The beginning of rebellion against the Mullah regime in Iran as
evident in the #IranProtests that erupted early in January, in addition to
Turkey's President Erdogan voicing support for Iranian President Rouhani
in favor of the stability of Iran signals the possibility of a rapprochement
between the two countries[1].
From the historical perspective, the state of relations between Turkey and Iran
has witnessed ups and downs. Both countries adopt policies that overshadow
their common stakes in their relations. It is possible to make such a statement
if we look at the issues that affect Ankara and Tehran and influence their
foreign policy and relations. These critical issues are mainly the Syrian
crisis, Kurdish question, and the Geneva, Astana and Sochi Talks.
Both countries are also
concerned with the Hakan Atilla case, initiated by the Federal District Court
in Manhattan (NY) in the United States. The suspect, a Turkish and Iranian businessman, Riza Sarraf
(Reza Zarrab) who was later
indicted after confessing to the US Prosecutor's Office, is an integral part of
this evolving issue. Similarly, the Babek Zencani trial - who was convicted of
cheating Iran of $2.8 billion and sentenced to death- is another
significant case of mutual Iranian and Turkish interest.
According to reports in the
Iranian and Turkish press that have circulated since 2010, the former president
of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime was alleged to have been involved in
a joint business between Zarrab and Zencani[2].
Turkey's stance on these reports and accusations is different than that of
Iran. While Iran prosecuted Zencani for corruption and bribery, Turkey has not
opened any process of investigation on Zarrab who been trialed in the US and
Anakara has even perceived the trial as 'fiction'. In other words, there are
cooperative as well as competitive relations between Turkey and Iran in both
bilateral and regional issues. This article attempts to show how the future
relations as well as the areas of cooperation and competition between Turkey
and Iran can evolve.
The Arab
Spring and Syrian Crisis
There have been serious
disagreements on Middle East policy in Iran-Turkey relations for the last few
years. Since 2011, Turkey has been supporting the regime change in Syria
together whereas Iran has been providing military support for the continuation
and preservation of Assad's regime. Accordingly, Iran became the main regional
opponent to Turkey. However, Turkey, despite tensions between the two,
continued its relations with Iran on bilateral energy trade among other areas.
Occasionally when these relations became strained, Erdogan complained that Iran
had expanded its hegemony under the name of Shiism and accused Tehran of
flaring a sectarian war.
Nonetheless, the rapprochement
progress between Turkey and Iran on the Syrian issue and the formation of a
mutual dialogue has started with the Astana process in 2017. The first
reflection of this rapprochement has started with Turkey, Russia, Iran and the
Assad regime working together on the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria
and supporting Baghdad's policies on the Turkish referendum in northern Iraq.
Chief of Staff for the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad
Bagheri visited Turkey twice in 2017[3].
The only issue that was agreed upon during these bilateral visits, according to
various assessments, among new cooperation opportunities was preserving the
status quo in the Middle East.
The Kurdish
question and Northern Iraq
In order to ensure their
territorial integrity, Turkey and Iran, Iraq and Syria demonstrated that they could
work together against changes in the territorial status quo by dealing with
organizations such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDG), Democratic Union
Party (PYD), and People's Protection Units (YPG). These organizations maintain cooperation
with Barzani in northern Iraq, and with the United States in Syria. The Syrian
President, Bashar al-Assad described the Kurds’ co-operation with the United
States as a "homeland traitor"[4]. In
other words, “we can negotiate with the Kurds who do not cooperate with
America”. However, this unexpected rapprochement between Ankara, Tehran
and Damascus did not last long. As Erdogan described Assad “as a terrorist”,
the potential of dialogue between these two sides was closed again[5].
The Assad
Regime and Geneva Talks
One of the
main contentious points on the Syrian war between Iran and Turkey is the Geneva
talks. Iran and the Assad regime are in favor of bypassing the Geneva
negotiations in every manner. The main reason behind Tehran and Damascus’
stance is UN Security Council resolution 2254 in relation to the Geneva
negotiations in 2015 for determining the roadmap of resolving the Syrian Crisis
and starting the negotiations in Geneva. The Iranian regime and al-Assad think
that the negotiations in this framework will work against their interests[6], especially, when coming
to negotiate the removal of Bashar al Assad from power.
This is the most significant
issue requested by the Syrian opposition who participated in these
negotiations. It is also possible to see signs of Russia's close similarity to
this view from time to time. But Russia has not made a final decision on
Assad's departure and is trying to change the view of western countries. And in
this regard, attention was given at the meeting between Trump and Putin in
November 2017 where they made a joint statement to resolve the Syrian crisis
via diplomatic channels and emphasized the Geneva talks[7].
