Currently Bab al-Mandab is witnessing an unprecedented
escalation of threats endangering the global trade movement passing through the
strait. The technological advancement associated with naval mines emerges as an
effective tool in flaring up this threat.
While maritime threats in this region have been common
throughout the last three decades in the Red Sea, yet the threat actors have
changed significantly. The threats emanating from piracy and al-Shabab movement
receded, while the Houthis’ threats to the strait have been on the rise.
Nature of Threats
1. Military
threats: Military threats in Bab al-Mandeb have spiked since October 2017,
as the Houthi militias started launching missiles and planting naval mines, as
well as attacking Gulf vessels using drones. This threatened one of the vessels
operated by UAE, Swift, which operated as a landing pad for troops and
logistics center. In the ensuing weeks, the US Navy intercepted three similar
assaults. In addition, it launched Tomahawk missile strikes to destroy the
coastal radar sites responsible for gathering information needed by Houthis to
carry out such attacks. [i]
Furthermore, a Saudi frigate was targeted off the
Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah at the end of January 2018 by a remotely
controlled drone similar to those used by Iranian smugglers in the Strait of
Hormuz. The US military ships, which cross the Strait of Hormuz, are frequently
harassed by small boats from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy,
using an unmanned, remotely-controlled boat.
Given these risks, the US government has advised that Bab
al-Mandeb Strait should be crossed during daylight hours only, amid growing
threats to vessels.
2. Economic
threats: According to the Annual Energy Report issued by Columbia
University, the closure of Bab al-Mandeb as a waterway, even temporarily, can
lead to significant increases in total energy costs and global energy prices. [ii]
The closure of the strait hinder the passage of the Arabian Gulf oil through
either the Suez Canal, or the Sumed pipeline, thereby increasing the transit
time and cost. In addition, European and Southern African oil flows will no
longer be able to reach Asian markets through the Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandeb.
Based on economic forecasts, the cost of shipping will increase by USD 45
million per day, plus the higher freight costs due to the longer route taken by
the tankers by about 6000 nautical miles.
For Egypt, Bab al-Mandeb strait has an additional
significance as the country maintains its electricity supply through relying on
the imported liquefied natural gas passing through the strait. Egypt receives
one tanker of LNG weekly passing through Bab al-Mandab, thus Egypt is concerned
about any attempts to obstruct the passage to protect its LNG imports. [iii]
Threat Actors
1. The
Iranian role: Iran has worked on expanding its presence in the Horn of
Africa after 2006 Lebanon war, in anticipation of regional and international
reactions to the outcome of that war. As a result, Tehran worked on charting a
new map for its naval influence, expanding beyond its limited presence in the
Arabian Gulf and coastal waters of the Indian Ocean. Elements of the naval
forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have been stationed in the Gulf
of Aden since November 2008, when they dispatched the first warship to carry
out anti-piracy patrols in response to Somali pirates seizing Iranian cargo
ship. [iv]
The Iranian strategy in the Red Sea formulated in 2009 after
holding the Iranian-Djiboutian summit, which was culminated with signing a
memorandum of understanding for mutual cooperation. This cooperation allowed
Iran to create military training centers that aimed to create what was known as
the African Revolutionary Guards. In addition, the Central Bank of Iran granted
loans to the Central Bank of Djibouti and the two countries agreed to establish
a joint committee contributing to the development of Djibouti. [v]
Another factor that contributed to the expansion of the
Iranian role in the Red Sea was the growing relations with the Houthis in
Yemen. The Iranian support to Houthis has played a major role in turning them
into an armed militia, threatening the Yemeni national security, as well as the
national security of the GCC. This has led the Arab Coalition to take actions
to thwart the growing Iranian role in Yemen.
2. Somali’s
al-Shabaab movement: After a period of relative calm, al-Shabaab
al-Mujahideen movement made a strong comeback in Somalia with the attacks that
took place in October and November 2017. Attacks launched by the movement are
the deadliest since 2007 in terms of the magnitude of destruction and losses,
which carry strong messages for the movement’s foes at home and abroad. These
terrorist attacks indicate a desire to prevent the administration of the Somali
President Mohamed Abdullah Farmajo from completing its term.
Al-Shabaab is seeking as well to force the states
participating in African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to withdraw their
forces, which has already been done by Sierra Leone while Kenya and Uganda
still resist. The attempts of al-Shabaab to undermine the nascent efforts to
establish state institutions in Somalia pose a major threat to all Gulf States,
as the chances of terrorist attacks in the region are on the rise.
“The U.N. Security Council’s sanctions monitoring team, which tracks compliance with U.N. sanctions on Somalia and Eritrea, found in 2013 that most Iranian weapons deliveries are coming into northern Somalia - that is, the autonomous Puntland and Somaliland regions – after which they are moved farther south into Shabaab strongholds.”[vi] Thus, the Iranians continue to expand their disruptive influence in the region by arming violent extremist organizations.
