Researchers in international relations share the belief that natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcanoes, and tornadoes can lead to a change in the foreign policy of affected states. This change depends, of course, on the magnitude, geographical scope, and economic and social impact of the disaster, as well as on the affected state’s power, including natural and human resources and social and political stability.
Within this context, concepts such as the so-called “disaster diplomacy,” crisis management in exceptional circumstances, and the “reconstruction diplomacy” emerged. These refer to policies pursued by the state to mobilize a maximum of foreign aid to address the immediate impact of disasters and later initiate the reconstruction process.
The analysis applies to the earthquake which hit southern Turkey and northern Syria on February 6, 2023, and hundreds of subsequent aftershocks that were followed by another two earthquakes on February 20. Turkey declared a state of emergency of the fourth degree, which means the country is calling for foreign aid. Teams from more than 100 countries engaged in search and rescue operations and clearing debris while relief aid flowed into the country and funds were allocated for reconstruction.
The disaster was a severe blow to Turkey’s economy and social stability. The ten provinces worst hit by the disaster have a population of 13.5 million (16% of the country’s total population) and account for 9% of Turkey’s GDP, 15% of agricultural production, and 9% of industrial production. The earthquake killed tens of thousands, forced millions from their homes, and severely damaged buildings, roads, and infrastructure. Turkish President Recep Tayyeb Erdogan, on February 14, described the earthquake as “the worst natural disaster in the 21st century.”
Changes to Foreign Policy
Questions are raised about whether severe natural disasters can impact the affected states' political behavior and foreign policy. Other questions are whether such change would redefine the state’s foreign policy or just cause a re-arrangement of the state’s priorities in employing the tools of this policy.
In general, observers agree that affected states, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, prioritize their domestic affairs over their foreign affairs. They also postulate that disasters temporarily reduce the economic power of affected states because they mobilize most of their resources for reconstruction. Consequently, this would reduce the resources allocated to foreign policy. So how is Turkey's policy towards Arab states and the larger Middle East affected? What changes are likely to be introduced to this policy?
Turkish media backing the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AK Party, were quick to project Erdogan’s spearheading rescue efforts and guiding the government's efforts to face the disaster, as well as reiterate that international solidarity with Turkey was the fruit of de-escalation policies pursued by Erdogan in recent years.
Reinforcing De-escalation
The major trends of Turkey’s policy towards the region will likely remain unchanged because they reflect Erdogan’s perception of Turkey’s national security and the elite members of his ruling party. Moreover, it is also likely that any possible changes will be introduced to the tools and methods and not to the objectives. For example, Turkey pursued a policy of reconciliation and cooperation with the Arab Gulf states. Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait to achieve two goals. The first goal is to open up the markets of these states for Turkish goods and commodities and expand Turkish businesses operating in these states. The second goal is to increase Gulf investments in Turkey.
Leaders of the Arab Gulf states visited Turkey and pumped huge investments into the country. The trend is likely to continue because, on the one hand, Turkey is in need of financial support from the Gulf at this time and because Saudi Arabia and the UAE are looking forward to establishing strategic relations with Turkey on the other. Moreover, Qatar, too, will follow a similar approach to reinforce its ties and alliance with Ankara.
Erdogan, in his video message on the second day of the World Government Summit in Dubai, on February 14, thanked President His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President, Prime Minister, and Ruler of Dubai, for the support provided by the UAE to Turkey in the aftermath of the powerful earthquake. Erdogan said, “In Turkey, we say that our stability and security are inextricably linked to that of the Gulf region. The Turkish leader also thanked Saudi Arabic for supporting his country.
Turkey continues to pursue the same new policy towards Egypt that is characterized by a willingness to resolve, or at least to freeze, pending political disagreement while at the same time working on enhancing common economic interests. This was reflected in a phone conversation between President Erdogan and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi following the earthquake, a meeting between Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly and representatives of Turkish companies operating or planning to invest in Egypt, and a visit by the Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry to Syria and Turkey.
Additionally, Turkey responded to an initiative launched by Russian President Vladimir Putin in September 2022 to improve relations with the Syrian regime. As a result, the chiefs of intelligence of Turkey and Syria held a series of meetings that paved the way for a meeting bringing together the defense ministers of Turkey, Russia, and Syria in Moscow on December 28, 2022.
