Iraq's diplomatic efforts in recent years have yielded notable success in addressing regional conflicts through mediation initiatives. This is particularly evident in the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, which culminated in the China-brokered agreement to restore relations between the two countries on March 10, 2023, following groundwork laid by Baghdad.

Building on this success, Iraq is now attempting to mediate between Syria and Turkey. In early June 2024, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani announced these efforts during an interview with Turkish channel "Haber Turk," stating that Baghdad is "fostering a positive atmosphere between the two countries."

On June 30, 2024, the Syrian newspaper Al-Watan, known for its proximity to Damascus decision-makers, revealed that a meeting between Syrian and Turkish officials was expected to take place in Baghdad. This meeting would mark a significant step in a prolonged negotiation process that could lead to political and practical understandings between the two nations.

On July 7, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed openness to inviting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to Turkey "at any time." This followed Erdogan's positive response on June 28 to Assad's willingness to consider initiatives for restoring relations with Turkey, noting that there was no reason to prevent the establishment of diplomatic ties between Ankara and Damascus.

Baghdad's mediation efforts between Damascus and Ankara raise intriguing questions about Iraq's motivations. The initiative faces numerous challenges, given the complexities of the long-standing border tensions between Syria and Turkey. 

Interwoven Factors

Iraq's efforts to mediate between its neighbors, Syria and Turkey, with the goal of restoring diplomatic relations, are driven by several key factors:

1. Enhancing Iraq’s role as a regional mediator:

The Sudani government recognizes the critical importance of succeeding in this mediation as a strategic regional endeavor. Success in this arena would help alleviate internal pressures from certain Shiite leaders within the "Coordination Framework." These pressures could specifically target Prime Minister Sudani, as these leaders vie for the position of prime minister in the upcoming political phase.

Furthermore, Iraq seeks to solidify its position as a key regional mediator. This aspiration is bolstered by its longstanding historical ties with both Syria and Turkey, as well as its firsthand experience with the negative repercussions of the Syrian crisis. These unique circumstances grant Iraq a distinctive and potentially influential position in the mediation process.

2. Political calculations of Sudani’s government:     

The Iraqi Prime Minister's offer of regional mediation is driven by multiple factors. While it responds to recent initiatives from Ankara following President Erdogan's visit to Baghdad on April 22, it also forms part of a broader strategy to address security challenges along Iraq's borders with Syria and Turkey. These challenges primarily relate to combating terrorism and fostering an environment conducive to economic cooperation.

Therefore, Sudani's decision to announce Iraqi mediation efforts through a Turkish channel can be interpreted as a calculated move, sending an indirect message to both the Turkish public and opposition parties. The latter, having gained significant political momentum following their strong performance in recent local elections, have expressed a desire to normalize relations with Damascus. This sentiment was exemplified on July 5 when Özgür Özel, leader of the Republican People's Party, announced his intention to visit Damascus and meet with President Assad later in the month. By positioning Iraq as a mediator, Sudani appears to be strategically courting Turkish public opinion, which aims not only to bolster the chances of successful Iraqi mediation, but also to enhance trade and economic relations with Ankara.

3.  Resuming oil exports through Turkey:

In light of escalating Turkish military activities in northern Iraq, coupled with Baghdad's severe financial challenges and mounting domestic pressure for the withdrawal of American forces, the Sudani administration has reassessed its stance on collaboration with Ankara. This reevaluation particularly concerns the potential resumption of Iraqi oil exports through Turkish territory. These exports came to an abrupt halt on March 25, 2023, following a ruling by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. The decision mandated Turkey to compensate Iraq with $1.5 billion for unauthorized oil exports by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) between 2014 and 2018, conducted without the Iraqi federal government's approval.

A primary catalyst for Iraq's diplomatic initiative is the pursuit of rapprochement with Turkey, aimed at securing substantial economic advantages for Baghdad. The suspension of Iraqi oil exports from Kirkuk and the Kurdistan region via Turkey has resulted in a significant loss of 450,000 barrels per day since March 2023. Consequently, Baghdad and Erbil have suffered a combined revenue loss exceeding $5 billion. In this context, monetizing this oil has become an urgent imperative to mitigate Iraq's staggering budget deficit, which has ballooned to approximately $48 billion.

4. Increasing trade exchange between Baghdad and Ankara:

A report published on August 30 by the Center for Global Development highlights that budget deficit pressures are pushing the Iraqi government to finalize an oil export deal, potentially even more urgently than Turkey. This mutual interest in resuming oil exports through Turkey serves as a stepping stone towards enhancing trade relations between the two nations.

The urgency is further underscored by Iraq's ongoing "Development Road" project, an ambitious initiative aimed at establishing a trade corridor from Basra in the south, through Turkey, and ultimately extending to Europe. The same report projects that bilateral trade volume could surge from $15 billion at the end of 2022 to approximately $20 billion within the next five years.

5. Alignment with the Iranian role:

The support of the Coordination Framework bloc for Sudani's mediation initiative, along with the involvement of Faleh al-Fayyad, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi), suggests that Iran backs and has a vested interest in Iraqi mediation. This perspective stems from the notion that what Iran could not achieve through the Astana process might be realized through Iraqi diplomatic efforts.

