The
38th GCC Summit will be held on December 5 and 6 in Kuwait. This
Annual summit of Gulf Arab heads of state is of paramount importance as it is the
first of its kind since the eruption of the Qatar Crisis, on June 5, 2017. It
comes amid critical circumstances and timing, especially after the failure of
the previous regional and international mediation attempts, the mounting Iranian
threats across the region and the recent assassination of Yemen’s former
president Ali Abdullah Saleh by the Houthis on December 4.
The
article will focus on whether there are prospects of utilizing the upcoming summit meeting to
discuss the Qatari crisis, by addressing the factors that may facilitate
resolving the crisis, as well as the challenges, and implications on the future
of the GCC.
Kuwait Mediation
The
Kuwaiti mediation efforts have been the most prominent initiative throughout
the crisis. The Emir, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, has made
persistent efforts to ease off the tensions, despite the setbacks and
challenges he previously faced. In this summit, it is expected that Sheikh
Al-Sabah would continue his efforts to, at least, set the roadmap for resolving
crisis.
Several
indicators reflect that there might be intentions to attempt to solve the crisis, which are as follows:
Positive
Indicators
1.
Attendance: According to
Reuters, the Qatari Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani is expected to attend
the summit as confirmed by the Qatari foreign minister.[1] Furthermore,
an unnamed source told CIPHER that the summit was likely pushed ahead after the
approval of King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud.[2]
2.
Al-Jubair’s statements: In an
interview with an Egyptian TV Channel, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir
stressed upon the fact that the Qatar crisis forced Doha to take several
measures that partially fulfill the Quartet countries’ demands including:
signing an agreement with the US, and allowing US officials to audit and
monitor Qatari banks. Moreover, Doha has reduced its support to terrorist
organizations in Syria and Libya. Yet, al-Jubeir stressed that the remaining concerns for the Quartet
countries, which need to be addressed by Qatar to restore the trust, include what measures Qatar would take
against terrorism financiers, and members of terrorist organizations residing
in Qatar, including the Muslim Brotherhood.[3]
3.
Qatari Reconciliatory Tone: Sheikh
Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, the Qatari foreign minister, stated that
summit is expected to result in setting a roadmap and a clear mechanism to put
an end to the crisis. He also expressed his country’s readiness to discuss
regional security concerns.[4]
Persistent Regional
Challenges
Yet, despite that there might be some minor positive indicators, there are key disputes that would hurdle any attempts for reconciliation. The most important of which are the following:
1- Qatari – Iranian relations: Despite positive statements from both sides,
there are still a number of factors that could hinder resolving the crisis. The
most prominent of which is Qatari relations with Iran. It should be taken in
consideration that one of the main reasons behind the Quartet decision to sever
ties with Qatar is the hostage deal in which Doha paid about USD 1 billion to
release members of its royal family, who were kidnapped in Iraq while on a
hunting trip. Around USD 700 million was paid to Iranian figures and regional
Shi’ite militias.[5]
Thus, Qatar was paying Saudi’s archrival, Iran, which is accused of fueling
conflicts and sectarianism in the Arab world,[6] at a
time the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has reached its climax.
In
addition, on October 3, 2017, the Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad
Zarif held a meeting with the Emir of Qatar to discuss their bilateral
relations, as well as regional issues. According to Qatar’s News Agency, quoted
in Al-Arabiya, “the meeting demonstrated cooperative relations between both
counties in various fields. In addition, discussions took place on the status
of the region, including current events.” The Emir further expressed his
“comfort regarding strengthening ties between Qatar and Iran.”[7]
Furthermore,
Qatar along with Turkey and Iran continued to deepen their trilateral relations
evidenced by the signing of a transportation pact on November 28, 2017, which
is expected to help accelerate commodity delivery and facilitate trilateral
trade.[8] This
came amid escalating tensions between Tehran and Riyadh, especially after the
Saudis successfully intercepted the Iranian Burkan 2-H missile, fired by the
Houthis to target King Khaled International Airport, 20km north of Riyadh.[9] Relations
between Tehran and Riyadh will further deteriorate after the assassination of
Ali Abdullah Saleh by Houthis, following Saleh’s declaration of alignment with
Riyadh two days earlier.
2-
Qatari, Turkish and Muslim Brotherhood Alliance: The Qatari–Turkish relations is partially
ideological in nature, as Turkey’s AKP-led regime, allied with Qatar supports
the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the region, especially in the aftermath of
the 2011 Arab Spring[10]. This is evident in war-torn countries such as
Libya and Syria. They also share the same aggressive position and antagonism towards
the post 2013 Egyptian government, who managed with popular support to oust the
Muslim Brotherhood.
