Spokesperson of Libya’s House of Representatives Abdullah Belhaiq, on September 21, announced that the parliament has passed a vote of no-confidence against the unity government. Eighty-nine of the 113 lawmakers who attended the house session voted to withdraw confidence from the administration of interim Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, which will, however, continue to operate as a caretaker administration until the general elections are held on December 24.
The move sparked wide controversy about its timing as well as potential consequences for the implementation of the roadmap. With less than 100 days to go to elections, the timing and efficacy of the decision, coupled with developments in the electoral scene and reactions of parties to the crisis, signals that a elections in Libya will be a very hard task to carry out.
Democracy’s intricate trajectory
Despite popular willingness to hold the elections, which is the main demand in such measures, reaching the ballot boxes on December 24, requires joint efforts from all stakeholders both inside and outside Libya. The such measures include preparation of the constitutional basis and electoral regulations, providing a safe environment for voters and electoral committees. Within this context, various dynamics could challenge to the whole process as per the following:
1. Delayed agreement on the constitutional basis.
Failure of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), a 75-member body, to agree on a constitutional basis, raised concerns over an elections deadlock. The concerns are mainly about the contradicting proposals, as well as the forum’s failure to reach consensus on a basis that contradicts Law No. 1 that was approved by the House of Representatives in 2021 about presidential elections. Therefore, this delay, though it can be bypassed through the House of Representatives or the Presidential Council, remains an hurdle threatening the electoral path, and also opens the door for challenging the legitimacy of the elections with the constitution as well their outcome in the future.
2. Obstruction of electoral legislation:
The Muslim Brotherhood and its arms in Libya seek to block the approval of electoral laws. President of the High Council of State Khalid al-Mishri rejected the House of Representatives’ legislation on presidential elections and described the passing of the law as a unilateral move encroaching on the jurisdiction of the council. He even called the UN political mission to reject the law and the supreme court to invalidate it as unconstitutional. Abdul Razzaq al-Aradi, a leader of the Brotherhood and a member of the forum, withdrew from the forum in protest of the parliament’s approval of the law. He too urged the international mission to reject the law and correct the relevant measures taken in this direction.
These efforts seem to pose a bigger threat to elections because if they yield results the legislative and electoral process will be blocked. This would threaten the whole process of transition and even spark a fresh vicious circle of conflicts or mean that the ineffective legislations would not achieve stability perceived in the electoral process.
3. Potential security repercussions.
Field confrontations between militia groups in western Libya, sabotage operations carried out by Syrian mercenaries around their areas in Tripoli as well as frequent terror attacks by ISIS cells in southern Libya, all indicate potential attacks that threaten the electoral process and even completely halt it in some areas. Scenes of such attacks are likely to be utilized to affect the elections, especially in areas where armed militias affiliated with certain political forces willing to block the elections to impose their own agendas or to bargain to get guarantees that maintain their presence that is in danger of diminishing.
Catalysts of complexity
Actors in the Libyan crisis initially agreed on invoking the ballots whey they approved the roadmap. However, this agreement did not materialize into action. It even became an evident example of interventions that obstructed the elections. The most visible dynamics catalyzing this complexity are as follows:
1. Conflict between Libya’s institutions reached a peak:
Disagreement between state institutions tasked with leading Libya on a path to elections has taken a dangerous course, with the House of Representatives making a decision to withdraw confidence from the unity government on September 21. Dbeibah rejected the motion and called for protests in the Shuhada Square in the capital on September 24. This represents the peak of confrontations with the executive and legislative institutions. The development signals intense polarization, threatens division and allows those blocking the elections to utilize the scene to achieve their goal of obstructing transition in the country. Moreover, this confrontation poses a threat to the functions of bodies that are the most involved in the elections. The most important of these bodies is the High National Election Commission whose activities, and consequently the electoral process, are likely to be impacted by the developments. Additionally, the consequences of such confrontation will impact the ceasefire, and pose a danger by causing involved militias to turn against it when they feel that it would be their last chance to destroy the roadmap.
