Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan have been ramping up over the past period, initially starting due Azerbaijan’s imposing tolls on Iranian trucks carrying oil and commodities through border areas created the long disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in the wake of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, a recent exchange of accusations between Baku and Tehran, the fiery statements from officials of both countries, the recent war games conducted by Iran, as well as by Turkey and Azerbaijan, all prove that the causes of the current crisis are beyond custom tolls. That is especially because relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have been marred over the past decades by a lack of mutual trust caused by several reasons.

Causes of Tensions

The recent flare up of tensions between Baku and Tehran could only be comprehended when examining the historical and geopolitical contexts that are intertwined with the ambitions of Turkey, Iran and Russia. The three regional countries are the major players in re-arranging the political, security and economic landscape in this sensitive region, which was the scene of a series of wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the past decades. In the latest war, which broke out a year ago, Azerbaijan emerged victorious and inflicted a decisive defeat against Armenia. It is precisely from this point that the causes of the current tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan can be analyzed. Of these causes, the following stand out:

1.    Shifts in the South Caucasus:

The outcome of the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia tilted the geopolitical balance against Iran and in favor of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Consequently, Ankara and Baku joined forces to bolster their influence in the region, leaving Iran behind to become a regional player that has to afford changes and shifts.

Eventually, Azerbaijan has sovereignty over, and enforces its laws in the areas it captured territory in the latest round of fight with Armenia. The Azeri customs now impose a toll on Iranian trucks travelling through Karabakh on their way to Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Europe. Nevertheless, what troubles Iran more is the construction of the Zangezur corridor, also known as the Turkish corridor, between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which inflicted huge losses on Iran, mainly the tolls it used to impose on Turkish trucks travelling to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. However, Iran’s loss will be doubled if and when Turkey and Azerbaijan carried out their plans in this region, and in particular, the construction of a railway through Armenia to link Azeri and Turkish territory.  

2.    Rising Azeri nationalism in Iran:

The Iranian regime is highly concerned by the growing nationalism among millions of ethnic Azeris, who sympathize with Azerbaijan for nationalist, cultural and linguistic reasons. Their nationalist ambitions are growing and even pushing for cessation from Iran who keeps accusing Azerbaijan of backing what it called ‘Azeri separatists’ in northwest Iran, where, up to 1946, they still had an independent state that collapsed after the Soviet Union gave them up and the Iranian forces launched a fierce attack.

In the wake of Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia, tensions over the Azeri population are likely to heighten, prompting Tehran to take a series of security measures including conducting, for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, military drills with the border with Azerbaijan. The war games prompted Turkey and Azerbaijan to carry out joint military drills in a region bordering Iran, amid an exchange of threats and fiery statements from Iranian and Azeri officials. Before that, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkey conducted military exercises in Baku, raising concerns in Iran over the emergence of a new axis on its border.

3.    Iran’s fears over Azeri-Israeli ties:

 Despite the already strong ties between Azerbaijan and Israel, Tehran says that the Nagorno-Karabakh war has significantly strengthened this relationship, and that Tel Aviv now maintains a strong presence on the ground in Azerbaijan to monitor the activities of Iran’s nuclear program and missiles. Deep at home, Iran finds itself surrounded by Azerbaijan, especially after a number of Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated inside Iran and nuclear facilities were hit by sabotage operations. Iran claims that the Israeli presence in Azerbaijan has a hand in all these attacks. However, Azerbaijan believes that Iran is using Tel Aviv’s influence in Azerbaijan as a pretext to escalate against Baku and to justify its military exercises on the border.

4.    Nationalist ambitions of the Turks and Iranians:

Iran is aware that Turkey is the regional power that stands behind Azerbaijan, and that Turkey has grand nationalist ambitions, which pose a challenge to Tehran not only in the Caucasus but also inside Iran. Moreover, Turkish nationalism sparks similar ambitions inside Iran. Therefore, it was not surprising that Iranian media are not talking about Azerbaijan as being a part of Iran before, it was captured by the Tsardom of Russia in 1911. This does heighten the nationalist sentiments of all parties and increase the potential for confrontation.  

