One of the recurrent questions constantly raised by the
west: Whether Islam is compatible with democracy? It is attributed to the assumption
that many Islamic political parties do not believe in democracy, except as a
tool to reach power. Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) seemed to
challenge this assumption with its ascendance to power in 2002.
AKP party drew admiration due to its initial policies aiming
to reinforce democratic rule, along with implementing successful economic
reforms that resulted in an average annual rate of growth of real GNP equal to
7.8 percent over 2002 – 2006.[i]
AKP presented a model of an Islamic party that embraces liberal ideology. Many
western think tanks, as well as, the former US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton praised Turkey as a model that could inspire Arab countries in the post
Arab spring era.[ii]
However, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the former Prime Minster
of Turkey and its current President has become more authoritarian over the
course of time. This was evident in the way he dealt with his political
opponents inside Turkey. This article will shed light on how Erdogan’s policies
influenced negatively the Turkish democratic model rather than consolidating it,
through the following tactics:
First: Tightening his Grip over Power
Erdogan and Abdullah Gül played a prominent role in the
creation of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and Gül was the
first AKP Prime Minister in 2002, as Erdogan was barred from seeking
political office after a prison sentence in 1999, “on the grounds of
threatening the Kemalist nature of Turkey, especially secularity”.[iii]
Later, Gül resigned from the premiership after the AKP government changed the
law making way to Erdogan to be the Prime Minister by election in the spring of
2003, while Gul became the Foreign Minister. In 2007, Gül resigned from
the government to become president, while concurrently Erdoğan began to
consolidate his current control over the AKP. Ahead of the 2011 elections, Erdogan
further purged Gül supporters from the AKP parliamentary ranks ahead. [iv]
The scenario was repeated with Ahmet Davutoğlu, who
replaced Erdogan as Prime Minister in August 2014 as the latter become the
president. Tensions have simmered between them leading to Davutoğlu’s resignation
after 20 months in office in which he tried to resolve their conflict. One of
the main causes of the rift was Davutoğlu’s attempts to act independently and his
disagreements with Erdogan over a number of policies, including Erdogan's plans
to change the country from a parliamentary system to a presidential one. [v]
That is why Erdogan replaced him with Binali Yildirim.
Even before Yildirim’s reign as a Prime Minister, President Erdogan dominated the executive branch, despite the fact that the position of the president is largely symbolical. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that Erdogan has been the defacto ruler of Turkey since his rise to power in 2003. After the April 2017 constitutional referendum, he has the right to contest the next presidential elections, in which he will enjoy full executive powers. [vi]
Second: Building a New Deep State
Since his ascendance to power, Erdogan mounted his
attack on the Turkish deep state, referring to a presumed clandestine network
of military officers, and their civilian allies who, for decades,
suppressed anyone thought to pose a threat to the secular order, established in
1923 by Atatürk. Erdogan always expressed his concern that the deep state would
prevent him from governing effectively. [vii]
Yet in fact, Erdogan was able to rise to power thanks to his alliance with the Gülen
movement. The movement, which has successfully penetrated state institutions,
especially the police, and judiciary. [viii]
However, the rift between Gülen and Erdogan erupted towards the end of 2013,
forcing Erdogan to designate the group as a terrorist organization, and make it
responsible for the July 2016 Coup d’état.
The failed coup d’état represented an opportunity for Erdogan to expand his power over the Turkish state and oust the Gülen movement from governmental institutions, as well as, any other opposition forces. The purge extended to state universities, the police, the judiciary, government bureaucracy, and the military, to mention but a few. About 149 media outlets were shut down[ix], and 231 journalists were arrested. Now, Erdogan can reinforce his own deep state that he has already built through depending on National Intelligence Agency (MIT), Islamists and ultranationalists.[x]
Third: Utilization of the Judiciary
One prominent example of how Erdogan utilized the
Judiciary to consolidate his power is what is known as the July 28, 2008
“Ergenekon trials”. “The original indictment described an elaborate plot
ultimately connecting 531 military officers, mafiosi, ultranationalists,
lawyers and academic figures who supposedly planned violent campaigns to
destabilize Erdogan's AKP and seize power.”[xi]
On August 5, 2013, Istanbul's High Criminal Court sentenced 275 of the accused,
including the former chief of the General Staff, General Ilker Basbug, to life
long prison terms.
