ISIS will not be definitely defeated as long as the
Syrian-Iraqi border remains an ungoverned space: On December 11, the Iraqi Army started to reinforce
border security with Syria, deploying more soldiers and border guards on the
road linking al-Qaim (al-Anbar) to Rubia (Nineveh).[1] However, only the military and political inclusion of
the Arab Sunni community into Iraq’s institutions, and in the future state of
Syria, will consolidate these achievements, cleaning the last pockets of jihadi
resistance.
Patchwork Security
The so-called Caliphate has lost all its main cities
in Syria and Iraq. However, jihadists have been relocating in the outskirts: The Syrian-Iraqi border represents the birthplace of
ISIS, as previously was for al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Given the extreme adaptability
demonstrated by the jihadi galaxy so far, it is anticipated that a new
reconfiguration of ISIS could resurge, like a phoenix, in the medium-term, from
this permeable border area.
Looking at current developments in Baghdad and
Damascus, this appears to be one of the most probable scenarios.
Notwithstanding different trajectories, Syria and Iraq, as state entities,
experience a crisis of political legitimacy. After six years of civil war,
Syria’s geographic sovereignty (the same of 2011 in terms of administrative
boundaries) can’t be translated into real political sovereignty, since regional
and international stakeholders with competing goals have agreed de facto on separated, although still
interdependent, spheres of influence.
Both in Iraq and Syria, “patchwork security” has
become the rule. As a matter of fact, sovereignty erosion and state
fragmentation favor locally-based security agreements instead of comprehensive,
national frameworks. Moreover, the coexistence, and sometimes cooperation,
between regular security forces and armed non-state actors multiplies the
variety of security providers on the same territory, leaving room for hybrid
security experiences of combat. De-escalation zones in Syria, as well as the
anti-ISIS military campaign in Iraq, are clear examples of the “patchwork
security” trend.[2]
Imperative of Sunni Integration
This slippery reality affects the Syrian-Iraqi border,
fostering the involvement of foreign and/or transnational players: The causes of the Sunni Arab insurgency have not been
solved, whether in Iraq nor in Syria. Since 2014, the situation has only
worsened along the border. A serious reconstruction plan can’t be delayed, as
the number of internal displaced peoples (IDPs) skyrocketed due to war and
unrest, while the provision of security services is not able to reach
peripheral areas. Moreover, Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias are now present
also in predominantly-Sunni provinces of Iraq, as well as the Bashar al-Assad’s
army in Eastern Syria (Deir el-Zor).
Therefore, the risk of new insurgencies remains high
on the Syrian-Iraqi border. Not to forget that the Arab Sunni protest movement
against central Iraq’s institutions, started on December 2012 in al-Anbar[3], paved the way for ISIS’s territorial and military
impressive escalation. Thus, before counter-terrorism, the stabilization of the
border is firstly about devolution of powers and military integration, welfare
and job opportunities.
The great interdependence between Eastern Syria and
Western Iraq makes things even more complicated. Historically, Badia and
Jazira represent a lone human space with high internal cohesion, almost an
“ecosystem” with own patterns and rules: Tribes, most of Bedouin origins,
are tied by cross-border linkages of blood and marriage, plus economic and
commercial interests. During the Iraq war, fighters and weapons from Syria used
to reach Iraq; then, due to the Syrian civil war, they have followed the
opposite path, from Iraq to Syria.
Patronage Relations
From a geopolitical perspective, regional and
international players have different, often conflicting ideas with regard to
Syrian and Iraqi border provinces. Looking at this permeable frontier,
external penetration is likely to ignite local tensions: Foreign powers’
involvement means “patronage” rather than “aid”, since external help is related
to patron-client dynamics. This is especially true for the Arab Sunni community
(or better “communities” given the internal fragmentation)[4], who has always seek for sponsorship in order to cope
with political marginalization.
Iran aims to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state,
an objective shared by Turkey:
Al-Hasaka (on the Turkish-Syrian border) and Nineveh (on the Iraqi-Syrian
border) governorates are the linchpin of Kurds’ independence ambitions. Yet,
Teheran is also interested in downplaying Arab Sunni governance’s attempts
along the Syrian-Iraqi border. It is willing to maintain the “Shi’ite corridor”
open, connecting Iran to the Mediterranean Sea through Southern Iraq (Basra),
Damascus and the Hezbollah-controlled Southern Lebanon. As a matter of fact,
the “Shi’ite corridor” encompasses the previous “useful Syria” concept (al-Suriya al-mufida, i.e. the triangle
Damascus-Homs-Latakia), thus consolidating the Iranian influence on the Levant.
With regard to Syria and Iraq, the key Turkish goal is
to impede the establishment of a Kurdish nation-state. Beyond tight economic
relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ankara tried to impose
its military presence in Nineveh: In the first half of 2017, this provoked
frictions between Iraq and Turkey, especially when Baghdad blamed the former
Mosul governor Athil al-Nujaifi’s militia (the Ankara-trained Hashd al-Watani, then rebranded Haras Ninawa) of having allowed Turkish
troops to enter and station at the Bashiqa base.[5] Turkey also justifies its actions in Iraq due to the
protection of the Sunni Turkmen minority.
