On October 13, US President Donald Trump
announced his decertification of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
citing Iran’s violation of the accord’s “spirit”, and laid out his strategy for
countering Tehran’s expanding influence more aggressively.[i]
Yet without unilaterally scrapping the JCPOA, Trump told Congress and US allies
in the P5+1 that they must ‘fix’ the accord by imposing more stringent
constraints on Iran. If they fail to do so, the US president is threatening to
“terminate” the agreement.[ii] Due
to Trump’s decertification decision, which constitutes the gravest action
against the JCPOA’s legitimacy since its passage, and the Treasury Department’s
new sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), US-Iran
relations have entered a new phase marked by more confrontation and less
diplomacy. The implications for the Middle East’s security landscape will be
significant with the specter of direct confrontation between the US and Iran,
in addition to substantial increase of the arms' race between key Middle
Eastern states.
Iran’s Stance
If the US unilaterally walks out of the JCPOA,
Iran would likely see the costs of complying with the JCPOA as outweighing the
benefits. Under such a scenario, Iran could also possibly join North Korea in being
the only other country to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[iii] Although
President Hassan Rouhani responded to Trump’s speech maintaining that Iran
would continue adhering to the JCPOA regardless of Washington’s moves, he
warned that Tehran would only remain compliant with the accord if the other
signatories do so too.[iv] On
October 18, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, vowed to tear the JCPOA to
shreds if the US abandons the agreement.[v]
If Iran would no longer be a party to the JCPOA and/or NPT, the Iranians would attempt
to enrich uranium without being committed to the treaty's constraints. Some
scholars argue that if Iran persists on its endeavor to become a nuclear state,
along with its interventionist policies in the region, some Arab states may
consider developing nuclear capabilities as a form of deterrence, fueling a
nuclear arms race in the region.
Washington’s Internal Dynamics
The risks of regional instability heightening
from Iran having free reign to enrich more uranium have largely contributed to
disagreement within Trump’s administration. Secretaries of Defense and State,
James Mattis and Rex Tillerson, warned against abandoning the JCPOA without any
evidence of Iran’s violations of any of the accord's technical terms, of which
there is none according to the International Atomic Agency and US and Israeli
intelligence agencies.[vi],
[vii],
[viii],
[ix]
From Mattis and Tillerson’s vantage point, while Washington and its allies
should hawkishly counter Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East, it is better
to address the Iranian menace through policies that do not threaten to unravel
the JCPOA.
Yet
those in Washington who support Trump in weakening the JCPOA, and possibly soon
terminating the accord, argue that threatening the future of the nuclear
agreement offers America more leverage over Iran with respect to non-nuclear
issues including Tehran’s missile testing and its support for the Syrian regime
and various non-state actors in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC).
With Trump shifting the JCPOA’s fate to the US
Congress, American lawmakers will have the authority to unravel the accord.
Trump has urged Congress to establish “trigger points” by December 12 that
could automatically reimpose sanctions on Tehran should the Iranians not comply
with the new constraints imposed unilaterally by Washington. Yet according to
the European Union’s chief diplomat, Federica Mogherini, the US Congress
intends to ensure Washington’s compliance with the JCPOA despite the
president’s position.[x]
Although each Republican member of the Republican-controlled Congress opposed
the JCPOA, now that the accord has been implemented and receives staunch
support from Washington’s Western allies – in addition to China and Russia -
American lawmakers from Trump’s party are indicating that in the interest of
preserving the US’ credibility on the international stage. Accordingly, they
are likely going to push for foreign policy initiatives to challenge Tehran
more aggressively throughout the Middle East without unravelling the JCPOA.
Iran’s
Domestic and Foreign Outlook
Odds are good that Trump’s policies vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic will further
backfire against his administration’s interests in empowering Iran’s
reformists. In June, Tillerson implied that the US was in favor of regime
change in Tehran, stating that supporting “elements inside of Iran that would
lead to a peaceful transition of that government” was the administration’s
policy.[xi]
Yet Trump’s increasingly anti-Iranian foreign policy is strengthening the
IRGC’s prestige and legitimacy among Iranians across the country’s political
spectrum. Consequently, the Iranian regime has capitalized on growing
nationalism as more citizens of the Islamic Republic have rallied around the
flag, ultimately undermining the Iranians seeking to democratize their
country’s political system and embrace more Western influence.[xii]
New sanctions on Iran, especially nuclear
ones, would increase Tehran’s hostility toward the US and result in a more
aggressive Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East. The unravelling of the
JCPOA would empower those in Iran who have argued that engaging Washington
diplomatically is counter-productive, and weaken arguments of “moderates” in
Tehran who seek more compromise with the United States in the future.
