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A Different Perspective; How did Putin Benefit from the Wagner Group Rebellion?

24 يوليو، 2023


There is a general consensus among experts from both Russia and the West that the Wagner mercenary group’s rebellion was only an internal crisis. Underlying this consensus is the fact that, after Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000 as president, the West’s influence over Russia's domestic politics became insignificant. However, official international reactions contradicted this belief. The United States and the European Union considered the rebellion as an internal matter, as did China. Regardless of what conclusions the western powers drew about the causes and implications of the short-lived insurrection, it showed “real cracks” in Putin’s grip on power, according to the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. French President Emmanuel Macron said that what happened shows the divisions that exist within the Russian government, as well as the fragility of both the Russian army and its auxiliary forces like the Wagner Group.

Analysis of the developments show varied interpretations, most of which, from the perspective of the Russian insiders, pointed to the fact that what happened on June 24 reflects divisions within the elite and a crisis in the management of the country's political system. Some went as far as believing that this crisis marks the beginning of the end of President Putin's rule, while others believe that he could use it to strengthen his authority. 

A third group suggests that Moscow may witness internal conflict within the country's elites, possibly leading to power struggles. Furthermore, even before and after the crisis was settled, many Western analysts hastened to confirm that it was a decisive blow to Putin's regime. However, it should be noted that a majority of these analyses failed to provide logical evidence to support their conclusions. To shed light on the implications of the Wagner rebellion on the Russian domestic scene, it is important to address the following points in particular.

A Crisis of Personalities

It can be said that the crisis of the Wagner Group’s rebellion occurred within the Russian military elite, between the non-state entity Wagner Group and the official military and security institutions. Tensions between the two sides were personal rather than institutional. Additionally, Yevgeny Prigozhin's companies served for long years as a major supplier to the Russian military, especially as a food caterer. The tension involved certain high-ranking officers of the Russian army. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov were the main targets of Prigozhin who demanded their dismissal saying they were a main reason for his rebellion. In this context, leaked US intelligence reports in April indicated that the United States intercepted communications between top Russian military commanders discussing how to handle Prigozhin's ongoing demands for more ammunition and supplies at a time when the Russian army is facing shortages of ammunition.

According to expert assessments, including from Russia, the appointment of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov as overall commander of forces for what Moscow calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine in January 2023, replacing General Sergei Surovikin, came in response to request from senior General Staff officers and senior officers of the ministry of defense who wanted to convince Putin of the need for empowering the regular military institution to regain full control of the war in Ukraine at the expense of Wagner Group. Surovikin is known to have had a close relationship with Prigozhin in the past. Both Gerasimov and Prigozhin served in Syria from 2017 to 2019; and the chief of the mercenary group openly admires Gerasimov's skills.

The move coincided with Prigozhin's loss of the ability to continue recruiting prisoners into Wagner. Since the summer of 2022, the group has been using unskilled personnel most of whom were prisoners, and assigned them tasks commonly referred to as "cannon fodder," meaning sending them without sufficient fire cover to storm and expose Ukrainian targets. Documented cases show recruited prisoners being brutally treated or executed for refusing to obey orders, abandoning their positions, or attempting to surrender to the Ukrainians. Scenes of brutal executions with a heavy hammer that have become symbolic of Wagner and were used to instill fear among prisoners.

It was evident that the leaders of Russia’s regular military establishment were dissatisfied with the fact that Wagner Group fighters enjoyed significant operational independence on the ground although they rely entirely on logistical support from the General Staff and political support from President Putin himself. In this context, Wagner made several deals for direct prisoner exchanges with Ukraine although its fighters did not have the status of recognized lawful combatants. 

Prigozhin's Ambition

In recent months, and alongside his eagerness to appear in the media and maximize the use of available media resources, including news agencies, websites and Telegram channels owned by Wagner Group, Prigozhin has shown evident political ambitions. Through these media outlets, the man seeks to emphasize that his group is capable of carrying out tasks beyond just combating and that it can advance Russia's interests globally through other means, provided that the Kremlin grants Wagner sufficient powers and resources. Recent information from Moscow indicates that the dismantling of these resources and media outlets used by Prigozhin to make populist statements to the public and the youth in particular, is currently underway.

Furthermore, some believe that there are social and political implications of the tensions caused by Prigozhin’s actions. These were embodied in his portrayal of himself as an anti-establishment figure operating outside the hierarchical ruling order. However, according to this perspective, what he fails to grasp is that President Putin's regime exercises full control over all active entities in the country, especially those with significant political influence. That is, any individual who becomes entirely independent will be in serious danger: the system will either engulf them or neutralize them. Therefore, it was evident to the Russian leadership that this was evidently an armed rebellion that must be dealt with firmly.

Lack of Support

It should be noted that the Wagner Group's rebellion, which some Western analysts believed was doomed to failure, was actually a desperate attempt by Prigozhin to salvage his enterprise and impose a discussion about conditions to preserve his group's presence on the battlefield and its future role. However, his attempt did not receive any significant sympathy or support, neither from the regular forces nor from governors of regions and provinces, nor from any Russian officials. While Progozhin and his forces faced little resistance when they took over the Rostov-on-Don base, Putin ultimately sided with the regular army and completely excluded him from the deal brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko that included changes to the command. The deal included integration of all non-state military groups into the armed forces, a requirement to which everyone complied i.e. around 35 groups except Wagner.