However, Erdogan in alliance with his then-Gulenist allies, who had infiltrated the police and judiciary, utilized the case in order to weaken his opponents at that time, namely the military and Kemalist opponents.[xii] That was evident when, on April 21, 2016, the High Court of Appeals overturned the convictions because of procedural flaws and the case's lack of merit. The court said there was a prolonged trial process with unlawful searches of offices and homes, and fabricated evidence.[xiii] Despite the deteriorated relations between Erdogan and Gulen since December 2013, this case reveals how the judiciary was utilized as a tool in Erdogan’s Power struggles.
Fourth: Collusion with Terrorist Organizations
Erdogan has been frequently accused of turning a blind
eye to ISIS in northern Syria as Turkey has become the main transit route for
foreign fighters to enter and exit Syria since 2011. On the other hand, “an
unknown number of wounded fighters of the Islamic State in Libya have been
transported out of the country to an Istanbul hospital to undergo medical treatment”
in December 2015, according to Italian intelligence.[xiv]
Ankara started taking an active role in countering the group only after the
first planned attacks by ISIS on Turkish soil took place in July 2015. It also
allowed US forces to operate against ISIS out of Incirlik Air Base, as well as
bases in Ditarbakir and Malatya.[xv]
Fifth: Corruption
Erdogan was
able to earn an admirable reputation for honesty and efficiency as the mayor of
Istanbul during the mid-1990s. However, this picture changed dramatically with
the corruption probe of December 2013 that involved top AKP officials, “the
charges included bribery, corruption, fraud, money laundering, and gold
smuggling.”[xvi] Businessman
Reza Zarrab, one of the officials accused, was reportedly involved in a
money-laundering scheme to bypass US sanctions on Iran. All of the 52 people
detained were connected in various ways with the AKP, and several family
members of cabinet ministers.
The son of
Recep Tayyip Erdogan was also subjected to investigation, by the release on
YouTube of audio recordings in which Erdogan was reportedly heard telling his
son, Bilal, to urgently get rid of tens of millions of dollars. Erdogan has
claimed the recordings were a montage but experts disagreed. [xvii]
Widespread public outrage forced four cabinet ministers to
resign. Meanwhile, the AKP majority in the Parliament dropped most of the
corruption charges, without even setting trials. [xviii]
The corruption scandal has influenced the popularity of the AKP party, which
was reflected in failing to secure an overall majority in Parliamentary
election in June 2015 for the first time, since AKP ascendance to power in
2002. It further resulted in escalating enmity between Erdogan and Gulen, whom
he held responsible for revealing the corruption scandal.
Sixth: Handling of Internal dissent
The Turkish government has constantly accused Arab governments
during the Arab Spring of repressing peaceful protests. Yet, Erdogan and his
government did not pursue a different course, when they had to deal with their own
protesters, as evident in how the Turkish authorities dealt with the Gezi Park
protests that erupted on May 28, 2013. Protesters opposed the replacement of
Taksim Gezi Park for reconstructing the historic Taksim Military Barracks.
Later, it turned into mass rallies against Erdogan after a heavy-handed police
response, which resulted in killing a number of protesters, as well as injuring
thousands.[xix]
Public officials have variously referred to the
protestors as hooligans and claimed that terrorist groups were behind the protests,
in order to justify the levels of violence used by the police to disperse them.