The shift in Turkey’s Syria policy perhaps can be explained by a willingness to use Damascus to control the Kurds on Turkey’s border, especially after Ankara became sure that Moscow and Washington rejected any large-scale military land operation in northern Syria.
Other reasons for rapprochement between Turkey and Syria in the aftermath of the earthquake include Turkey’s desire to speed up the repatriation of a maximum number of Syrian refugees and to ditch plans to settle one million Syrian refugees that the AK Party previously embraced.
This rapprochement was also evident in Ankara’s approval of opening two additional border crossing points - the Bab Al-Salama and Al Ra’ee - to facilitate the flow of relief aid into Syria. Turkey also pledged to open its airspace, for the first time since 2012, to airplanes carrying relief supplies to Syria.
Yet, this rapprochement between Turkey and Syria requires an agreement between the two countries reaching a compromise regarding the situation in areas controlled by Turkey in Syria’s northern provinces of Aleppo and Idlib. It also requires approval from Iran, which has a powerful influence on Damascus and wants to ensure that this rapprochement would not be at the expense of its own influence in post-war Syria.
To this end, Tehran sought to take advantage of the earthquake in Syria and sent General Esmail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force of its Revolutionary Guards Corps, to make a show-off visit to the Syrian city of Aleppo. The equipment sent by Iran to the city sported pictures of slain commander Qasem Soleimani. Turkey probably did not welcome this Iranian behavior.
Moreover, Turkey opened the sluice gates of the Ataturk dam to avoid the impact of aftershocks and allow water to flow to the Euphrates River to the Iraqi governorate of Duhok. The move undoubtedly represents a highly positive development for Iraq, which in recent years suffered water scarcity and low levels in the river. That is, this can serve as a starting point for easing tensions marring relations between two countries.
Regarding Libya, Turkey is likely to be unable, in the current circumstances, to increase its military commitments in the North African country and to be interested in establishing political de-escalation and maintaining a ceasefire between the warring parties.
Moreover, there are signs of improving relations between Turkey and Israel. After the latter rushed aid to quake-hit areas, Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Cavusoglu thanked Tel Aviv. Additionally, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen visited Ankara on February 14, 2023, where he met President Erdogan and expressed his country’s full solidarity with Turkey. He said that Israeli carriers are set to resume direct flights to Turkey two days after his visit.
In response to Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, who took the initiative to call Erdogan, and to Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias’ visit to Ankara, where he offered aid, Turkey is likely to pursue de-escalation policy in its dispute with Cyprus over oil exploration and production in the eastern Mediterranean and its dispute with Greece over islands in the Aegean Sea.
A Determinant of the Elections
This analysis presumes that President Erdogan and his party are set to stay in power after they win the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for May 24, 2023. A majority of analysts expect that Erdogan is likely to face the hardest election in his political career. More hardships built up because of his expansionist economic policies. More issues would surface if it turns out that the massive destruction caused by the earthquake was exacerbated by corruption, administrative deviations, and local authorities’ allowing the construction of residential buildings that were not earthquake-proof and did not meet safety standards. The leader of the opposition Republican People's Party Kemal Kılıçdaroglu did not hesitate to throw the accusation at the government, which he held fully responsible for the disaster. The accusation appeared to be well-founded when the government arrested a number of contractors and officials of involved construction companies to question them.
If the opposition parties succeed in closing their ranks and agree on one candidate to run against Erdogan in the election, it would put more pressure on the Turkish leader. That is why some believe that if Erdogan realized that his chances may become slimmer, he might well look for a constitutional exit to postpone the elections. Such an exit might lie in the interpretation of Article 78 of Turkey's Constitution of 1982 with Amendments through 2017, which states that “ If holding new elections is deemed impossible because of war, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey may decide to defer elections for a year. If the grounds do not disappear, the deferment may be repeated in compliance with the procedure for deferment.” The pretext, or the grounds, would be the consequences of the earthquake, which are similar to those of war. This is especially so because the constitution authorizes the parliament to defer the elections. Because he controls the parliament with a majority of loyal members, the move would be a hard one to make for Erdogan, even though it means he would come under wide criticism both at home and abroad.
