest of such warnings from Iran came in statements delivered on March 14 by Abbas Araghchi, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs, and a former top member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team, at a meeting of the parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee. The meeting was held to discuss a number of issues including the impact of the recent ouster of US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on the nuclear deal and an attempt by protestors to storm the US Embassy in London.
Araghchi said that Iran has two options for dealing with the potential US withdrawal from the deal. Iran, he said, will have to decide whether to stay in the deal along with the other parties i.e. China, European powers and Russia, or walk out of the deal if the US does. Yet, Araghchi noted that the second scenario is more likely because the US withdrawal will greatly reduce the economic benefits from the deal, even if other parties decide to stay in the deal.
In fact, Iran, on several occasions, already claimed that the US is impeding the way for foreign firms willing to enter the Iranian market and seal deals with Iranian businesses. Accordingly, several such firms had to avoid taking relevant practical steps in this direction.
No doubt, the possibility of Iran withdrawing from the deal, or at least taking preparations in this direction, may become more potent after the appointment of Mike Pompeo as US Secretary of State. Iran believes that the decision to install the former CIA director paves the way for US withdrawal from the nuclear deal. That is especially given the visible convergence between stances adopted by President Trump and the new secretary of state on the deal as well as other issues with Iran, such as its ballistic missile program, its meddling in regional crises and supporting armed and terrorist organizations.
The North Korea Issue
Moreover, such perceptions aim to increase the chances of pursuing the same approach in other international crises, such as with North Korea, especially after it was announced that he would meet with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in early May this year to discuss possible settlements to pending issues between the two countries.
Thus, parties adopting this approach have the view that any failure in the nuclear deal can impose negative repercussions on other international issues, especially because North Korea will consider such failure as a sign of futility of a diplomatic option to settle those issues. This can even reduce the possibility of such meeting being held in the first place.
Multiple Hurdles
Yet nevertheless, such ideas may not succeed in achieving their set goals. That is because Iran and the US still insist to hold onto the same positions on the deal, thus leaving European powers involved in the efforts with only difficult limited choices to make.
Furthermore, this initiative does not clarify positions on pending issues of common interest for both sides. The most prominent of which is the ballistic missile program, which will receive sanctions relief within eight years after the deal was signed. This is perceived as a gain that Iran will insist on keeping, without taking the risk of engaging in new negotiations that may enable other parties to wrench it.
In other words, Iran, and more specifically the government of President Hassan Rouhani, believe that the restrictions, which were imposed on missile and nuclear activity and which will be removed within 8 and 10 years respectively after the 2015 deal, were among justifications used to pass the deal domestically. This term helped Rouhani to overcome several obstacles posed by the regime’s influential institutions, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in particular, to avoid approving it.
Additionally, there are views in Iran that responding to this initiative can be interpreted as a sign of weakness that may prompt the US and other parties to put strong pressure to wrench more concessions from Iran and increase chances for keeping the nuclear deal alive.
In light of this, it can possibly be argued that Iran is not likely to be responsive to such initiatives because they would not achieve its desirable goals for staying in the deal. This would prompt it to send out escalatory messages in the coming period in preparation for an American walkout from the deal.