2. Competition for influence in Libya:
Warring Libyan factions are trying to use all their sources of influence and power, such as social ties, political influence and economic capability, to expand their alliances with tribes and communities across the country’s regions as well as to improve their chances for winning the elections. This is tied to decisions to release leading figures of the former regime and releasing their sequestered funds. Such a move was explained by some as deals aimed at garnering the votes of supporters of the former Ghaddafi regime. Additionally, some of these moves signal efforts to create new fronts to draw up the post-December 24 stage, if the scheduled elections are held, as they will shape the opposing camps in a more confrontational and more complicated manner.
3. The Brotherhood’s hope for avoiding the fall:
The Brotherhood in Libya is aware that their popular support is at its lowest and that running in the elections will mean the fall of the organization’s last stronghold in North Africa. The Brotherhood seeks to achieve either one of two goals. The first goal is to place pressure on parties willing to participate in the elections and contribute to the success of the process in order to secure guarantees, or strike deals that preserve their influence after the December elections are over. The second goal is to block and even abolish the elections, if they have no chance to maintain their presence with the same level of influence. From the very beginning, the Brotherhood’s efforts ran in this direction. The organization rejected any elections before holding a referendum on the constitution. Later it insisted that the president should be elected by the House of Representatives which is elected indirectly. Additionally, the organization obstructed efforts within the LPDF to reach agreement on a constitutional basis, while the High Council of State wanted to block the passing of electoral legislation. It also threatened to reject the result of the elections and to resort to on-field confrontations.
4. Volatile security situation in western Libya:
Irregular on-field movements that militia groups try to use to garner wider influence and control in Libya’s political landscape represent the most important cause of complicating the electoral path. That is, these groups began to threaten to reject the elections if their opponents are not removed alongside the supporters and leading figures of the former regime. The most recent clashes that broke out in the west between units affiliated with the Higher Council of State, and those affiliated with the unity government and its military headquarters, represent a show of force and a preview of what they are capable of if the results of the elections turn out to be against the political forces with which they are affiliated.
5. Continued presence of foreign troops and mercenaries:
No decisive action was taken to remove foreign troops and mercenaries and to stop the transfer of these elements between bases under Turkey’s control. Recent reports show that some of those were sent from Alwatya airbase to Mitiga base, which means that there are roles for them to play in the foreseeable future. Moreover, these elements can cause unrest in areas surrounding their camps. In January 2021, some of these elements held a demonstration inside the Police College in Tripoli. Later in August, they held demonstrations and vandalized property in areas surrounding the Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli to protest salary cuts and a halt of funds that lasted for months. This means that they can go out of control both autonomously or driven by others, which will cause security unrest that can obstruct the elections.
Three Possibilities
In light of aforesaid dynamics, the outlook for Libya’s elections reveals three possible trajectories:
1. Holding elections:
Elections would be held on December 24 as planned, and measures would be taken to implement the UN-backed roadmap in due time. This trajectory would be affected by the Libyan involved parties’ success in overcoming their disagreement, as well as the presence of popular or international pressure that force these parties to change their behavior so as to improve the chances of holding the parliamentary and presidential elections on time.
2. Modifying the roadmap:
If the efforts of parties working to obstruct the elections are successful, or if the crisis reached a peak with signs of on-field confrontations, then a deal to change the schedule of the elections would be reached to avoid the collapse of the roadmap and a fresh conflict with unpredictable consequences. Statements from the US proposed two rounds of elections, that begin in December 2021 and end in September 2022. The proposals signal a potential path to adopting this option.
3. Toppling the roadmap:
This hinges on the competing parties’ willingness and ability to start a fresh conflict, as well as on the involved international parties’ approval of such a consequence. This becomes a valid possibility if the political stalemate remains unresolved, where political bodies fail to reach agreement that would allow the full implementation of the roadmap, or if the current situation continues to prevail in the country.
In conclusion, despite their importance and the current momentum in this direction, the general elections in Libya are facing highly complicated issues and obstacles. Efforts to hold the elections according to the schedule set in the roadmap are likely to fail if these obstacles remain unresolved.
