أخبار المركز
  • مركز "المستقبل" يستضيف الدكتور محمود محيي الدين في حلقة نقاشية
  • مُتاح عدد جديد من سلسلة "ملفات المستقبل" بعنوان: (هاريس أم ترامب؟ الانتخابات الأمريكية 2024.. القضايا والمسارات المُحتملة)
  • د. أحمد سيد حسين يكتب: (ما بعد "قازان": ما الذي يحتاجه "بريكس" ليصبح قوة عالمية مؤثرة؟)
  • أ.د. ماجد عثمان يكتب: (العلاقة بين العمل الإحصائي والعمل السياسي)
  • أ. د. علي الدين هلال يكتب: (بين هاريس وترامب: القضايا الآسيوية الكبرى في انتخابات الرئاسة الأمريكية 2024)

Ankara’s Mobilization

Why does the "March for Justice" Constitute a Threat to Erdogan’s Regime?

19 يوليو، 2017


The "March for Justice", staged by Turkish opposition, led by Kamal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP), revealed the growing opposition to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This is closely interrelated with the outcome of the constitutional referendum in April 2017, which underscored the widespread opposition groups amounting to nearly half of the voters in Turkey. The referendum was passed by only a very slim majority, which manifests the shifting political equilibria in Turkey towards the opposition, given the rise of political leaders who are capable of mobilizing people to reject the policies of the government of the AKP, such as power monopoly, politicization of the judiciary and prosecution of opponents.

Motives of the March 

Turkish opposition rallied hundreds of thousands of supporters on July 9, 2017, led by Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the CHP, in a protest of the AKP and Erdogan’s policies. The opposition staged "March for Justice," which lasted 25 days, roaming throughout Turkey, and ended up in Istanbul in the Asian part of Maltepe. The main motives behind the growing opposition in Turkey are as follows:

1- "MIT trucks case": The March for Justice sought primarily to pressure the government to release CHP lawmaker Enis Berberoglu, who was sentenced to 25 years over spying charges after leaking a video to the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet, showing elements of the police in early 2014 stopping and inspecting a truck accompanied by Turkish intelligence agents, amid conflict among wings of the Turkish State. The police discovered that the truck was carrying weapons bound for Syria, while the Turkish Government denied that, saying it was transferring humanitarian aid to the Syrian Turkmen, in what came to be known as "MIT trucks case".

2- Widening circle of opponents: The Turkish government accused Hizmet group headed by Fethullah Gülen, of playing a key role in the aborted coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016 to overthrow the government of the then Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The accusations widened to include many of Erdogan's opponents from the secular movement and some officers in the security and military institutions. In addition, Erdogan dismissed a large number of judges and arrested a large number of academics, professors and members of the State administrative apparatus. This contributed to form a huge mass of Erdogan's opponents, who staged the protests against the AKP.

3- Waning impact of the European pressures: The success of the recent referendum in Turkey has arguably allowed the Turkish government to consolidate its domestic powers. The government has been imposing state of emergency for almost a year and it is renewed every three months. Unlike it was previously concerned with such criticisms, Ankara no longer cares about the European criticism levelled at the Turkish President claiming that his country was no longer a state of law, or with regard to the respect for the fundamental values of human rights. Due to Turkey’s continuance to undermine the democratic foundations, the European Parliament recommended on  July 6, 2017 to suspend Turkey's accession talks to the European Union, if the recent constitutional reforms were implemented without modification. For its part, Germany withdrew its troops from Incirlik air base in Turkey on July 10, 2017 amid tense relations with Turkey due to Erdogan's government insistence on political propaganda and communications with the Turkish community in Germany.

The March for Justice’s Demands

Some estimates indicated that the number of demonstrators in the March for Justice reached over 1 million Turkish citizens, but the Turkish authorities dismissed that stressing that the number was no more than a few thousands. The rally was concurrent with the AKP celebrations of the first anniversary of the botched military coup, a clear message to the regime of the growing public rejection of Erdogan and his policies of trying to assume sole control of power. 

