Iran always endeavors to emphasize its role as the chief proponent of the Syrian regime in its battles against the opposition forces, but also to project this role as crucial for the regime’s survival. This is frequently evidenced in the intensified media coverage of a recent visit by General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of Quds Force, the elite extra-territorial Special Forces arm of Iran's Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), to rural Hama, Syria, where fierce confrontations took place recently. Such coverage was also given to a deal between the Iran-allied militia Hezbollah and the Jaish al-Fatah, an alliance of armed rebel groups such as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly known as the al-Nusra Front) to evacuate civilians and rebel fighters from areas such as Zabadani and Madaya (besieged by the Syrian regime forces and allied militias) and Al-Foua and Kefraya (besieged by opposition armed factions).

Without a doubt, the aim is to send messages to international and regional powers, with a focus on the United States, Russia and Israel that have become involved more than ever in the implications of the expanded presence of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria.

Nevertheless, there are indications that trending views at the decision-making circles in Tehran reflect doubts in Iran's ability to continue its support for the Syrian regime and escalate its involvement in the armed conflict. These doubts arise from ambiguity surrounding the future of this conflict due to the overlapping interests and policies pursued by involved powers, and a potential difficulty for Iran to rely on allied powers on the long term. That is, allies may opt for settlements and deals with Iran's adversaries in Syria whenever they decide that such policy would serve their interests, regardless of whether or not it would threaten Iran's own interests. 

Multiple Goals

Iran became increasingly indifferent to condemnations from powers involved in Syria for appearances of Iranian prominent military commanders in battlefields in Syrian cities, such as Aleppo and Hama. This indifference proves that Tehran is not serious about taking part in international commitments and continues to flagrantly breach the United Security Council resolution, and UNSC Resolution 2231 of 2015 concerning the nuclear agreement struck with the P5+1 group of world powers. This is evidenced in the fact that Iran allows some of its military commanders, who are banned from travelling to foreign states under international sanctions, to appear in conflict zones inside Syria. 

Moreover, Iran is no longer interested in concealing its major role in armed confrontations between the Syrian regime and the opposition, after it was keen on keeping low profile at the onset of the conflict.

Through this, Iran seeks to achieve two goals:

1- Responding to recent statement from the US hinting at US action to undermine the Iranian military presence in Syria. On March 9, 2017, US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley stated, "we’ve got to make sure we get Iran and their proxies out (of Syria)". Haley hinted at that again in a statement on April 3, 2017, while declaring Washington's priorities for Syria:  fighting ISIS, removing the Iranian influence and push for a political solution. 

Through projecting its prominent military involvement in the conflict in Syria, Iran seeks to stress that the US approach to its Syrian role will face difficult hurdles, especially because this presence is not limited to military and financial support for the Syrian regime. Tehran supports the Syrian regime through providing commanders and militants from its Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the allied-sectarian militias that Tehran created, financed and trained over the past years. In addition, Tehran also supports the Syrian regime through its evident economic and social influence in the regime-held areas in particular, where Iran has been seeking to buy lands and properties, and taking part in infrastructure development, in the telecommunications sector in particular. In other words, Iran seeks to expand its presence inside the Syrian society to create more obstacles for any future efforts to get it out of Syria. 

Ambiguous Policy

Apparently, Iran does not want to wait for a clear US policy towards field and political developments to take shape, especially because of the evident confusion that mars this policy, according to several views. This confusion became more evident when Washington emphasized that its priority is no longer to focus on getting Assad out. At the same time, Washington noted that both Assad and Iran represent two obstacles for any settlement to the crisis. That is, Iran appears to be keenly interested in being well braced in anticipation for a potential escalation by the US, not only over the nuclear deal, but also over Iran's role in regional conflicts, in Syria, Iraq and Yemen in particular, where Iran seeks to underline that curtailing its role in these conflicts would be no easy task.

Suspicions about the Russian Ally

2- Iran seeks to project its huge differences with Russia over Syria's strategic importance. Both states seek to stress on the importance of their cooperation and coordination, which was reflected in Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's recent visit to Russia. Iran acknowledges that its ability to sustain and perpetuate its military intervention in the conflict in Syria has limits, which was evidenced in Iran's repeated announcement that it will allow Russian warplanes to use its military bases to conduct airstrikes against the opposition forces and armed terrorist militias inside Syria. The reiteration indicates that unlike Russia, Iran lacks adequate airpower that can make a difference in the conflict. 

However, all this does not negate the fact that Iran no longer hides its doubts about possible reliance on Russia's vital role in the conflict in Syria on the long term in particular. This is because of Russia's precise calculations that do not detach coordination with Iran over the Syrian conflict from its own relations with other parties pursuing anti-Iranian policies, such as the US administration of President Donald Trump and Israel.

Moreover, what stands out in this context is that there are trending views in Tehran that are voicing doubts about the Syrian regime's intentions towards Iran, especially when it amounts to a conflict of interests between Russia, Iran and Syria in the long term.

These doubts were clearly voiced by Mustafa Zahrani, head of strategic affairs at the Institute for Political and International Studies of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In an article published by the Iranian Diplomat website of Sadegh Kharrazi, Iran’s former ambassador to the UN, Zahrani focused on a range of important issues. He mentioned that Iran lacks a strategy for extracting itself from the conflict in Syria, unlike Russia, whose role was limited to air cover, will enable it to withdraw from Syria when it deems that necessary. He also discussed the possibility that the Syrian regime could upgrade its relations with Russia on the expense of its relations with Iran because Russia is more capable than Iran of protecting it and sustaining its support. 

Debate inside Iran

Zahrani's article unequovically does not reflect Iran's official view. However, publishing it on a website that is affiliated with the Iranian Foreign Ministry and figures backed by the Iranian regime, does make it safe to say that there is debate among Iran’s elite over the possible trajectories of the conflict in Syria and their influence on Iran's interests and the future of its relations with both Russia and the Assad regime. It is also an indication that some trending views inside Iran seek to give the impression that Iran may very well think of exiting Syria in the long term because continued involvement in the so-called "Syrian quagmire" will inflict heavy losses on Iran and threaten its interests.  

Multiple Hurdles

However, Iran's exit from Syria does not appear to be an easy option, because the conflict in Syria has severely drained Iran's financial and human power at a time when it suffers from economic problems that, apparently, pose no easy challenges, despite lifting international sanctions more than one year ago. That is, the Iranian regime will no longer be able to easily propagandize its exit from Syria at the domestic level, especially because it reiterates its involvement in Syria to protect Iran's national security and that had it not been for Iran's continued support for the Syrian regime, terrorists would have reached the capital Tehran. 

Moreover, an exit from Syria would deal a strong blow to Iran's efforts to bolster its expansion into the region, and weaken its ability to sustain direct links with allied terrorist armed militias in states hit by crises. It would also push Iran back to its own borders, an unpleasant scenario for the influential ruling religious leaders who, since the 1979 ousting of the Shah, have been attempting to adopt an ideologically driven interventionist policy. This policy is founded on the belief that keeping the regime in power hinges on exporting domestic crises, expanding its presence in remote regions while preventing adversaries from getting close to Iran's borders.