Turkey and Russia agree on the importance of Geneva talks. On the
contrary, Iran is anxious about the breakdown of its influence in case of the
Syrian crisis being resolved in the framework of the Geneva negotiations. The
main reason for the failure of the ninth Geneva negotiations in 2017 is the
provocation of these negotiations on the Assad regime. Both Assad and Tehran’s
approach on the Geneva talks does bother Turkey directly and it demonstrates
potential tensions in working on the strategic issues on the future of Syria.
From Astana to Sochi
The beginning of the Astana
talks process together with the means sought by Turkey, Iran and Russia for
resolving the Syrian crisis since 2016 , resolving the war in Syria was to be within
the framework of Geneva talks. Nonetheless, upon examining the current situation,
there is a risk
of this cooperation collapsing with the concern of the Assad regime and Iran bypassing
the Geneva process. In this context, Russia retaliated against drone attacks after
the assertion that the attack on the Khmeimim and Tartus military bases on 31
December and January 6 respectively originated from Idlib [8].
Nevertheless, the initiaton of the military operation against Idlib by the
Assad regime puts the Astana process under threat. At the same time, it
should not be ignored that the Syrian National Congress (SNC), expected to take
place in Sochi at the end of January, may be postponed. It occurred before when
in January 2009, Syrian opposition’s announcement of its discomforts and indicating
non-participation signals claiming the Sochi talks have become part of Geneva[9].
It is seen that there are
differences of views between Turkey, Russia, al-Assad regime and Iran in
finding the rational outcome of Astana talks in Sochi (SNC) and in context of
legitimacy of all these processes to be a part of the Geneva process. While
Turkey and Iran have objected the participation of Kurds in these processes,
Russia is trying to remain neutral in this regard. Strategic disagreements
between Iran and Turkey on the withdrawal of al- Assad regime, Iran’s objection
on Russia and Turkey’s perception of taking Sochi and Astana processes to be in
the framework of the Geneva process and this 3 + 1 (Turkey, Iran, Russia and
Assad Regime) formation demonstrates a situation where there is a direct
conflict of interest. At the same time the recent Russian policies in Idlib and
coordination of attacks in cooperation with regional groups damages the
interests of Turkey.
Strategic disagreements between Turkey and Iran about the future of Syria and the Astana and Sochi summits with the conflict of interests of the two countries may turn into a serious problem. The perception of Russia, Iran and al-Assad regime on the Kurds who do not cooperate with the United States as a party may put Turkey’s regional interests in jeopardy. In this sense, Turkey’s dialogue started with France and Germany, which shows that the Geneva process is becoming more active and the country is looking for allies. It can be said that the only issue agreed upon between Turkey and Iran in the regional concerns has been to preserve the status quo and to block attempts to change borders, but there is a serious disagreement on how this can be achieved.
[1] Haberler: Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, İran Cumhurbaşkanı
Ruhani ile Telefonda Görüştü, 3 January 2018
https://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-iran-cumhurbaskani-ruhani-10413921-haberi/
[2] Zencani'den idam
öncesi itiraf: Türkiye'de 8,5 milyar dolar rüşvet dağıttım, Cumhuriyet gazetesi
6 April 2016 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/511094/Zencani_den_idam_oncesi_itiraf__Turkiye_de_8_5_milyar_dolar_rusvet_dagittim.html
[3] Kıymet Sezer (2017) “ 9 generalle geldi” Yeni Şafak
gazetesi İstanbul
http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/9-generalle-geldi-2780551
[4] Esad: ABD destekli Kürtler vatan haini Sputnik
Turkish
https://tr.sputniknews.com/ortadogu/201712181031450113-esad-cenevre-sorun-suriye-halki-/
[5] Erdoğan'dan Esad'a terörist suçlaması. DW. 27
December 2017.
[6] Sam Heller. “AMERICA IN SEARCH OF AN UN-GENEVA FOR
SYRIA”. 8 January 2018, War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/america-search-un-geneva-syria/
[7] CNN Turk: Rusya Savunma
Bakanlığı'ndan Suriye'deki Rus üslerine saldırı açıklaması, 9 January 2018. https://www.cnnturk.com/video/dunya/rusya-savunma-bakanligindan-suriyedeki-rus-uslerine-saldiri-aciklamasi
[8] "Russian military eliminates militants who shelled Hmeymim airbase December 31". 12 January 2018.
http://tass.com/defense/984904
[9] Ria Novosty. “Siriyskaya oppozitsiya vystupila protiv provedeniya kongressa nats dialoga v Sochi". 9 January 2018.