Containing Threats
Given the increasing Iranian military role in Yemen, Saudi
Arabia has sought to widen the military confrontation to Djibouti, with the aim
of setting up a military base on its territory facing Yemen, on the other side
of Bab al-Mandeb strait, to thwart any naval threats against its military
operations in Yemen. Djibouti’s Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Ali Yusuf confirmed
these endeavours, saying that his government agreed in principle to establish a
Saudi base in Djibouti. A draft security, military and strategic agreement
between them has already been drafted and will be signed soon he added.
UAE as well established a base in the Eritrean port of
Assab, in order to support the current military operations in Yemen, as well as
to step up their military presence in the region[vii]
and guaranteeing the security of oil exports passing through the Bab al-Mandab
Strait. [viii] The UAE has used this base to launch military
operations, including airstrikes in southern Yemen, while the Emirati combat
ships were involved in enforcing naval blockade of the Yemeni ports of Hodeidah
and Mokha. [ix] This military operation, dubbed as Golden
Victory, is intended to liberate the city from the Iran-backed Houthi militia.
"The liberation of the port is the start of the fall of the Houthi militia
and will secure marine shipping in Bab Al Mandab strait and cut off the hands
of Iran, which has long drowned Yemen in weapons that shed precious Yemeni
blood", said Yemen’s government in a statement announced by Saba news
agency. [x]
Other Regional countries like Egypt began to pay attention
to the security of the horn of Africa. This was evident in the Egyptian
announcement, in January 2017, of the Southern Fleet commander center at Safaga
Naval base in the Red Sea governorate. This naval force included Mistral, which
clearly reveals that in the Egyptian strategic calculation the security
situation might necessitate such intervention. Furthermore the purpose of creating the Southern Fleet Command was not only to facilitate
the management of maritime traffic but to strengthen Egypt’s deterrent
capacities in the face of the threats in the Red Sea region, especially in
the vicinity of Bab Al-Mandeb given the deterioration in the state of
security of Yemen. [xi]
Finally, it could be argued that in the face of the rising
maritime threats in the southern entrance of Red sea, regional countries,
especially Arab Gulf States, have managed to pacify with a high degree of
success the current threats, whether in the face of Iran or Armed non-state
actors.
[i] Kevin
Duffy, Hard Times at the Gate of Tears Bab al-Mandab, accessible at: https://mwi.usma.edu/bab-al-mandab-hard-times-gate-tears/
[ii] John
J. Conti, Energy Outlook 2018Columbia University, Center on Global Energy
Policy, February 13, 2018, NY, accessible at: https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/conti_020132018.pdf
[iii] Jimmy
Drennan, ”The Gate of Tears: Interess and Strategy in Bab el-Mandab Strait”,
Strategy in the BAM, January 31, 2018, accessible at: http://www.marsecreview.com/2018/01/strategy-in-the-bam/
[iv] Michael
Eisenstadt and Alon Paz, Iran's Evolving Maritime Presence, Washington
Institute, March 13, 2014, accessible at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-evolving-maritime-presence,
[v] Fadi
Eid, The Fingers of the Revolutionary Guards in the Horn of Africa, the
Moroccan Center for Contemporary Studies and Research, print.
[vi]) Louis
Charbonneau, “UN Monitors see arms reaching Somalia from Yemen, Iran”, Reuters,
accessible at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-arms-un/exclusive-u-n-monitors-see-arms-reaching-somalia-from-yemen-iran-idUSBRE9190E420130211
[vii] Analysis
of the UAE Military Base in Assab – Eritrea, Tesfa News, December 8, 2016,
accessible at: https://www.tesfanews.net/analysis-uae-military-base-assab-eritrea/
[viii]
Ismail Numan Telci, “Military bases in UAE foreign policy”, Daily Sabah, March
12, 2018, accessible at: https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2018/03/12/military-bases-in-uae-foreign-policy
[ix] Rahma
A. Hussein, The UAE’s Military and Naval Reliance on Eritrea Makes the War in
Yemen Even Riskier for the U.S., Just Security, May 31, 2017, accessible
at: https://bit.ly/2sg5sCf
[x] “Arab
Coalition launches offensive on Yemen’s rebel-held Hodeidah”, The National,
June 13, 2018, accessible at: https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/arab-coalition-launches-offensive-on-yemen-s-rebel-held-hodeidah-1.739551
[xi]
Ahmed Eleiba, “Looking South: The expansion of Egypt’s naval operations”, Ahram
Online, accessible at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/255116/Egypt/Politics-/Looking-south-The-expansion-of-Egypt%E2%80%99s-naval-opera.aspx