This
alliance was strengthened through military cooperation treaties between Ankara
and Doha in 2015, allowing a Turkish military base to operate in Qatar. After
the Qatari Crisis occurred, Turkey threw its weight behind Qatar through
accelerating the deployment of Turkish troops in Doha.
One must pinpoint that the Turkish–Qatari
alliance act as a revisionist power, seeking to change the regional status quo,
by sponsoring regimes and non-state actors that are loyal to them, either
ideologically or on sectarian basis.
Preventing the
collapse of the GCC
Despite
the mercury situation in the GCC, the escalating regional tensions with Iran
may offer a good opportunity for the GCC to resolve its differences and restore
its cohesiveness as a functional regional organization in a turbulent region. One
positive indicator is in contrast to the claims that the GCC summit will be
postponed for six months; its occurrence in its scheduled timing reveals the
states’ commitment to the GCC regardless of the ongoing rift. The GCC foreign
ministers meeting on Monday, December 4, held on the eve of the heads of state
summit, reflects the shared commitment of trying to reach a unified gulf
strategy on regional matters[11].
It
is believed that the evolving situation in Yemen, and the Houthis assassination
of Saleh will be a top priority of the 38th GCC summit. As this
crucial meeting convenes with the summit opening scheduled at 5:30 pm (Kuwait
time) on December 5[12],
the Arab Gulf States will affirm that its internal crises are to be settled
from within the GCC.
To conclude, despite positive rhetoric regarding possible breakthrough in the Gulf stalemate, "political trust crisis" between conflicting parties is still a significant impediment hurdling rapprochement. It should not be ignored that Qatar previously accepted to modify its foreign policies in the 2014 agreement, and accepted all the Arab Gulf demands. However, Doha renegaded all its commitment and didn't comply to any of the requested demands, which eventually led to the current crisis. If the conflict was not resolved within the GCC, we might see a more flexible "alliance of the willing" countries of similar foreign policy orientation.
[1] “Qatari Emir to Attend Gulf Summit Despite Row: Foreign Minister”. Reuters. 3 Dec. 2017. Accessible at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-summit/qatari-emir-to-attend-gulf-summit-despite-row-foreign-minister-idUSKBN1DX0O4
[2] Sigurd Neubauer. “View: Washington is Outsourcing the Qatar Crisis”. The Cipher Brief. 3 Dec. 2017. Accessible at:
[3] " الجبير من
القاهرة: ننتظر إجراءات قطر بحق الاخوان المسلمين"“Al-Jubeir
from Cairo: We await Qatar’s actions against the Muslim Brotherhood”. Russia
Today. 19 Nov. 2017. Accessible at:
[4] “تميم يبعث رسالة لأمير الكويت قبل يوم من القمة الخليجية” “Tamim
sends a message to Emir of Kuwait a day before the Gulf summit”. Russia
Today. 4 Dec. 2017. Accessible at: https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/913571-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9/
[5] Erika Solomon. “The
$1bn Hostage Deal that Enraged Qatar’s Gulf Rivals”. Financial Times. 5 June
2017. Accessible at: https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43
[6] Ibid.
[7] “Qatar’s
Emir: We are Comfortable with our Growing Iran Relations”. AlArabiya 4
Oct. 2017. Accessible at: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/10/04/Qatar-s-Emir-Tamim-We-are-comfortable-with-our-growing-ties-to-Iran.html
[8] “Iran,
Turkey, Qatar Sign Deal to Ease Doha Blockade”. Financial Tribune. 28
Nov.2017. Accessible at: https://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/76877/iran-turkey-qatar-sign-deal-to-ease-doha-blockade
[9] Naser Al
Wasmi. “Houthi attack on Riyadh highlights Yemen missile threat”. The
National 5 Nov. 2017. Accessible at: https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/houthi-attack-on-riyadh-highlights-yemen-missile-threat-1.673279
[10] Curtis R.
Ryan. “Regime Security and Shifting Alliances in the Middle East”. Project
on Middle East Political Science. Accessible at: https://pomeps.org/2015/08/20/regime-security-and-shifting-alliances-in-the-middle-east/
[11] Mirza
al-Khuweidli. “Gulf Summit to kick off in Kuwait amid Internal
Challenges”. Asharq Al-awsat. 5
Dec. 2017. Accessible at: https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1104036/gulf-summit-kick-kuwait-amid-internal-challenges
[12] Ibid.