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Cairo Mediation

Libya’s elections at crossroads

24 يناير، 2023


The political crises in Libya are set to see a breakthrough when Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), said on January 6, that an agreement on a constitutional basis was reached with Khaled Al-Mishri, Chairman of the High Council of State (HCS), setting the war-weary country on a hopeful pathway for peace. 

A New Old Agreement

Despite high hopes for a political breakthrough in Libya, other experts have voiced their cynicism at the new agreement between the two Libyan politicians. The Mishri-Saleh statement is familiar, having previously announced similar agreements. The new agreement, however, could be analysed in a new context: 

1. Endorsing the constitutional document: 

The Cairo joint statement stressed the importance of finalising the constitutional document upon which the election process would be based. However, Al-Mishri has hinted that the document is pending a full agreement on a few final articles, which remain contentious between the two rival chambers. 

Al-Mishri has reiterated the importance of a comprehensive agreement on the new constitutional document, which would form the basis for a new election process. If the disagreement stands, Al-Mishri proposed a referendum to resolve the disagreement on pending articles. 

The new draft contains 67 articles in contrast to the initial 198-article document drafted by the joint committee of the house and the state mid-last year. The new document has yet to capture the mechanisms of the election process. However, such details are expected to be outlined in the awaited roadmap and revealed in Libya later. 

2. Drafting a new roadmap: 

The joint statement revealed the intention of drafting a roadmap to get the country out of the long-standing political deadlock. The roadmap includes an election deadline set for the end of 2023. The roadmap should enable Libyan factions to form a new caretaker government until elections are held. 

Many experts believe the new roadmap shall resolve the issue of unifying the military institution. This aim has been set as representatives of the Libyan National Army negotiate with armed groups in the west of Libya. The goal would be to integrate these armed groups into the Libyan military. 

3. Welcoming elections: 

The international community and regional powers have welcomed the joint statement. A new hope Libya, the UN commission to Libya has stressed the importance of building on previous agreements between the two chambers and adhering to a clear road map that leads to elections in 2023. 

Similarly, US Ambassador and Special Envoy to Libya, Richard Norland, said that the conclusion of discussions between the leaders of the HoR and HCS leaves no reason to delay setting an early date for parliamentary and presidential elections. The agreement in Cairo is a positive step, said Norland, and thanked Egypt for mediating the talks. The Arab League also has commended the agreement and encouraged all Libyan factions to set clear timelines for the road map. 

Significant Indications

The agreement indicates a key development for Libya’s political future, which we may outline as follows: 

1. Disagreement: 

In Libya, the Mishri-Saleh agreement has had mixed reactions. While some have been optimistic that military officers may step down from government and pave the way for elections, others have been more cynical that the agreement might fall short of achieving real change. The latter view is supported by the fact that, to date, the details surrounding the roadmap remain unannounced. Also, a few articles still need to be subject to agreement by the two sides, casting further doubt over the prospects of the agreement itself. 

Other factions have accused both politicians of pushing their own agenda and cementing the status quo. The agreement is, the opposition has pointed out, formulated in such a way that would lead to the displacement of Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, Libya’s interim Prime Minister, and lessening international pressure over elections timelines. 

2. Alignment between Cairo and Ankara: 

The latest agreement between the two rival sides must be considered in the context of a more recent rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey. The two countries took to de-escalation following a period of tension that peaked when the HoR issued a new law concerning the constitutional court. 

3. Utilising elections: 

Since early January 2023, al-Dbeibah has accused Mishri and Saleh of scheming a ‘dubious’ agreement that would derail elections and split the government between them. al-Dbeibah has offered to run elections this year instead. 

Soon after al-Dbeibah’s statement, the agreement was announced in Cairo. al-Dbeibah has voiced his concerns over the agreement, mainly as officials spoke of potential restructuring of the executive authority. 

Hence, al-Dbeibah has sought to convince Washington to reject the agreement, which may lead to a new government. He has promised energy privileges to American companies in return for supporting his government. Not long after the agreement, Libya’s Minister for Oil and Gas, Mohammed Oun, met Jeffrey Byat, US Assistant Secretary of State, alongside senior executives of ConocoPhillips, a US oil conglomerate, where he discussed potential investments and oil projects in Libya. 

4. International community confusion: 

International actors have been weary of supporting a new executive authority and instead have encouraged both sides to deliver elections this year. The international community is concerned that the decision to create a new executive government would deepen the conflict. The EU, however, has kept quiet about the agreement, casting more doubt over the international community’s position on the Cairo announcement. 

Expected Changes

The political scene in Libya is undoubtedly shifting across three key vectors, outlined as follows: 

1. Anticipated meeting in Libya: 

Mishri and Saleh are expected to meet again in Libya in mid-2023, ahead of announcing the full details of the roadmap once HoR and HSC pass it. 

2. New arrangements: 

In an attempt to widen the Libyan political agreement, Egypt has hosted a meeting between Khalifa Haftar, Supreme Commander of the Libyan National Army, and Head of the Presidential Council, Mohammed Al-Manfi. Parallel meetings have taken place in Jordan where representatives of the Libyan army and rebel militias from western regions have met to discuss prospects for a ceasefire, the second in recent months. 

Experts have speculated that regional mediation for de-escalation may lead to a new political consensus across Libya’s factions, which may benefit the Mishri-Saleh alignment.

3. Libyan partnerships at risk: 

Mishri-Saleh’s alignment could lead to the breaking down of existing partnerships. Reports have speculated about an existing alliance between Haftar and al-Dbeibah in opposition to Mishri and Saleh. Other experts have claimed that meetings in Jordan were meant to forge a new alliance between Haftar and al-Dbeibah, which may shuffle the cards in Libya. Supporters of the former regime have criticised the Cairo agreement, claiming it aims to exclude Gaddafi’s son from running for elections. 

In summary, the prospects of the newly announced agreement between Mishri and Saleh hinge on international support, especially from Egypt and Turkey, and the two politician’s ability to form a new government. Therefore, two scenarios face Libya. The first is that the country would witness a shift in political breakthrough as military officials resign and pave the way for a new civil government while excluding dual citizens, leading Haftar’s son to be nominated. The second scenario further deepens the existing political divide, as new alliances and interests will fuel it.