On November 27, 2024, Syrian armed factions, led by what is known as "Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham" (HTS), formerly "Al-Nusra Front" and once affiliated with Al-Qaeda, launched extensive attacks against Syrian government-controlled areas in an operation dubbed "Operation Deterrence of Aggression." These armed factions successfully seized Aleppo, Syria's second-largest city, and made advancements towards Hama. This comes amid efforts by the Syrian government to launch a counteroffensive against the armed factions.
The armed factions declared that the aim of their surprise attack was to deliver a "preemptive strike" against the Syrian government forces, marking the first significant assault since the Turkish-Russian ceasefire signed in March 2020.
Multiple Motivations
The recent military operations against areas controlled by the Syrian government were driven by several factors, the most important of which are:
1. Returning Syria to Regional and International Attention:
One of the motivations for the attacks is to refocus attention on the Syrian crisis, which has witnessed a decline in international and regional interest. This is particularly due to other prominent regional conflicts, such as the Israeli war on Gaza and the war in Lebanon. This waning attention has raised concerns among armed factions in northwestern Syria, especially Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), that the decline of interest could lead to a tacit acceptance of the current situation. Such acceptance would likely consolidate a status quo that serves the interests of the Syrian government.
2. Attempting to Slow Down Regional rapprochement with Damascus:
Some factions in Syria view the current regional rapprochement with the Syrian government and the trend towards normalization of relations by regional countries as detrimental to their interests. They perceive these developments as threats to their control over territories in the north and northwest of Syria. The recent rapprochement of relations between Damascus and several Arab countries has led these factions to recognize an emerging Arab consensus regarding the legitimacy of the Syrian government. This rapprochement reached a notable milestone in May 2023, when the Council of the League of Arab States, through decision number 8914, agreed to reinstate the Syrian government's participation in its meetings and all related organizations. The same applies to the efforts of rapprochement between Damascus and Ankara, which these factions perceive as creating unfavorable conditions.
3. Covering Up Crises in Areas Controlled by the Factions:
The areas under the control of HTS, particularly the city of Idlib, are experiencing severe living conditions. Approximately 91% of families live below the poverty line, unemployment has surged past 88%, and inflation rates stand at 75.4%. In Idlib, demonstrations demanding an end to HTS's military rule have become increasingly frequent. Protesters are calling for the release of prisoners and individuals who have been forcibly disappeared. This unrest and internal instability have been exacerbated by the actions of Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of HTS, who has been preoccupied with restructuring the organization since the start of the year, resulting in the dismissal and arrest of several leaders. Given these circumstances, the internal turmoil is likely a significant factor driving HTS and its allied factions to initiate military attacks against Syrian government forces as a strategy to divert attention from growing domestic opposition.
Reasons for the Retreat
The reasons behind the retreat of Syrian government forces can be attributed to several factors:
1. Inability of Security Institutions to Anticipate the Attack:
The surprise attack by armed factions on Aleppo and parts of Hama may have caught the Syrian government off guard, exposing a critical miscalculation by its security apparatus. This oversight was not confined to the Syrian government; it also extended to Russia, which failed to predict the attack, as well as marking another failure for the Iranian intelligence system.
The extensive military preparations by the armed factions, evident before the attack, should have signaled an imminent assault. It is unlikely that such a large mobilization of equipment, weapons, and fighters would be intended for anything other than combat. While the Syrian government might have been aware of these preparations, it appears they underestimated them, dismissing them as typical of what the HTS describes as 'infiltration operations' against government forces.
2. Decline in the Combat Readiness of the Syrian Army:
Although Syria was not a direct confrontation arena in the regional conflict, unlike fronts such as Lebanon and Gaza, the ongoing conflict has still significantly undermined the security capabilities and combat readiness of Syrian forces. The continuous Israeli strikes since the beginning of the war targetting centers and associated with Syrian army forces and Iranian presence, have progressively weakened the military capabilities and readiness of the Syrian army. Furthermore, the Syrian army's prolonged involvement in nearly a decade-long conflict has greatly depleted both its military strength and material resources.
3. Weakening of Regional Support Fronts:
The ongoing conflict with Israel has prompted Iran to redeploy its forces across the region. After Israel assassinated several senior Iranian military commanders and advisers in Syria, Iran, fearing further targeting of its leaders, withdrew them from the country. At the time, Iran's assessment was that the Syrian front was relatively stable and that the divided armed factions posed no significant threat to Syrian government or Iranian interests. Meanwhile, the capabilities of regional support forces for the Syrian army have diminished due to the prolonged conflict in the region. Specifically, after tensions with the United States escalated, culminating in the killing of three American soldiers at the Conoco base in January 2024 and subsequent U.S. retaliatory strikes, the Iraqi factions' presence in Syria has significantly decreased. Additionally, Lebanese Hezbollah, a key military supporter of the Syrian government, has pulled back a substantial portion of its forces stationed in Syria due to the escalation of conflict with Israel. Hezbollah's focus on the conflict with Israel and the losses it incurred have relegated its operations in Syria to a secondary priority.
4. Shortcomings of the Russian Presence:
Russia has been a crucial ally of the Syrian government, particularly after playing a pivotal role in 2015 to help Syria regain territories lost to armed factions. However, with the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia has withdrawn a significant portion of its military equipment from Syria reallocated it to bolster the Russian war effort in Ukraine. This shift has stripped the Syrian defenses of key resources that had been a fundamental part of their arsenal since 2015
The Syrian government is likely to focus most of its efforts on stabilizing the front lines, especially in the city of Hama, with the help of concentrated airstrikes by the Syrian and Russian air forces, while awaiting the reorganization of Iranian support for Syria, as confirmed by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi during his visit to Damascus and his meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In this context, it is unlikely that Iran will involve Hezbollah in the expected counteroffensive in Syria, due to Iran's desire to focus the party on restoring its internal influence in Lebanon and rebuilding its military forces. It is more likely that Iran will replace Hezbollah with Iraqi factions to play the role of Hezbollah in Syria.