Determinants of De-escalation

Escalation between Iran and Azerbaijan suggest that their relations have entered a new stage marked by tensions. There are, however, determinants that might help de-escalate tensions and might even lead to understandings between the two states. The most important of these are:

1.    The Russian factor:

As part of its Eurasian strategy, and in the context of its conflict with the West, Moscow seeks to include all involved parties. Driven by its effective historic role in the Caucasus, it is a potential mediator in any de-escalation of tensions between Iran on one side and Turkey and Azerbaijan on the other. This was evident in a visit to Moscow on October 6 by Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian. Leaks from the meetings he held in the Russian capital have it that the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov proposed a mechanism based on a 3+3 formula - the three South Caucasus states Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and their three neighboring states Russia, Turkey and Iran- to resolve pending issues between them. The proposal might receive approval from the states involved in the current escalation in the Caucasus, a step towards de-escalation, cooperation and joint regional projects.

2.    The diplomacy of interests between Iran and Turkey:

Tehran is aware of the strong influence Turkey has on Azerbaijan, and of the importance of maintaining cooperation with Ankara on hot regional issues, from Syria to the Caucasus, through Iraq as well as bilateral cooperation avenues and energy in particular. Based on that, Iran wasted no time approaching Ankara and sending deputy foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani there on October 7 in an attempt to reach a common view on the current escalation in the South Caucasus. It also should be noted that, over the past days, Turkey has not made any statements that would provoke the Iranians over the current escalation, which was unlike the policy pursued by Turkey on Syria, Iraq, Libya and other conflict zones in which Ankara intervened.

3.    The search for new agreements between Iran and Azerbaijan:

Some believe that the current escalation between Iran and Azerbaijan would not amount to war, and that the main reason behind the escalation has to do with Iran’s attempt to secure its interests, and commercial interests in particular, in the South Caucasus. That is, Iran wants to guarantee the same passage for its trucks as before. However, this requires an agreement with Azerbaijan whereby Baku would cede what it considers sovereignty over territory it captured in its war with Armenia, which means trade routes from Iran to Russia and Europe would be maintained through this territory.

Contradictory Strategies

In fact, and despite the aforesaid determinants that might curb the current escalation in the Caucasus, the contradictory strategies adopted by Iran, on one side, and Turkey and Azerbaijan, on the other, might appear to be sufficient for keeping this conflict on in the coming period, especially because of Ankara’s grand ambitions and the enterprises it proposes as past of a geopolitical shift.

This was evidenced by recent signs of Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s rapprochement with Armenia emerged, including proposed joint projects in transport and communications and the construction of regional corridors. Moreover, Armenia allowed Azerbaijan’s planes to use its air space for flights between Baku and Nakhchivan. Overall, this means a potential partnership between Ankara, Baku and Yerevan would take shape despite their historical disputes. Such partnership can deepen Iran’s wounds in the South Caucasus and may even push it towards further escalation.

The War Scenario

 Some believe that Iran, for many reasons, might well start a war with Azerbaijan. For one, Iran now finds itself surrounded by the Caucasus, and continues to lose huge trade advantages with this vital region. It also finds itself facing regional plans that reduce its role and stature. Nevertheless, what Iran fears the most is seeing the implications of all these regional developments moving into its heartland.

Perhaps what provokes Iran the most now is the stand taken by Russia, which overlooks the sensitive corridors and territory in Karabakh, meaning that the shifts that are underway now in the South Caucasus are overseen by Russia. What compound the issue for Tehran is that these shifts coincide with other shifts that are not in its favor. These include rapprochement between Pakistan and the Taliban after the group’s takeover of Afghanistan, between Turkey and a number of Arab states following the signing of peace treaties, and between Turkey, Egypt and Arab Gulf states. All these ongoing developments coincide with a deteriorating internal situation in Iran, fueled by the faltering nuclear talks, the Western sanctions that are still in place against Iran, as well as the growing indignation of Iranians.

Based on the above, some believe that Iran is likely to start a limited war with Azerbaijan probably to send a tough message to the Iranian Azeris at home that looking beyond the border is not allowed, before Tehran looks for new pacts to secure its interests in the South Caucasus. No one knows how such a war that breaks out on the border will subside. Uncertainty about this is caused by the complexity of this conflict, as well as the conflict of interests and strategies, the intertwined historical and geographical factors amid flaring nationalist sensations in this volatile region.