Following the death of former Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi and his foreign minister Hussein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran aims to strengthen coordination between Ankara, Baghdad, and Damascus. This is done with the intention of reorganizing its regional strategy in light of the Israeli war on Gaza. However, Iran seeks to achieve this without allowing Turkish influence to grow in Iraq or Syria. Instead, Iran plans to address Turkish security concerns through the authorities in Baghdad and Damascus.

Challenges of Iraq’s Mediation

Despite these motivating factors for Iraqi mediation between Syria and Turkey, it is important to consider the potential challenges that could impede its success. It is worth noting that neither side has rejected the mediation. The following are some of the challenges that may arise:

1- Eroded mutual trust between Syria and Turkey:

The erosion of mutual trust between Syria and Turkey presents the most prominent challenge hindering Iraqi mediation efforts. At the core of this distrust lies Damascus's ongoing criticism of Turkey's role in the Syrian crisis, particularly its support for Syrian opposition forces in Idlib province. This sentiment is reciprocated by President Erdogan, who has repeatedly expressed skepticism and apprehension about the Syrian regime.

Complicating matters further are the preconditions set by both sides. Damascus demands that Ankara withdraw its forces from northern Syria, while Turkey insists on securing its borders with Syria before considering any troop withdrawal. These mutually exclusive conditions create a significant obstacle for Iraqi mediation attempts. The challenge facing Baghdad is further magnified by the fact that its mediation effort follows the failure of Russian attempts to achieve reconciliation between Syria and Turkey. 

2- Diverging views on resolving the Syrian crisis:

The Syrian conflict presents multiple points of contention between Damascus and Ankara, with the Idlib situation at the forefront. The Syrian government's determination to regain control over Idlib, following Turkey's withdrawal of support for armed groups in the region, remains a significant issue. However, the fundamental disagreement between the two nations centers on the approach to resolving the broader Syrian crisis.

This discord was prominently displayed in late June during an exchange between Turkish UN delegate Ahmed Yıldız and his Syrian counterpart Qusay Dahhak. Their dispute highlighted the stark differences in their respective visions for Syria's future. Turkey advocates for a political solution aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which outlines a roadmap for forming a transitional government and fostering reconciliation between opposing factions. Interestingly, this stance has met resistance not only from the Syrian government but also from opposition groups supported by Ankara. These factions, in a surprising turn of events, organized protests in areas under their control to express their disapproval of Turkey's position.

3- Challenges of repatriating Syrian refugees:

The Syrian refugee crisis and escalating calls for their repatriation have emerged as a critical issue in Turkey. Opposition parties have accused Erdogan's government of laxity in returning refugees to Syria, allegedly to secure their votes for the ruling Justice and Development Party in elections. The influx of Syrian refugees has placed a significant economic strain on Turkey and triggered demographic shifts, leading to a surge in societal violence, much of which has been directed at the refugees themselves.

Currently, Turkey hosts over three million Syrians under temporary protection status and approximately two million with residence permits. The Turkish government's recent efforts to engage with the Syrian regime can be interpreted as an attempt to address the challenges arising from hosting more than five million Syrians by facilitating their repatriation. This initiative represents one of the key hurdles in achieving Turkish-Syrian reconciliation.

4. Impact of the upcoming U.S. elections:

While Erdogan's government seeks positive engagement with Iraq, hoping the April cooperation agreement between Baghdad and Ankara will foster a comprehensive security and economic partnership, Turkey's cautious approach to meetings with Syrian officials under Iraqi mediation is unlikely to yield immediate strategic decisions. Ankara is adopting a wait-and-see stance, anticipating the outcome of the upcoming U.S. presidential elections. A potential change in administration, particularly the return of Donald Trump to the White House, could significantly bolster Turkey's influence in both Iraq and Syria.

5. Regional competition in the Syrian arena:

The Iraqi mediation effort in Syria faces a formidable challenge: the complex web of regional competition. Russia, Iran, and China have established significant stakes in the country, each with its own military, security, and economic interests. China, in particular, has focused its influence on infrastructure and reconstruction projects while also aiming to prevent the return of an estimated 6,000 Uyghur fighters to its borders.

This delicate balance of power is now threatened by the potential entry of Turkey, a major regional player that already wields substantial influence in northern Syria. Should Ankara and Damascus normalize their relations, Turkish influence could potentially expand across most of Syria, disrupting the current equilibrium.

Interestingly, while Russia, Iran, and China have ostensibly approved the Iraqi mediation initiative, their primary goal seems to be limiting Turkish influence in Syria and preventing its further expansion. 

In conclusion, the success of Iraqi mediation in restoring Syrian-Turkish relations hinges on several interconnected factors. Primarily, Baghdad's ability to navigate regional conflicts and the existence of common ground between Ankara and Damascus are crucial elements. However, numerous challenges must be overcome for successful reconciliation under Iraqi auspices. One of the main obstacles is the intense competition between regional and international actors in Syria, which can significantly impede the progress of Iraqi mediation efforts. This complex geopolitical landscape is further complicated by the divergent interests between Syria and Turkey, potentially limiting the effectiveness of Baghdad's diplomatic initiatives. Despite these challenges, there may be room for progress in specific areas where Syrian and Turkish interests align. For instance, both nations might find common ground when addressing future pathways for their shared borders, particularly in Syria's northwestern regions.