In the political timeline of the Yemeni crisis, there have been several instances that could have marked "the day after," signifying a post-agreement era of a comprehensive political process in the country. This possibility has surfaced multiple times, starting with the proposal of the Peace and Partnership Agreement before the Houthi coup against the legitimate government in September 2014. It continued with the Kuwait negotiations in 2016, from which the Houthis withdrew at the signing stage, and the Stockholm Agreement in 2019.
However, the most significant missed opportunity for "the day after" in Yemen occurred in April 2022 when a UN-brokered truce was reached. Another potential "day after" emerged in September 2023 with the draft roadmap presented by the UN special envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg. Unfortunately, the events following October 7, 2023, and the war in the Gaza Strip possibly derailed this path due to the Houthis' involvement in the conflict.
Intertwined “Day After” Dynamics
The "day after" in Yemen coincided with the "day after" in the Gaza war when the Houthi group initiated a naval battle in the southern Red Sea, ostensibly in support of Palestinians in Gaza, and connected it to the conclusion of the conflict in the enclave. However, the "day after" in Gaza poses challenges due to the potential for the conflict between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah to escalate into a wider war, potentially involving the Houthis as well. In general, the Houthis have vowed to back Iran in any regional confrontation, a stance the group has reaffirmed on multiple occasions. Following a warning by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Hossein Salami on May 7, 2024, regarding the expansion of threats and the battlefront to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Houthis declared the possibility of broadening their attacks to target ships in the Mediterranean.
Earlier in March, the Houthi group called on Saudi Arabia to resume the "peace process" in Yemen, seemingly stepping back or attempting to separate issues. However, this call came after the US re-designation of the Houthis as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity," which added to the economic sanctions and restrictions against the group.
This re-designation was followed by a change in Iran's stance, which has been a primary driver of Houthi behavior. Further, this shift in Iran's position coincided with a new round of negotiations between Washington and Tehran in Oman in May. These negotiations are expected to have an impact on regional issues, including Houthi attacks on shipping in the southern Red Sea.
Deals for Disaggregating Arenas
During the Gaza war, Iran's so-called "unity of arenas" strategy served as a cover for the roles of its regional proxies. However, subsequent developments indicate a separation of roles from the actual objectives of each arena, where negotiations in each arena now focus on different issues to reach separate deals unrelated to the Gaza conflict. Iran generally leverages all these deals to broker a larger agreement. After Israel's attack on an air defense facility near Isfahan, central Iran, on April 19, Iran began reorganizing its priorities and focusing on its nuclear capabilities. In this context, American reports revealed that Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, Amir Saeed Iravani, initiated negotiations with Washington, leading to direct talks between the two countries in Oman.
The most notable developments in each regional arena are as follows:
1. Iraq:
The escalation by Iraqi Iran-backed militias against US forces has subsided as a result of the US response to the attack on the logistics outpost Tower 22 in Jordan and negotiations between Baghdad and Washington regarding the future of US military presence in Iraq.
2. Syria:
The level of escalation in Syria decreased following the mutual attacks between Iran and Israel last April, resulting in almost no recorded militia attacks on US bases in Syria.
3. Lebanon:
Despite Hezbollah's focus on escalating tensions with Israel and supporting Gaza, it is evident that the current conflict equation between Hezbollah and Israel revolves around negotiating a "buffer zone." This buffer zone will play a crucial role in shaping future conflict dynamics and determining the rules of engagement between the two parties.
4. Yemen:
The Houthi escalation in the southern Red Sea over approximately six months serves multiple objectives, with Iran primarily exerting pressure on Western powers. It is worth noting that these Western powers are involved in military missions either alongside the US or independently, and they were also parties to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.
Furthermore, Iran has geopolitical ambitions to establish a presence in the Red Sea, using it as a launchpad into the high seas. This was demonstrated by the IRGC's vessel "Mahdavi," which undertook an unprecedented voyage from the Gulf of Aden to the Indian Ocean, south of the equator.
However, Iranian policy may be entering a new phase in the aftermath of the tragic plane crash that claimed the lives of President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Amir Hossein Abdollahian, and others on May 19. As a result, the new Iranian foreign minister, Ali Bagheri Kani, may need to postpone negotiations with Washington until Tehran resolves this crisis. Therefore, Iran's immediate focus is expected to shift to domestic affairs, with a primary emphasis on internal stabilization over the next three months as it works to restructure the executive branch after Raisi's passing.