Turkey and the Arab Gulf states compete for outreach vis-à-vis Sunni communities in Syria and
mostly Iraq, even though Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been
stressing Arab nationalism’s role into Iraqi politics, for instance opening
also to Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shi’ite leader who opposes the Iranian expansion
in Iraq. However, unlike Ankara, Riyadh can claim ancient, transnational
tribal linkages with Euphrates’ clans[6] (Shammar, Dulaimi, Jibbouri, Oubaid, Zubaid): Restoring reliable connections with Jazira and Badia’s
shuyyukh would be relatively easy for
the Saudis. However, inter-tribal and, most of all, intra-tribal balances have
deeply changed. Several Iraqi and Syrian Sunni tribes supported ISIS, as well
as some Syrian Sunni tribes cooperated with the al-Assad’s army against
jihadists (Deir el-Zor).[7] These events contributed to furtherly widen the
legitimacy gap between many shuyyukh
and their tribal bases, already eroded by decades of cooptation and patronage
operated by central governments.
Since Baghdad declared ISIS defeated (as territorial
entity), Russia and the United States’ strategic interests amid Syria and Iraq
are going to become more and more conflicting, waiting for 2018 Iraq’s general
elections. Moscow, who has just announced a troop drawdown in Syria, aims to
consolidate influence on the Eastern Mediterranean coast: Notwithstanding
differences, Russians and Iranians both focus on Western Syria (see Moscow’s
new air base in Hmeimim, Homs and the naval one in Tartus). Looking at the
American strategy, not only Washington was unable to challenge the Astana
framework (Russia, Iran and Turkey), but the Trump administration decided to
end covert support for Syrian opposition groups. This opens a new security
vacuum. The US renounce to contain the Iranian influence on the ground, as well
as to counter the ascendance of al-Qa‘ida’s affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
(HTS) along the de-escalation zone of the Syrian-Jordanian border,[8] while tensions are likely to grow in Raqqa's Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) between Arabs and Kurds, not for the ethnic cleavage
(see People's Protection Units-YPG and Shammar tribe cooperation), but rather
for the struggle on energy resources.[9]
Military integration remains an unavoidable step in
order to build stability between Syria and Iraq. In Iraq, the National Guard
act (Qanoon al-Haras al-Watani)
didn’t pass, mirroring competing regional views of military reform.[10].. But this project would be a useful way to include the Arab Sunnis into
the regular military, counterbalancing the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF,
Hashd al-Shaabi). What would be the future for local Sunni fighters who joined
ISIS for salary and protection, especially on the border, or for the small
number of Sunnis who enrolled in the PMF to fight ISIS? This point gains new
prominence now that Iranian proxies are increasing their positioning along the
border, thus in predominantly Sunni areas, favoring potential clashes.[11] As a result,
the Syrian-Iraqi border will be decisive for the fate of Iraq and Syria’s
stabilization, or it could turn into a highway for the resurgence of violence.
The author thanks Dr. Andrea Plebani for commenting on the article.
In
fragmented states, patchwork security refers to locally-based security
agreements and/or the coexistence/cooperation between regular security forces
and armed non-state actors. Eleonora Ardemagni-Umberto Profazio, “New Armies
for a New Era. Decrypting post-2011 Arab Military Reforms: Trends from Tunisia
and the United Arab Emirates”, NATO
Defense College Foundation Working Paper, September 2017 http://www.natofoundation.org/
Kirk H. Sowell, “Iraq's Second Sunni Insurgency”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, The Hudson Institute, vol. 17, 2014; International Crisis Group, Iraq: Falluja’s Faustian Bargain, Middle East Report n°150, April 2014.
Myriam Benraad, “Du phénomene
arabe Sunnite irakien: recompositions sociales, paradoxes identitaires et
bouleversements géopolitque sous occupation (2003-2008), Hérodote-Revue de géographie et de géopolitique, 130, 2008; Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978
Myriam Benraad, “Mosul, Sunni Arabs and the Day After”, pp. 91-108; Ibrahim Al-Marashi, “What Future for Iraq? Unity and Partition after Mosul”, pp.13-32, in Andrea Plebani (ed), After Mosul: Re-Inventing Iraq, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), 2017.
Dawn Chatty, “The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control”, Middle East Journal, vol.64, n°1 Winter 2010.
Kheder
Khaddour-Kevin Mazur, “Eastern Expectations. The Changing Dynamics in Syria’s
Tribal Regions”, Carnegie Paper, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, February 2017.
Genevieve Casagrande, “Southern Syria Deal Fails to Constrain Iran, Al Qaeda”, Institute for the Study of War, November 15, 2017.
[9] Aris Roussinos, After
Raqqa: The Challenges Posed by Syria's Tribal Networks, Terrorism Monitor,
The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 15, Issue 12, June 16, 2017.
Giovanni Parigi, “Iraq: Competing Views of Military Reform”, in Eleonora Ardemagni (ed), Arab Armies, Six Years On, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), ISPI Dossier, December 2017 http://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/arab-armies-six-years-19134
Among them,
PMF’s members as Kata’ib Hezbollah (Rutba, Ramadi, Fallujah, north Ramadi),
Badr Brigade (Falluja area), Hawza militias (affiliated to the leader of the hawza of Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani), Liwa Ansar Allah al-Awfiyah (pro-Iran militia, west of Ramadi and
north east of Fallujah). Institute for
the Study of War, “Iraqi Security Forces and Popular Mobilization Forces:
Orders of Battle”, Report, 1 December 2017.