Recent developments in various regional crises have been directly impacted by efforts from several regional and world powers to reach political settlements. The broadening of conflicts and continued disputes between domestic political players has further hindered these efforts, which has caused the aforementioned parties to suggest “alternative initiatives,” either by bridging the gaps of dispute and alleviating pressure on the relative domestic balances of power, or by dealing directly with the new balance of power caused by confrontations on the ground between rivals.

These initiatives are facing several challenges that may undermine their ability to achieve any real results in the coming phase.

Various indicators:

Several indicators reveal a rise in alternative initiatives to deal with new factors resulting from developments in various regional crises, most notably:


1-    Russia’s call to hold new negotiations between the Syrian regime and the moderate opposition in Kazakhstan in mid-January 2017. Although many reports show that the parties supporting these possible talks are trying to achieve three main goals (expanding the scope of the ceasefire to cover all of Syria with the exception of military operations against ISIS and Fat’h Al-Sham Front; drafting principles for implementing Security Resolution 2254; and embedding a political solution to settling the crisis), many believe Russia’s efforts are nothing more than another attempt to launch an alternative path to undermine Geneva I, because these principles no longer apply in light of the new realities resulting from developments on the ground, especially after opposition fighters lost Aleppo to the regime and its militia allies.


This view is based on several factors, including the possibility that Russia wants to remove the UN envoy to Syria Stefan di Mistura – who called for holding talks between the regime and opposition in Geneva in February 2017 – from any talks. Also, Russia has expressed a desire to remove the Syrian Supreme Commission for Negotiations from talks. This makes it more likely that Moscow, in coordination with Iran and the Syrian regime, will try to circumvent these principles and establish a new frame of reference for settlement linked to what may be concluded in Kazakhstan after negotiations are completed.


2-    The announcement of the leader of Lebanon’s Future Movement on October 20th 2016, of support for the nomination of General Michel Aoun, the leader of the Change and Reform bloc and founder of the Free Patriotic Movement, for president. Some political players inside Lebanon viewed this announcement of support as a radical shift that will redraw the political balance of power in Lebanon. Lebanon has already been rocked with conflict after they were directly impacted by the Syrian conflict when Hezbollah became involved in fighting alongside the Syrian regime. This analysis views Hariri’s nomination of Aoun as an “alternative initiative,” since his main nominee prior to Aoun was the leader of the Marada Movement, MP Suleiman Al-Frangieh.


3-    US President-elect Donald Trump has adopted a different approach to the nuclear deal reached between Iran and the 5+1 Group on July 14th 2015. He not only made harsh comments about the deal, describing it as a “disaster”, but also threatened before the presidential election to “tear it up”. Trump has subsequently called for new negotiations to reach an agreement that places more restrictions on Iran.

Multiple goals:

There is no doubt these players are seeking to promote new initiatives to deal with developments in multiple regional crises in order to achieve a variety of goals, including:


1-    Embedding new balances of power: Those who oppose a new parallel negotiation path for the Syrian crisis believe that Russia’s efforts, with the approval of Iran and the Syrian regime, primarily aim to reach an agreement on new paths for settlement that reflect the new balance of power created by the battle of Aleppo. Thus, it is expected that talks in Kazakhstan will not discuss the future of the Syrian president in power, even though it is one of the main obstacles thus far that has delayed reaching a settlement.


2-    Ending chronic political crises: An example of this is the presidential vacuum in Lebanon which has lasted 29 months since the end of President Michel Suleiman’s term in May 2014. Lebanon’s political parties have been unable to agree on a candidate. This has negatively impacted conditions inside Lebanon on various levels, especially with reference to the economy and the internal security of the nation. This crisis coincided with increased political tensions resulting from Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian conflict, and several terrorist attacks occurring within Lebanon.


Many believe that Aoun’s ascension to power after the elections on October 31st 2016, was one of the conditions of the deal reached with Hariri, stating that the former would become president and the latter prime minister. This did in fact happen, after President Aoun approved the new cabinet headed by Hariri on December 18th 2016.


3-    Changing current policies: This is evident in the steps taken by Trump who is seeking to make significant changes in US policies adopted by outgoing president Barack Obama, especially with regards to the Iranian nuclear deal. Trump believes these policies sent “the wrong message” to Iran as is evident in their deliberate testing of ballistic missiles and its navy provoking US warships in the Gulf. According to his view, the nuclear deal does not guarantee that Iran will not attempt to acquire capabilities to build a nuclear bomb.

Possible challenges:

Although there is a growing trend of proposing new initiatives for the various crises of the region, there are still many challenges that could undermine their ability to continue or achieve any significant results. If Russia moves towards erasing the principles of Geneva I, there will be strong opposition from regional and international powers concerned with the Syrian crisis. Meanwhile, existing disputes between those participating in the Kazakhstan talks could hinder their ability to launch a new, parallel path to settle the Syrian crisis. In fact, the entire settlement path may experience many changes after Trump is sworn in on January 20th 2017.


Aoun reaching the presidency and Hariri becoming prime minister will not end the multitude of crises currently facing Lebanon, especially as prominent disputes continue without resolution – essentially Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian conflict – which threaten attempts to achieve political stability in the coming phase.

Efforts by Trump’s administration to hold new negotiations on the nuclear issue will likely be met with refusal by Iran and possibly other world powers that participated in talks, because it could re-ignite the nuclear crisis and squander efforts made in recent years to reach a settlement.

In conclusion, new initiatives that are emerging on the regional stage face many seemingly difficult obstacles, especially since there is no general consensus on them right now among domestic, regional and international players concerned with the crises in the Middle East.