[xx]
Finally, it could be argued that Erdogan’s efforts to
consolidate power were gradual. At first, he utilized Turkeys’ desire to access
EU membership as a deterrent against the army not to instigate a coup against
AKP government. In addition, during this initial phase, he utilized his
relations with Gulen’s deep state in order to back AKP’s government. Secondly,
after the rift with Gulen, Erdogan tried to weaken the grip of his opponents
over state institutions, without much success. He even tried to consolidate his
relations with the Army. Thirdly, the failed 2016 coup was utilized in order to
purge the Gulen movement from state institutions, as well as any political
opponents deemed threatening to Erdogan’s power. Lastly, the refugee crisis in
Europe represented the perfect opportunity for Erdogan to ensure that EU turns
a blind eye to his increasing authoritarian tendencies. Thus, Erdogan’s rule of
Turkey, which extends to August 2019 is paving the way to the end of the once
praised Turkish model, and turning the country into an autocratic one. [xxi]
[i])
A. Erinç Yeldan and Burcu Ünüvar, An Assessment of the Turkish Economy in the
AKP Era, Research and Policy on Turkey, 2015, (p. 2), accessible at: http://yoksis.bilkent.edu.tr/pdf/files/12116.pdf
[ii])
MATTHEW LEE, Clinton eyes Turkey as model for
Arab reform, CBS News, July 16, 2011, accessible at: http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/clinton-eyes-turkey-model-arab-reform
[iii]
Akkoc, Raziye, Turkey’s most Powerful President since Ataturk: A Profile of
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Telegraph, April 20, 2015, accessible at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/11548369/Turkeys-most-powerful-president-since-Ataturk-A-profile-of-Recep-Tayyip-Erdogan.html
[iv]) The
Diverging Paths of Abdullah Gül and Tayyip Erdogan, April 24, 2013, The
Turkey Analyst, accessible at: https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/42-the-diverging-paths-of-abdullah-g%C3%BCl-and-tayyip-erdogan.html
[v]) Turkey
PM Ahmet Davutoglu to quit amid reports of Erdogan rift, BBC, May 5,
2016, accessible at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36213401
[vi]) How
will Erdogan’s constitutional referendum change Turkey?, Financial Times,
April 15, 2017, accessible at: https://www.ft.com/content/1fc620a6-2121-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9
[vii])
Dexter Filkins, The Deep State: The Prime Minister is revered as a moderate,
but how far will he go to stay in power?, The New Yorker, March 12,
2012, accessible at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/12/the-deep-state
[viii])
Sarah El-Kazaz, The AKP and the Gülen: The End of a Historic Alliance, Crown
Center for Middle East Studies, no. 94, July 2015, accessible at: https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB94.pdf
[ix]) Turkey
Purge, accessible at: https://turkeypurge.com/
[x]) Erdogan's
Deep State: Ankara Creating Monsters in Menacing Power Grab, Sputnik, February
12, 2016, accessible at: https://sputniknews.com/politics/201602121034638032-ankara-creating-monsters-erdogan-deep-state/
[xi]
Michael Gunter, Erdoğan and the Decline of Turkey, Middle East Policy, Volume
23, Issue 4, Winter 2016, pp. 123 – 135.
[xii])
Michael Gunter, Erdoğan and the Decline of Turkey
[xiii])
What Turkey can learn from coup plot case dismissal, Al Monitor, April
25, 2016, accessible at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/turkey-ergenkon-coup-plot-case-dimissed-after-nine-years.html
[xiv])
Lorenzo Tondo (et al.), Italy fears ISIS fighters slip into Europe posing as
injured Libyans, The Guardian, April 28, 2017, accessible at: https://goo.gl/0URC3g
[xv]) Kilic
Kanat & Kadir Ustun, U.S.-Turkey Realignment on Syria, Middle East
Policy, Vol. XXII, no. 4, Winter 2015, p. 88.
[xvi] Berivan
Orucoglu, Why Turkey’s Mother of All Corruption Scandals Refuses to Go Away, Foreign
Policy, January 6, 2015, accessible at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/why-turkeys-mother-of-all-corruption-scandals-refuses-to-go-away/
[xvii])
Ibid.
[xviii])
Sarah El-Kazaz, op.cit.
[xix])
Gezi Park Protests, Amnesty International, accessible at: https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/eur440222013en.pdf
[xx]) Ibid.
[xxi])
Aykan Erdemir, Erdogan’s Referendum Ploy, Foundation for defense of
democracies, April 7, 2017, accessible at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/dr-aykan-erdemir-erdogans-referendum-ploy/