At the end of the march, the Turkish opposition put forward a number of demands, most notably are: more transparent investigations about the coup attempt that took place a year ago, given that Kamal Kilicdaroglu CHP leader and champion of the protest movement is always keen on describing the coup as "theatrical coup" or "coup under control" because there were no fair trials with regards to the coup attempt. In addition, there has been a conflict of public accounts on the coup, besides CHP confirmed that Parliament's investigations about this coup were faux, and did not issue subpoenas to the Chief of staff or the head of Turkish intelligence.

The opposition has demanded to end the state of emergency that enabled Ali Yildirim’s government to consolidate its power and violate the law and the constitution, turning Turkey into authoritarian State par excellence. The list of demands also included stopping "politicization of the Turkish judiciary" especially that the recent constitutional amendments allowed Erdogan to interfere with the judiciary, which he has long accused of bowing to Fethullah Gülen. The new amendments allow Erdogan to choose four members of the Supreme Council of judges and prosecutors, who handle the appointments and dismissals in the judiciary, while the Parliament appoint seven members. 

Turkish opposition tabled other demands such as the return of all academics and government officials to their previous posts, who were previously acquitted of involvement in the coup attempt, the immediate release of arrested journalists, ending all crackdown campaigns on news outlets, strengthening the foundations of the rule of law, as well as respecting secularism, democracy and human rights. Furthermore, they demanded fair Turkish foreign policy that respects international law and seeks rapprochement with the peoples of the region, and avoid interfering in the internal affairs of neighboring countries or pursuing hostile policies toward major regional powers.

Rise of the Opposition

The recent protests in Turkey demonstrated that the Turkish opposition managed to overcome vulnerability and fragmentation, to regain its ability to rally and counter the AKP. Turkish opposition now views the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019 as "decisive battle" with Erdogan regime, which will see a watershed ruling that will either turn Turkey into "Ottoman Sultanate" or preserve the remaining of the Turkish State. In this respect, the most important landmarks of the rise of the Turkish opposition force are as follows:

1- Rise of public leaders: the rise of the CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu constitutes a turning point in the ability of the Turkish opposition to counter the AKP. For many years, the Turkish opposition was lacking leaders that enjoy public acceptance and have the capability to mobilize. The AKP exploited the involvement of some opposition leaders in ethical scandals to tarnish the opposition's image and undermine their popularity and accuse them of corruption. However, Kilicdaroglu is a real challenge to Erdogan’s regime because the former adopts inclusive national slogans and a narrative that appeals to large segments of the population. 

2- Cohesion of the "opponents coalition":  the March for Justice underlined the presence of a strong and cohesive coalition of multiple streams, parties and groups from different political leanings, which converge to oppose the ruling party’s violations, security prosecutions of the opponents, judges, university professors, government employees and the closure of newspapers and non-state media outlets, in addition to rejecting Turkey's regional policies that dragged the country into foreign conflicts due to interference in the internal affairs of other states.

3- Adopting national slogans: Turkish opposition adopted national and inclusive slogans that appeal to the various political movements besides its popularity among different groups of Turkish people. Moreover, it has taken "adalet" as its main slogan in addition to "state of law", waving the Turkish flag and pictures of Ataturk. This reveal the opposition keenness to unify the supporters of the survival of modern secular Turkish state in the face of the supporters of the religious movements, who are looking to dismantle the State and reproduce the "Ottoman rule" with what it all its associated aspects of the monopoly of political power, domination of radical religious movements, and the ambitions of external expansion. 

4- Transcending the centrality of cities: Turkish political opposition managed to transcend the "centrality of cities" by rallying its supporters in rural areas outside the major cities and staging a massive march that moved from such places towards the capital. This reflects that the opposition sought to infiltrate and dismantle major strongholds of Erdogan's supporters in rural areas and peripherals far from the capital and encourage opposition supporters to regain their activism in preparation for decisive electoral rounds in the future.

Overall, the March for Justice will likely help restore the Turkish opposition’s strength and ability to rally, leading to the rise of new public mobilization and revive the ability of the Turkish people to protest and break barriers and restrictions, which were set by the Turkish regime to curb political opposition through the struggle with Hizmet movement, led by Gulen, military interventions in Syria and Iraq, and the security clampdown in the wake of the failed military coup against Erdogan.