أخبار المركز
  • مركز "المستقبل" يصدر العدد الثاني من مجلة "اتجاهات آسيوية"
  • أ. د. نيفين مسعد تكتب: (عام على "طوفان الأقصى".. ما تغيّر وما لم يتغيّر)
  • د. إبراهيم فوزي يكتب: (بين موسكو والغرب: مستقبل جورجيا بعد فوز الحزب الحاكم في الانتخابات البرلمانية)
  • د. أيمن سمير يكتب: (هندسة الرد: عشر رسائل للهجوم الإسرائيلي على إيران)
  • أ. د. حمدي عبدالرحمن يكتب: (من المال إلى القوة الناعمة: الاتجاهات الجديدة للسياسة الصينية تجاه إفريقيا)

Reasons behind Increased Recourse to Sanctions in the Region

10 يوليو، 2017


There is a growing trend from the part of UN organizations, major international and regional powers to impose sanctions on states, former presidents, armed militia leaders, tribal leaders, military officers, businessmen, or charities in the Middle East. This is indicated in several cases such as imposing sanctions on the government of Qatar, the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Huthi militias and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, and the Iranian regime.

The objectives of introducing such sanctions vary. It could be to bring about a radical change in the policies of the targeted states, or make an adjustment in specific issues such as international terrorism and nuclear proliferation, or weaken these political regimes, dry up the "financial reservoirs" of armed militias, or push actors to deal with the faltering political transition.

On the other hand, sanctions do not necessarily intend to punish the other party, in one way or another, lifting sanctions may aim to bring about a positive impact on one side or the other as internal political conditions change. Examples of these are the European Union removal of Aisha Gaddafi’s name from the list of asset freeze; supporting the commitment of the target state to follow specific paths as reflected in the lift of U.S. sanctions on Al-Bashir's regime in Sudan, and rebuilding bilateral economic ties as the cases of Russia and Turkey.

To elaborate, there are multiple objectives behind the imposition of sanctions, which could be explained as follows: 

Behavior Modification

1-To alter the policies of targeted states: this applies to the current trend of Arab States boycotting Qatar, which was translated into severing political ties and degrading economic relations. Those states presented 13 demands to Doha to study and implement as prerequisite to restoring relations. These demands are related to countering and cutting funding to terrorist and armed militia groups, shutting down Al-Jazeera channel and its media networks, closure of the Turkish military base, reducing diplomatic representation with Iran, among others.

However, Qatar rejected these demands, as stated by Mohamed Bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, while he was in Rome on July 1, and also after his meetings in the United States with delegates of the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as some non-permanent states’ ambassadors, where he said that “Doha is ready for dialogue under proper conditions", without specifying what those conditions, reflecting the desire of Doha to escalate the crisis.

In this context, Omar Ghobash, the UAE Ambassador in Russia in an interview with the Guardian newspaper on June 28, said, "There are certain economic sanctions that we can take which are being considered right now", adding that “One possibility would be to impose conditions on our own trading partners and say you want to work with us then you have got to make a commercial choice”. Meanwhile, Egypt demanded on June 28 during a UN session on "the Challenges of Combating Terrorism in Libya"  documentation of the repeated violations by certain states, particularly Qatar, to sustain sanctions on Libya.  Ambassador Tariq Al-Kuni said that Qatar should be subjected to sanctions for arming terrorist groups and organizations in Libya.

Partial Change

2- To partly change policies of targeted states: that is related to specific issues such as nuclear proliferation and counter-terrorism, which applies to sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran. The US Senate majority, on 15 June, passed an act imposing new sanctions on Tehran, especially regarding supporting acts of international terrorism, as well as its ballistic missile program. Moreover, a large number of Republicans and Democrats opposed the nuclear deal reached in 2015 with Iran, and President Trump holds the Iranian regime responsible for instability in the region.

