Hezbollah’s deals with ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly al-Nusra Front) revealed a rise in its pragmatic orientations after years of involvement in the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah achieved various gains from its involvement in the ongoing conflict in Syria, the least of which were the non-conventional arms systems that match those of regular armies, combat and field experiences, in addition to assuming trans-border roles through negotiating and making deals with regional and international powers. Such gains will be reflected on the orientations of the party inside Lebanon and the region as whole. 

Hezbollah’s Deals

Hezbollah’s tendencies to cut deals with terrorist organizations and armed militia have increased along with its growing involvement in the Syrian war. In 2017, the party reached an agreement with ISIS factions to withdraw an average of 300 of their elements and their families from the Lebanese-Syrian border to al-Bukamal town, in the rural city of Deir al-Zor northeast Syria, with the approval of the Assad regime.

In return, ISIS released a war prisoner of Hezbollah and returned the remains of a number of fighters and members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who were killed on battlefields against ISIS in the Syrian desert, Qalamoun and Deir al-Zor. In addition, ISIS disclosed the fate of eight Lebanese soldiers, who were captured by ISIS in Arsal in 2014. 

The deal sparked strong regional and international objections, especially after the party and the Assad regime supervise the transfer of ISIS elements and their families by buses and ambulances escorted by Syrian forces and Hezbollah elements. 

In August 2017, Hezbollah negotiated a similar deal with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, under which thousands of the latter’s elements withdrew from the Lebanese-Syrian border, especially Arsal town, in exchange for releasing a number of Hezbollah elements, in addition to ceasefire. This could be considered the foundations of a new role of Hezbollah in the Syrian war, where it will work to calm some fronts with terrorist organizations and assume negotiating roles on behalf of the Assad regime and Iran in the border area with Lebanon.

Pragmatic Rise

Despite ideological contradictions between Hezbollah and terrorist organizations, they resemble one another in their dual vision of the world. Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the party, admits that there are only two competing projects: his project and counterproject, while ISIS doctrine divides the world into two communities: one governed by ISIS and “Jahiliyyah” one, which includes all those who oppose it. 

Contrary to the expectation that similarity in radical and exclusionary visions, which form the basis of their political projects, will hinder them from making deals or accepting negotiations with the other; Hezbollah and ISIS managed to reach the above-mentioned deal. This reflects a decline in the ideological considerations governing their moves, and rather a focus on the pragmatic gains of flexibility in dealing with opponents in the field.

On the other hand, the Lebanese army maintained its goals from the first day in the operation Jroud Dawn and made no concessions in its quest to end the presence of ISIS fighters inside Lebanon; a matter confirms the extent of the difference between the priorities of the regular armies and armed militias. 

The priority of Hezbollah was to focus on clearing the Syrian areas adjacent to the Lebanese border from ISIS fighters, and to calm on of the combat fronts to allow Assad regime to concentrate on other fronts. Thus, the party acted as a mediator between ISIS in one hand and Assad regime and Iran on the other hand. 

However, ISIS fighters were keen to escape from the siege of the Lebanese army and move from the Lebanese-Syrian border area to escape to a safer area inside Syria with the lowest possible losses. This made Hezbollah’s deal ideal for ISIS and vise versa, which shows the convergence of interests between the two sides.

Complex Calculations

Although initial assessments confirm that Hezbollah deal with ISIS achieved the goals of all parties, the deal was more suitable for the calculations of the party and ISIS, rather than  the Lebanese army. The Lebanese army is a part of the confrontation not the deal, where it managed to lay siege on areas with concentrations of ISIS and targeted ISIS elements in the early days of the military operation, forcing them to withdraw towards the Syrian territory. In addition, the Lebanese army recovered several areas, including those in which Lebanese soldiers were buried by ISIS, where the army found them with a simple sweep. 

Thus, the deal saved ISIS from certain defeat, especially that it was reached a few days after the start of the Lebanese army’s military operation, yet Hezbollah did not wait for the army to complete its victory on the battlefield.

Hezbollah’s calculations focused on not letting the Lebanese state to accomplish any military achievement without making itself a partner in that achievement. Secondly, it focused on exploiting the military confrontations with ISIS as a cover to pass the swap with ISIS, exploiting the party’s help to solve a national issue to hide the Syrian and Iranian motives to cut deals with terrorist organizations. 

Significance of the Deals

Hezbollah deals with ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham revealed several significances, mainly as follows:

1. Lebanese border priority: The deal confirmed Iran’s awareness of the importance of having full control over the Lebanese-Syrian border and clearing it of all terrorist organizations, as compared to the Iraqi-Syrian border where Iran seeks to secure land corridor to connect it with Lebanon. The Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar called it “liberation route”, sparking objections from some of Iran’s allies in Iraq, who bear the costs of Iran’s deals with ISIS, which are reached through Hezbollah mediation.

2. Pragmatic calculations top the agenda: Hezbollah pragmatic calculations take precedence over ideological rigidity. This was made clear by the contradictory statements of its leaders and the duplicity of Hassan Nasrallah, who made clear his opposition in 2016 to providing open and safe corridors for the withdrawal of ISIS fighters from Iraq, while justifying safe exit for them from east Qalamoun in 2017. This is attributed to Hezbollah keenness to conclude future deals with ISIS and build relationships based on mutual gains and common interests.

3. Rivalry with the Lebanese state: Hezbollah seeks to confront the military and security institutions of the Lebanese state, and does not admit that the Lebanese army can alone take the necessary preventative and defensive measures to protect the Lebanese people. This was clearly manifested by Hezbollah’s show of power, where it takes unilateral decisions without consulting the institutions of the Lebanese state, and presents them with a fait accompli. Hezbollah is concerned over the growing military capabilities of the Lebanese army, the prospects of renewed debate over handing over its weapons, integrating its forces with the Lebanese army, and ending its involvement in the Syrian war.

Mounting Pressures 

Hezbollah’s deals with terrorist organizations have several internal and regional consequences. Domestically, the deal fueled political squabbling between supporters and opponents over its weapons, increased calls to end the military duality in Lebanon, to give the Lebanese Army full control over defense affairs and to monopolize solely the right to possess arms in Lebanon. However, the deal did not affect the equation upon which the current Lebanese government was formed. 

At the security level, the Lebanese forces will increasingly focus on Hezbollah moves to take one-sided decisions to achieve the interests of external parties, particularly Assad regime and Iran, which will increase the countertrends to defend the Lebanese internal interests in the face of the “unilateralist tendencies of Hezbollah”.

On the regional level, there have been increased warnings by Israel against the expanding role of Hezbollah in Syria, as an indication of growing Iranian influence, and as preparation for a long-term Iranian presence in Syria through regional proxies. Thus, raids on the border areas between Lebanon and Syria are likely to increase, especially if Hezbollah decided to get weapons to break the balance with the Israeli enemy. 

This is inseparable from the Israeli military exercises in September 2017, the largest of its kind in many years, with the participation of tens of thousands of troops and reservists from land, air and naval forces, to simulate the evacuation of cities and counter infiltrations at the border by Hezbollah.

In conclusion, Hezbollah is expected to continue striking deals with armed militias and terrorist organizations in Syria as part of implementing the Iranian agenda in the areas under its control. It is further a part of its quest to preserve the Iranian interests on the Syrian-Lebanese border. In addition, Hezbollah is expected to show off its capabilities to negotiate, conclude unilateral deals and agreements, as part of rivalry with the Lebanese state institutions.