Revealing Outcomes
In his latest briefing on Yemen to the UN Security Council on May 13, US Deputy Ambassador to the UN Robert Wood delivered a comprehensive summary of the outcome of the confrontation with the Houthis in the Red Sea. Wood disclosed that despite the Operation Prosperity Guardian coalition's efforts to halt Iranian arms smuggling operations to Yemen in the Red Sea, these operations persist unabated.
In actuality, Iranian ships have been traveling from Bandar Abbas to Somalia and then to the western coast of Yemen without facing restrictions. Allegedly, they are carrying construction materials that are exempt from inspection. This situation arises due to several factors: the truce agreement allows for the easing of restrictions on the Hodeidah port, which is controlled by the Houthi group, and building materials are not affected by US sanctions. Furthermore, the US is exercising caution in targeting Iranian ships as Washington aims to avoid escalating tensions with Tehran.
Wood's testimony is consistent with Houthi claims about the assaults in the Red Sea between November 2023, when the Houthis captured the commercial ship Galaxy Leader, and mid-May, when the group targeted the USS Mason, a U.S. navy destroyer, and a vessel named “Destiny." The Houthis have conducted over 100 attacks utilizing over 300 missiles, as well as aerial and naval drones.
Conversely, the performance index of international naval missions in the Red Sea indicates a decrease in offensive and preemptive operations. The Operation Prosperity Guardian coalition has transitioned into a routine defensive operation. An important development in this context was underscored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in April. Through satellite imagery analysis, it was revealed that the Houthis have been excavating and expanding tunnels and caves in the mountains to secure weapons storage.
During the US and British offensive operations against Houthi military systems, forces participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian could target these systems located on mountain peaks and slopes. However, the presence of storage facilities enables the Houthis to swiftly maneuver and redeploy the weapons. Naturally, these storage facilities are crucial for securing Houthi weapons in various locations in Yemen, both presently and in the future.
A crucial lesson from these developments is that subjecting the security and military infrastructure in the region to political deals without actively deterring threats to the maritime area creates a gap in the actual objectives of the US deployment in the region. This structure may need re-evaluation in light of the ongoing Gaza war to address threats and risks effectively.
Settlement Obligations
The Houthi group prefers the term "peace process" over "roadmap" when discussing Yemen. The distinction between the two terms is significant. The peace process involves bilateral negotiations with Riyadh, while the roadmap signifies a comprehensive political settlement involving multiple Yemeni forces. According to UN envoy Grundberg's briefing to the Security Council on May 13, achieving this comprehensive political settlement is still a relatively distant goal.
The Houthi group is unlikely to commit to internal arrangements at this stage. Recently, the armed group launched attacks on multiple fronts in Yemen, including Marib, Shabwa, and Al-Jawf. Consequently, they may redirect their excessive use of force from the Red Sea to the Yemeni mainland to rebalance power before pursuing a political settlement involving various obligations.
Achieving a comprehensive settlement necessitates a unified authority, posing a significant challenge amidst the identity crisis driven by the Houthis' ideological project. This procedural requirement entails the state's exclusive control over the use of force and, consequently, sovereign decision-making. The Houthis cannot persist in unilaterally dictating war-related decisions. Another pivotal concern is the management of Houthi weapons, as the group is unlikely to willingly distribute them among other parties.
When negotiations were ongoing to establish a "roadmap" before the Gaza conflict erupted, the Houthi group staged its largest military parade since coming to power. Their intent was evident: the group would not bargain their weapons but rather employ them as leverage in the negotiation process to fulfill their future goals, without subjecting them to legitimate state institutions. This stance suggests that other forces and factions might also consider resorting to their weapons.
Ultimately, the key challenge in the Yemeni crisis is to devise a comprehensive political settlement. However, with the current situation, a unified national project for the political forces is not yet in sight. Even if a political framework is agreed upon under UN auspices and within the context of a regional solution, the prospects of its implementation on the ground will continue to be unlikely, at least in the medium term.
