On December 1, Afghan news agency 'Aamaj News' announced that there were clashes between the Taliban fighters and Iranian border guards, in which both small arms and heavy weapons were used. The news agency added that the Taliban fighters managed to control three Iranian border checkpoints.

By contrast, Iranian news agency 'Tasneem' denied that Afghanistan succeeded in controlling the border checkpoints, explaining that the clashes were caused by 'a border misunderstanding', and that the clashes stopped. It also stated that Iranian authorities were discussing the situation with the Taliban. It is noteworthy that this escalation is the first of its kind, since the Taliban's takeover of.   

Controversial issues

This recent clash is an indicator of rising tensions between Iran and the Taliban, which reflects how both sides will deal with conflicting issues, as per the following:

1.     Iranian forces crossed the borders into Afghan territories:

The border clash took place near Nimroz State, in the north of Afghanistan, after Iranian border guards crossed the borders, thus entering Afghan territories. In retaliation, the Taliban used heavy weapons, sending American armored vehicles to clash with their Iranian counterparts.  

On the other side, Iranian media had a different story to tell, claiming that the clashes took place after Iranian farmers crossed a wall, which was built long ago to prevent smugglers and drug dealers from crossing the borders. This wall, as claimed, is hundreds of meters from the Iranian-Afghan border. According to Iran, the Taliban attacked the farmers because it 'thought' that they crossed the border between the two countries.

Previously, on October 24, Afghan Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoub Mohammed Omar (son of Mullah Omar, the founder of the Taliban) threatened neighboring countries, saying that Afghanistan will not turn a blind eye to any attempt to encroach on its sovereignty, in an implicit reference to Iran.

2.     Tehran’s opposition to the make-up of the Taliban government:

Iran is not satisfied as far as the Afghan cabinet is concerned, as there are no Iran-affiliated Shi’ite figures among the ministers. Though the Taliban announced that the new cabinet will comprise figures from the minority groups, this was not enough to Iran, which was hoping that more Hazaras would assume positions in the new government. Including key figures from Hazaras would have given Tehran a leverage to influence Afghan domestic politics.

In this respect, Iranian Foreign Minister announced October 27, in Neighbors of Afghanistan Meeting, that Iran believes that Afghanistan's new government should be inclusive. According to Gulbuddin Hekmetyar, leader of the Taliban-affiliated Islamic Party, this statement was interpreted as an attempt, on Iran's part, to persuade the international community not to recognize the new government of Afghanistan.

3.     Tehran is concerned about ISIS' activities:

Since Taliban took over Kabul, Tehran has been concerned over the possibility of Afghanistan turning into a safe haven for terrorists, notably ISIS, as this would constitute a direct threat to Iran's national security.

Recently, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of ISIS attacks, which target Shi’ites and their mosques in Afghanistan. For example, ISIS declared that it is responsible for the suicide attack on Bibi Fatima Mosque in Kandahar (in the south of Afghanistan) killing 61 people at least. A week earlier, a similar attack occurred in Khanabad Mosque (in Kunduz, in the north of Afghanistan), which killed more than 120 people.

On September 7, IRGC leader Esmail Qaani said before the Iranian parliament that Afghan Shi’ites are very important to Iran, and that Tehran has is fully in control when it comes to Afghanistan. This statement reflects that Tehran believes in military intervention as an option that can help Iran to counter ISIS and protect Afghan Shi’ites. The recent border clash, however, has proved this belief to be ungrounded.

4.     Iran fears that the Baluchis' crisis may surface:

Tehran is concerned that Afghanistan may become a base for supporting insurgent groups, especially in border areas, which includes various anti-Iran Sunni movements, most notably, the Baluchi minority.

In the latest border clash, the Taliban fighters were able to control several military sites, such as the police station of Dahrees village, in Hermend city, located in the Sistan and Baluchistan Province. This gives Iran reason to be concerned, as it means that Tehran will not be able to conduct any transnational operations in case of any threats from the Afghan side (especially from Baluchi rebels).   

It is noticeable that previously, Iran-Pakistan relations experienced tension as Tehran accused Islamabad of allowing Baluchis to use its territories as a base for carrying out operations against Iran, an accusation which Pakistan denied.

Parallel contexts

The border clash coincides with a number of developments pertaining to Iran and Afghanistan, which will be discussed in the following section:

1.     The tendency to marginalize Iran's role in Afghanistan:

Global and regional players are keen to marginalize Iran's role as far as Afghanistan is concerned. This was manifested in the meetings of the Troika Plus countries (i.e., Pakistan, the US, China and Russia). On November 11, Troika Plus representatives met in Beijing for the first time since the Taliban's takeover. In the meeting, they implicitly recognized the Taliban government. The Troika Plus countries seem to be bent on getting the Taliban to compromise in return for financial aid. A parallel path, so to speak, is the New Delhi Dialogue, comprising Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The common denominator between these countries is that they all had good relations with the former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, whereas their relation with the Taliban is characterized by cynicism, if not by antipathy. This makes it highly unlikely that these countries can influence Afghanistan.

2.     The US tendency to pursue pragmatic relations with Afghanistan:

It seems that the US-Taliban relations have recently come to be characterized by a degree of openness. For instance, on November 27, an Afghan delegation, led by Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Amir Khan Mutaqi, met a US delegation led by US Special Representative for Afghanistan Tom West. In the meeting, bilateral relations and possible financial aid were discussed. Undoubtedly, such attitude from the US is regarded unfavorable by Tehran.

3.     The resumption of Iranian nuclear negotiations:

The recent developments in Iranian-Afghan relations coincide with the resumption of the seventh round of Iranian nuclear talks (in Vienna, on November 29) between Iran on the one hand and the 4+1 Group on the other hand, in which the US is taking part indirectly. Having started last April, this round of negotiations is supposed to be the last.         

It seems that this recent development has made it necessary for Iran to avoid any new conflict with Afghanistan, lest it should negatively affect its position in the talks. Perhaps this is why Iran's Foreign Minister rushed to announce that the tension has been contained via coordination between Tehran and Kabul.  

In the final analysis, reasons of tension between Iran and Afghanistan still exist. However, Iran seems to be keen to contain any tension, at least temporarily, so that it can re-evaluate its leverage in Afghanistan. It is now obvious that the Iranian role in Afghanistan does not live up to Tehran's expectations, especially as it is not unlikely that Kabul may seek rapprochement with US and China under the auspices of Islamabad. All the recent developments give Tehran reasons to be anxious and suspicious.