On December 1, Afghan news agency
'Aamaj News' announced that there were clashes between the Taliban fighters and
Iranian border guards, in which both small arms and heavy weapons were used. The
news agency added that the Taliban fighters managed to control three Iranian border
checkpoints.
By contrast, Iranian news agency
'Tasneem' denied that Afghanistan succeeded in controlling the border checkpoints,
explaining that the clashes were caused by 'a border misunderstanding', and
that the clashes stopped. It also stated that Iranian authorities were
discussing the situation with the Taliban. It is noteworthy that this escalation
is the first of its kind, since the Taliban's takeover of.
Controversial issues
This
recent clash is an indicator of rising tensions between Iran and the Taliban,
which reflects how both sides will deal with conflicting issues, as per the
following:
1. Iranian
forces crossed the borders into Afghan territories:
The
border clash took place near Nimroz State, in the north of Afghanistan, after
Iranian border guards crossed the borders, thus entering Afghan territories. In
retaliation, the Taliban used heavy weapons, sending American armored vehicles
to clash with their Iranian counterparts.
On the other side, Iranian media
had a different story to tell, claiming that the clashes took place after
Iranian farmers crossed a wall, which was built long ago to prevent smugglers
and drug dealers from crossing the borders. This wall, as claimed, is hundreds
of meters from the Iranian-Afghan border. According to Iran, the Taliban
attacked the farmers because it 'thought' that they crossed the border between
the two countries.
Previously, on October 24, Afghan
Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoub Mohammed Omar (son of Mullah Omar, the founder
of the Taliban) threatened neighboring countries, saying that Afghanistan will
not turn a blind eye to any attempt to encroach on its sovereignty, in an
implicit reference to Iran.
2.
Tehran’s opposition to the make-up
of the Taliban government:
Iran is not satisfied as far as
the Afghan cabinet is concerned, as there are no Iran-affiliated Shi’ite
figures among the ministers. Though the Taliban announced that the new cabinet
will comprise figures from the minority groups, this was not enough to Iran,
which was hoping that more Hazaras would assume positions in the new government.
Including key figures from Hazaras would have given Tehran a leverage to
influence Afghan domestic politics.
In this respect, Iranian Foreign
Minister announced October 27, in Neighbors of Afghanistan Meeting, that Iran
believes that Afghanistan's new government should be inclusive. According to Gulbuddin
Hekmetyar, leader of the Taliban-affiliated Islamic Party, this statement was
interpreted as an attempt, on Iran's part, to persuade the international
community not to recognize the new government of Afghanistan.
3.
Tehran is concerned about ISIS'
activities:
Since Taliban took over Kabul, Tehran
has been concerned over the possibility of Afghanistan turning into a safe
haven for terrorists, notably ISIS, as this would constitute a direct threat to
Iran's national security.
Recently, there has been a
remarkable increase in the number of ISIS attacks, which target Shi’ites and
their mosques in Afghanistan. For example, ISIS declared that it is responsible
for the suicide attack on Bibi Fatima Mosque in Kandahar (in the south of
Afghanistan) killing 61 people at least. A week earlier, a similar attack
occurred in Khanabad Mosque (in Kunduz, in the north of Afghanistan), which
killed more than 120 people.
On September 7, IRGC leader
Esmail Qaani said before the Iranian parliament that Afghan Shi’ites are very
important to Iran, and that Tehran has is fully in control when it comes to
Afghanistan. This statement reflects that Tehran believes in military
intervention as an option that can help Iran to counter ISIS and protect Afghan
Shi’ites. The recent border clash, however, has proved this belief to be
ungrounded.
4.
Iran fears that the Baluchis' crisis may surface:
Tehran is concerned that
Afghanistan may become a base for supporting insurgent groups, especially in
border areas, which includes various anti-Iran Sunni movements, most notably,
the Baluchi minority.
In the latest border clash, the
Taliban fighters were able to control several military sites, such as the police
station of Dahrees village, in Hermend city, located in the Sistan and
Baluchistan Province. This gives Iran reason to be concerned, as it means that
Tehran will not be able to conduct any transnational operations in case of any
threats from the Afghan side (especially from Baluchi rebels).
It is noticeable that previously,
Iran-Pakistan relations experienced tension as Tehran accused Islamabad of allowing
Baluchis to use its territories as a base for carrying out operations against
Iran, an accusation which Pakistan denied.
Parallel contexts
The border clash coincides with a
number of developments pertaining to Iran and Afghanistan, which will be
discussed in the following section:
1. The tendency to marginalize
Iran's role in Afghanistan:
Global and regional players are
keen to marginalize Iran's role as far as Afghanistan is concerned. This was manifested
in the meetings of the Troika Plus countries (i.e., Pakistan, the US, China and
Russia). On November 11, Troika Plus representatives met in Beijing for the
first time since the Taliban's takeover. In the meeting, they implicitly recognized
the Taliban government. The Troika Plus countries seem to be bent on getting
the Taliban to compromise in return for financial aid. A parallel path, so to
speak, is the New Delhi Dialogue, comprising Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The common denominator between
these countries is that they all had good relations with the former Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani, whereas their relation with the Taliban is
characterized by cynicism, if not by antipathy. This makes it highly unlikely
that these countries can influence Afghanistan.
2. The US tendency to pursue
pragmatic relations with Afghanistan:
It seems that the US-Taliban
relations have recently come to be characterized by a degree of openness. For
instance, on November 27, an Afghan delegation, led by Taliban Deputy Foreign
Minister Amir Khan Mutaqi, met a US delegation led by US Special Representative
for Afghanistan Tom West. In the meeting, bilateral relations and possible
financial aid were discussed. Undoubtedly, such attitude from the US is
regarded unfavorable by Tehran.
3. The resumption of Iranian nuclear
negotiations:
The recent developments in
Iranian-Afghan relations coincide with the resumption of the seventh round of
Iranian nuclear talks (in Vienna, on November 29) between Iran on the one hand
and the 4+1 Group on the other hand, in which the US is taking part indirectly.
Having started last April, this round of negotiations is supposed to be the
last.
It seems that this recent
development has made it necessary for Iran to avoid any new conflict with
Afghanistan, lest it should negatively affect its position in the talks. Perhaps
this is why Iran's Foreign Minister rushed to announce that the tension has
been contained via coordination between Tehran and Kabul.
In the final analysis, reasons of
tension between Iran and Afghanistan still exist. However, Iran seems to be
keen to contain any tension, at least temporarily, so that it can re-evaluate its
leverage in Afghanistan. It is now obvious that the Iranian role in Afghanistan
does not live up to Tehran's expectations, especially as it is not unlikely
that Kabul may seek rapprochement with US and China under the auspices of
Islamabad. All the recent developments give Tehran reasons to be anxious and
suspicious.