Through these sanctions, the White House and Congress sanctions convey a clear message that Washington's new strategy is to confront Iran through sanctions on the its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is accused of supporting terrorism, and those involved in the development of the Iranian ballistic missile program. This comes as a response to a letter of challenge from the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani who asserted that his country would continue its ballistic missile program, followed by another letter from the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission spokesman in Shura Council, Hossein Naqvi Hosseini, who said on 16 June that "The Commission is drafting a counter bill as response to the sanctions bill on Iran".

Punishing Authoritarian Regimes

3- Weakening authoritarian political regimes: especially those accused of violating human rights, as the case of  Western countries’ sanctions against the Assad regime in Syria. In this regard, the Swiss Federal Court kept a freeze on the assets of the Central Bank of Syria, according to a statement issued on 16 June, the Court rejected an appeal filed by the Syrian Government after the Court decision to include Syrian entities and individuals whose assets were frozen in Switzerland in the black list, due to the ineligibility of the Bank to challenge its inclusion in that list. This comes in the context of the sanctions adopted by the Council of the European Union against the Assad regime.

For its part, the European Union declared, in its foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on May 29, 2017, the imposition of sanctions against 27 Syrian persons holding central positions in the regime and responsible for human rights violations and 8 institutions that support the regime financially. European Union’s sanctions on the Syrian regime includes an embargo on oil, restrictions on some investments, and freezing the assets of the Central Bank of Syria within the Union, and restrictions on technology-related exports that can be used in internal security, repression or intercepting communications via phone or Internet.

The US Treasury also imposed, on May 15, sanctions on five people and five entities accused of providing support to the Syrian regime, including Mohamed Abbas, who runs the financial interests of Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad as well as Iyad Makhlouf and Ehab Makhlouf (Vice-President of SyriaTel), along with sanctions on Al-Bustan Charity run by Rami Makhlouf and other sanctions on 271 employees of Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), which is responsible for the production of chemical weapons that were used in the attacks against armed opposition groups in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib on 4 April 2017.

The Canadian Government followed the same approach and sanctioned 17 of the Assad regime officials by freezing their assets and banning financial dealings with them, as well as 5 entities related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, chemical companies and research centres such as Mahrous Group, Organization for Technological Industries (OTI), Sigma Tech, Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology (HIAST), and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory (NSCL).

Choke off Funding

4- Dry up the "financial reservoirs" of armed militia: one of the objectives of sanctions on violent actors in the region is to choke off funding sources that help them in recruitment and destabilization operations. Washington and Riyadh have included, on May 20, 2017, one of Hezbollah leaders, Hashem Safieddine, on the first ever foreign joint terrorist designation. Safieddine is the head of the executive council of the party (designated by the two countries as a terrorist organization) and runs the political, economic and social affairs of the party, as well as its role in supporting Bashar Al-Assad, and he is seemingly being groomed to succeed Hassan Nasrallah. Consequently, his assets will be frozen in Saudi Arabia and any financial dealings with him through the financial sector will be prohibited. 

For its part, the UN Security Council also decided, on February 23, 2017, to extend international resolutions provided for in Resolution 2216 against Huthi leaders and former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh an extra year, and extend the mandate of the Sanctions Committee which includes controlling and facilitating the freezing of funds, and preventing travel of Abdulmalik Al-Huthi, until late February 2018. The resolution also requested the Expert Panel to present a biannual briefing report to the Sanctions Committee in July 2017, and a final report to the Security Council in December 2018. The aim of the sanctions is to punish the Huthi militia for insisting on blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemen and exacerbating the dangers of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Transcend the Transitional Phase

5- To push actors to transcend the faltering political transition: Security Council has recently and unanimously decided to extend the mandate of the Expert Panel of sanctions imposed on Libya to 15 February 2018, the resolution included adding oil derivatives to the goods banned from export. It also added to the travel ban and assets freeze list anyone involved in planning attacks against United Nations personnel, including members of the Expert Panel.  