According to Western reports, the Russian military had planned to use force against Wagner and arrest its leader after his forces refused to come under the umbrella of the regular army following the Battle of Bakhmut in May last year. During clashes between the two sides, Wagner fighters allegedly detained and assaulted a Russian officer of the rank of major and forced him to record an apology, claiming that his soldiers had attempted to attack Wagner forces. 

Prigozhin was not sure where this adventure would take him. His plan might have gone further than he expected. Once Putin threatened him, he had no choice but to use his military forces to protect himself and seek to strike a deal with the Kremlin. Prigozhin’s main problem seems to be his complete lack of popular support. Additionally, he did not receive any military support of any kind that could legitimize his actions. The Russian army is engaged in a military confrontation in Ukraine, and thus, it is not capable of participating in an internal political conflict. Even if Russian leaders and soldiers agreed with Prigozhin’s criticism of the army and accused it of inefficiency, they were not in a position to do much to support his rebellion. Furthermore, Prigozhin’s demands, especially his call for the dismissal of the defense minister and the chief of staff, were not realistic.

Putin’s Stance

Wagner’s rebellion raises questions about the reasons behind President Putin's tolerance with Prigozhin and his fighters, despite the group's growing influence and strength that reached the point of declaring rebellion and defying the president who has provided significant financial and political support since 2014 to the mercenary group.

To answer such questions, it is important to note that Brigozhin is a rebel who came from within the ruling system itself, has been and will remain part of this system, and has never been an opposition figure. Wagner remains part of Russia’s military system that is subject to the overall command of the armed forces, and its activities are monitored by the competent and relevant security agencies, just like dozens of other private military companies operating in the country. Some independent experts seeking to justify President Putin's patience towards Brigozhin's behavior cite the complexities of the war in Ukraine and its comprehensive repercussions on Russia in general, and the regular armed forces in particular. In the leadership’s view, this non-systemic force may prove beneficial in this battle, thanks to its flexibility, methods and modus operandi that cannot be used by the regular army.

In this context, Putin's decision to leave the door open for Wagner elements to integrate into the Russian army or be redeployed in a way that serves his comprehensive battle with the West, can be understood. In a televised speech on June 26th, the Russian president said that Wagner fighters may continue to serve Russia by signing contracts with the ministry of defense or other law enforcement agencies, or return to their families and friends, and that anyone who wants to resettle in Belarus (with Prigozhin) can do so." 

Regarding this point, a new development is emerging as Wagner’s channel on Telegram quoted Anton Elizarov, one of the group’s senior commanders, as saying that upon orders from Prigozhin, the fighters are currently on vacation until early August before moving to Belarus, where they will establish bases and coordinate with local authorities. He added, "We must prepare the bases and training camps and coordinate with the local governments and administrations, organize interactions with law enforcement agencies in Belarus, and establish supply and logistics services. Poland and some Baltic countries have received these statements with great concern. Polish Minister of Defense Mariusz Błaszczak, stated that his country has started moving more than two thousand soldiers to its eastern borders, and that 500 police officers were sent to reinforce security on the borders with Belarus.

In connection with these developments, the Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, on July 10،said that President Putin met with Prigozhin and in the Kremlin on June 29, five days after the group’s mutiny. Peskov said the meeting lasted three hours and was attended by 35 senior Wagner commanders. He added that Putin gave his assessment of Wagner's actions at the front during the Special Military Operation in Ukraine and also gave his assessment of the events of the day of the mutiny. He said Putin offered the commanders further options for employment and combat. Peskov said that the commanders outlined their version of what happened on 24 June and emphasized that they are staunch supporters of the head of the president.

Benefits for the Russian Regime

The bottom line is that Wagner’s aborted mutiny appeared to be an "internal affair" more like an issue between members of the same family, where some of them crossed red lines. Recent developments reflect the Russian leadership's assessment that Wagner, despite its rebellion on June 24, and other private military companies, remain important tools in Moscow's ongoing battle against the West. There is a possibility that they may still be used in Belarus, Russia's ally in this conflict, which is in line with a long history of Soviet and Russian reliance on non-regular forces.

In practical terms, according to Western experts, Putin was the biggest beneficiary of this crisis. It allowed him to pass several laws that support the expansion of the armed forces, including the integration of Wagner fighters into them. The crisis may have somewhat helped in defusing tensions that have recently escalated within the Russian political body. In this context, it is worth noting that President Putin, who still enjoys broad popular support as the leader engaged in an existential battle for Russia, managed to stay above the internal conflict between Prigozhin and the military elite. He used the feud to his advantage. For example, according to the New York Times, American officials conceded that there was an element of theater to Prigozhin’s public complaints but that it was nevertheless useful for Putin, who himself has privately criticized his military leadership for being too passive during the Ukraine war.