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Abbottabad Documents

How Did bin Laden Manage His Alliances with Iran and Muslim Brotherhood?

14 نوفمبر، 2017


Amid heightened tensions between the US and Iran, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has released a huge trove of documents of former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, which has been seized in the raid that killed him at his hideout in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad in 2011, just 50 kilometers from Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad.

This is the fourth tranche of Abbottabad documents released by the US intelligence since the military operation that killed him. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Military Academy, in May 2012, published 17 Abbottabad’s documents, but they focused on al-Qaeda threats to the US and the preparation of al-Qaeda for staging a massive terrorist attack against the it.

The last batch of documents unveiled in November 2017 is the largest trove, with 470, 000 files including documents and videos stored in more than 5 computers and dozens of hard disks.

Among the most prominent items disclosed by the U.S. intelligence are the notes written by Bin Laden, or dictated to one of his sons, containing 228 pages, the journal is titled, “Special diaries for Abu Abdullah: Sheikh Abdullah’s points of view — A session with the family”, revealing bin Laden’s visions of Arab revolutions, Al-Jazeera channel and al-Qaeda relations with Iran.

Why Now?

There are several motives behind the CIA’s disclosure of these documents, the most important of which are the following:

1-Exert pressure on Iran: Abbottabad documents confirms the existence of ties between al-Qaeda and Iran, which the US is seeking to exploit to ratchet up regional and international pressures on Iran and label it as a “state sponsor of terror.” This is inseparable from the US  new package of sanctions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah, and Donald Trump’s bid to renegotiate the Iranian nuclear deal.

2-Direct the attention to al-Qaeda: The field retreat of ISIS in its main strongholds in Syria and Iraq led to growing attention to al-Qaeda and its local offshoots, as the revelation of documents coincides with the siege of ISIS’s last concentration area in Deir ez-Zor in Syria, prompting the US to rearrange its priorities and focus on the fight against al-Qaeda and its affiliates at the global level.

3-Trust crisis between Trump and intelligence agencies: The disclosure of documents comes amidst muffled tensions between President Donald Trump and the US national security institutions against the backdrop of increasing leaks about the links between Trump and his aids and Russia before the presidential election, which are being used in the ongoing investigations. On his part, Trump exerts pressure on these institutions through several means, inter alia, permitting the publication of classified documents such as those relating to assassination of the former US President John F. Kennedy, prompting the agency to release the huge cache of bin Laden’s documents as a pre-emptive step.

Al-Qaeda's Alliances

Reviewing the content of the Abbottabad documents reveals the map of external relations of al-Qaeda -intellectually and organizationally-according to bin Laden’s visions. The most important revelations are as follows:

1-Intellectual impact of the Muslim Brotherhood: In his diaries, bin Laden asserted that he was intellectually impacted by Muslim Brotherhood during his upbringing, saying: “I was committed to the Muslim Brotherhood, despite their limited curricula.” He added that he was influenced by the founder of the Brotherhood in Yemen, Abdel Majeed Zendani, eleader of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (frequently called al-Islah), classified by the US as a terrorist.

This is a confirmation of the information mentioned by Ayman al-Zawahiri in a previous recoding broadcasted by As-Sahab Foundation, affiliated to al-Qaeda, where al-Zawahiri stated that bin Laden was a member of Muslim Brotherhood, and that the “organization” sent him to Pakistan when the Soviet invasion took place, on a specific mission, namely, to provide support for Jemaah Islamiyah there. The “organization” ordered him not to enter Afghanistan. Al-Zawahiri pointed out that Mustafa Mashur, former Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood visited Peshawar afterwards and met bin Laden and asked him to return to the Brotherhood.

2-Support Erdogan’s policies: Bin Laden revealed that he had ties with the religious movements in Turkey since early stages, noting that his first “jihadist mission” was to Turkey via Syria, where he met the leaders of “Erbakan Party” in 1976, namely the National Salvation Party (Turkish: Millî Selâmet Partisi, MSP). The party was then led by Necmettin Erbakan, the spiritual leader of political Islam in Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdogan is considered among the second generation of his followers.

In a different context, bin Laden referred to his vision of the developments in Libya and concluded by saying that Erdogan was “doing a good job”, meaning that Turkey’s intervention in the ongoing conflict in Libya would support the ranks of militant groups.

3- Al-Qaeda links to Iran: Among Abbottabad documents, the U.S. intelligence released a document written by a senior al-Qaeda leader who revealed that Tehran offered to supply the organization with all its needs such as “money, arms and training in Hezbollah camps in Lebanon” in exchange for targeting “American interests in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf”. 

The document also confirmed that the Iranian intelligence agencies facilitated the travel of some al-Qaeda members to Iran by providing them with the needed visas. Also, they helped Abu Hafs al-Mauritani to find a safe haven for his comrades inside Iran prior to September 11 attacks.

Another document revealed that al-Qaeda and Iran coordinated accommodation for some al-Qaeda leaders and their families in Tehran, and that Iran identified the countries to which they can move to, such as Syria and Qatar. The documents included also confirmation that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (former leader of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia) moved to Iran as military operations intensified against the organization, but the Iranian authorities arrested him, forced him to choose whether to travel to Malaysia, Turkey, Pakistan or Indonesia. However, he chose to return to Iraq.

In addition, the documents included letters written by bin Laden to his sons and wife in Iran, that he warned his son Hamza against trusting his Iranian hosts, in reference to the Iranian intelligence.

4-Moinoring Arab revolutions: Abbottabad documents disclosed that bin Laden was interested and followed-up the Arab revolutions. The documents, which were written about a month before he was killed, showed that he was considering the right time for al-Qaeda to intervene openly in the revolutions, but he showed- at the same time - reluctance to declare his support for the Islamists in Libya lest the US expand its footprint in Libya following the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime.

One more document uncovered bin Laden’s support for the Arab revolutions. He believed that they would create a favourable environment for achieving al-Qaeda’s objectives and spreading its thoughts and ideas. However, at a later stage, he indicated his dissatisfaction with the speed of change that accompanied the Arab revolutions, saying: “I am upset by the timing of the revolutions. We told them to slow down.” Bin Laden believed that toppling Arab regimes was in the interest of al-Qaeda.

5-Support Al-Jazeera channel: Bin Laden hailed Al-Jazeera channel for carrying the “banner of revolutions,” noting that al-Qaeda exploited the channel as a platform that helped spread its news and ideas. He stressed that al-Qaeda avoided interfering in the Arab revolutions for fear of undermining Al-Jazeera’s position.

Explaining why Al-Jazeera avoided covering the protests in some Arab countries, bin Laden said that the channel did so lest it faces more criticisms, but when protests intensified, they did intensify coverage.

Bin Laden praised Al-Jazeera for hosting the leaders of hardline religious movements, especially Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who is on the list of terrorism in a number of Arab countries, saying that: “When Al- Qaradawi talks about revolutions, he increases people’s confidence that the revolutionaries are right”. 

In conclusion, Abbottabad’s documents are likely to bring to light more important information about the web of alliances and external links of al-Qaeda and its supportive countries, financially and logistically, and the closely related media platforms, which promote its ideas, as well as the ties between it and political Islam movements, which seek to seize power and claim moderation and non-violence in the Middle East countries.