The resolution stressed the importance of the counter-terrorism efforts of the Government of National Accord headed by Fayez al-Sarraj through unified security forces under its authority. It also urged Member States to provide the necessary assistance to the government to counter threats facing Libya’s security. This  makes it incumbent upon the government to continue to improve the control of arms supplied to Libya or sold and transferred, track foreign terrorist fighters, and increase its coordination with its neighbors and close satellite channels that promote terrorism and violence.

This view was also echoed by Egyptian Ambassador Tariq Kuni, Assistant Foreign Minister for Arab affairs  – in the presence of the Chairman of the counterterrorism committee of the Security Council, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee on "ISIS" and "Al Qaeda" and Chairman  of the Sanctions Committee on Libya – during United Nations meeting called by Egypt on June 28, where he stressed that Libya is facing threats and neighboring countries are required to stop supporting terrorist groups with money and weapons, which requires taking actions against states that violate UN resolutions including Qatar. 

On the other hand, lifting sanctions on countries or individuals in the region, has many effects, as follows:

1- A changed domestic political situation: General Court of the European Union lifted sanctions on Aisha Gaddafi, the former Libyan leader's daughter, on March 28, based on the changed situation in Libya, since there is no longer any justification, from its point of view, to continue a ban on travel and freezing financial assets imposed 2011 for its alleged "close link to the regime". Although the European Union amended the sanctions in 2014, it kept the list and refused a request to remove her name. In 2017, the Court accepted Aisha Gaddafi’s appeal and lifted sanctions imposed six years ago. 

2- State stringent commitment to specific policies: the U.S. lifted the economic sanctions on Sudan in 13 January, which were imposed on Khartoum two decades ago, former U.S. President Barack Obama had outlined a six-month period to monitor policies and laws related to economics and promoting peace and combating terrorism. Washington has included Sudan on a blacklist of State sponsors of terrorism since 1993. Sudan has been under trade embargo since 1997 because of the indictment of Bashir's regime of supporting Islamic groups, especially harboring Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden during the period (1992-1996).

However, what helped lift sanctions on Sudan, at the end of June, was the adherence of the government to the required five paths, according to the vision of the U.S. security and intelligence community: cooperation in fighting terrorism, ending the war in the Sudan, ending support for rebels in South Sudan, ending support for the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, and delivery of aid to the needy in conflict zones. This was preceded by the US State Department welcoming Sudan's efforts in combating terrorism, particularly fighting "ISIS" and other terrorist groups, as reflected in a statement by State Department spokesman John Kirby on September 20, 2016.   

It should be noted that there are other sanctions imposed on Khartoum, as the UN Security Council decided in February to extend the mandate of the Sanctions Committee on Darfur (established by the resolution 1591 /2005) for a period ending on March 18, 2018, and the sanctions to be renewed every year, in relation to the prohibition of arms sales to Sudan, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

In this context, too, Umma party chief Sadek al-Mahdi, in interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper in London, on June 28, downplayed U.S. sanctions on Sudan, saying that their impact will remain limited unless Sudan's name is removed from the U.S. list of State sponsors of terrorism, and finding solutions to the Security Council resolutions amounting to 63 resolutions against Sudan, and a mechanism to convince the Paris Club to relief its debt.

3- Rebuilding bilateral economic relations: Russian President Vladimir Putin, in late May, issued a decree removing the obstacles to Turkish citizens working in Russia, and repealing the ban on Turkish companies working in certain sectors in Russia. This comes in parallel with consultations between Russian and Turkish foreign ministries to renew the agreement signed between the two countries in 2010, and lift all sanctions in an endeavor to rebuild economic ties between both sides especially after transcending a period of tension in the aftermath of downing Russian fighter in November 2015. It seems that there are understandings between Moscow and Ankara on several issues in the region.

Stressful Effects

Bottom line, it seems that using sanctions as a foreign policy instrument will be on the rise during the next period in Middle East crises, especially given the possibility of converting sanctions into aid if the targeted states were to comply with the demands of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union and the major powers in the region. Indeed, the growing effects of sanctions on the targeted states cannot be ignored, even a modern state cannot resist them, in the words of former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who said that sanctions are “a peaceful, silent and deadly” weapon at the same time.