Last month, the IRGC commander warned that Tehran would respond to new
sanctions with more missile tests and expansion of its arsenal, which could
target America’s military bases and personnel in countries near Iran.
Unquestionably, officials in Tehran are keen on avoiding a war with America and
the JCPOA’s unraveling is unlikely to push Iran toward starting one with the
US, yet the Islamic Republic may begin conducting a foreign policy in the Arabian
Gulf that bears certain features of notably similarity to North Korea’s conduct
in Northeast Asia. Within this context, the Trump administration would probably
fail to work in tandem with Iran in the war against ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and
perhaps elsewhere, as the US military did under Obama albeit unofficially so.
In sum, due to the Trump administration’s
plans to confront expanded and consolidated Iranian influence in the Middle
East more aggressively, there is a high probability that instability throughout
regional hotspots from the Levant to Yemen and Bahrain to Afghanistan will
intensify. Although there is no indication that either the Trump administration
or Iran’s regime seek an all-out US-Iran war, the risks of such a scenario are
heightened as the White House has abandoned the Obama administration’s efforts
to ease tension in Washington’s relationship with the Islamic Republic.
* Dr. Theodore Karasik is the senior advisor at Gulf State
Analytics (@GulfStateAnalyt), a Washington,
DC-based geopolitical consultancy.
Mr. Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics.
[i]
Edelman, Adam. “Trump Threatens to
Cancel Iran Nuclear Deal If It's Not Strengthened.” NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News Group, 13 Oct. 2017, accessible at: www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-puts-iran-nuclear-deal-hands-congress-n810366
[ii]
Ibid
[iii]
Oh, Kongdan, and Ralph C. Hassig.
“North Korea: A Rogue State outside the NPT Fold.” Brookings, Brookings, 28 July 2016, accessible at: www.brookings.edu/articles/north-korea-a-rogue-state-outside-the-npt-fold/
[iv]
Cunningham, Erin. “Iran's President
Fires Back at Trump on Nuclear Deal.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 13
Oct. 2017, accessible at: www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-blasts-trumps-moves-against-nuclear-deal-revolutionary-guard/2017/10/13/f5d6c5de-aeba-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.6e7625056b18
[v]
Shelbourne, Mallory. “Supreme
Leader: Iran Will 'Shred' Nuclear Deal If US Backs Out.”TheHill, 18 Oct. 2017, accessible at: thehill.com/policy/international/middle-east-north-africa/355982-supreme-leader-iran-will-shred-nuclear-deal-if
[vi]
DiChristopher, Tom. “Trump
Administration Still Weighing Options for Iran Nuclear Deal, Tillerson Says.” CNBC, CNBC, 4 Oct. 2017, accessible at: www.cnbc.com/2017/10/04/trump-administration-still-weighing-options-for-iran-nuclear-deal-tillerson-says.html
[vii]
Cunningham, Erin. “Iran Adhering to
Nuclear Deal with World Powers, U.N. Watchdog Says.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 31 Aug. 2017, accessible at: www.washingtonpost.com/world/iran-adhering-to-nuclear-deal-with-world-powers-un-watchdog-says/2017/08/31/cb408e7d-bc9a-4874-bbdf-001f919a8c86_story.html?utm_term=.4fe045b306eb
[viii]
“US Defense, Intelligence Officials
on Nuclear Deal.” The Iran Primer, 4 Oct. 2017, accessible at: iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2017/oct/03/us-defense-intelligence-officials-nuclear-deal
[ix]
Harel, Amos. “Israeli Intel Warns
Netanyahu against Pushing Trump to Undo Iran Deal.”Haaretz.com, Haaretz, 21 Jan.
2017, accessible at: www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.766210
[x]
Morello, Carol. “Despite Trump's
Misgivings, Nuclear Negotiator and Watchdog Say Iran Deal Works.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 7 Nov. 2017, accessible at: www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/despite-trumps-misgivings-nuclear-negotiator-and-watchdog-say-iran-deal-works/2017/11/07/c7192d8e-c3ed-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_story.html
[xi]
Takeyh, Ray. “It’s Time to Prepare
for Iran’s Political Collapse.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 5
July 2017, accessible at: www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/07/05/its-time-to-prepare-for-irans-political-collapse/?utm_term=.33bf4596fa02
[xii]
Hafezi, Parisa. “Iranians Fear
Economic Hardship, but United against Trump.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters,
14 Oct. 2017, accessible at: www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iranians/iranians-fear-economic-hardship-but-united-against-trump-idUSKBN1CJ0FN