The results of the Iranian elections held on March 1 were a foregone conclusion. There is, however, disagreement over the significance and implications of the elections, both internally and internationally. Three different views can be discerned. In the West, the elections were described as shaming the clerical government and as a black mark against the leadership's legitimacy, particularly as the ailing Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, made personal last-minute appeals on television, urging the population to show support by voting.
On the other hand, many radical hardliners saw the elections as a necessary consolidation of the government around Khamenei's agenda. They viewed it as a way to promote a strong Islamic line and as a resilient political strategy to confront foreign threats. Gulf leaders, meanwhile, saw the elections from a third perspective. They viewed it as a continuation of a government that appears little affected by internal upheavals or economic setbacks. They also believe those in power are committed to continuing the rapprochement among the states in the neighbourhood and to acting pragmatically as the region faces tensions from the Gaza War.
All three perspectives reflect the multi-sided conundrum presented by Iran's Islamic Republic. This is particularly evident as competition for control over who will be the next Supreme Leader, when the current one passes away, throws the country into a period of structural transition.
The Public Sentiment
The national parliamentary elections, held every five years, were accompanied this March by elections for the Council of Experts, which is tasked with appointing the next Supreme Leader and is elected every ten years. This combination of elections made the process of casting ballots, which require writing in the names of the chosen candidates, tedious and time-consuming. As a result, long lines formed at the polling stations, particularly in Tehran. The expected turnout was low, and it officially came in at 41%, slightly below the turnout for the presidential elections two years ago. However, witnesses questioned this number, estimating that the actual turnout was considerably smaller, possibly just 10% in Tehran (where official estimates put it at only 24%), and 25% in other cities and regions.
The lack of popular enthusiasm for this first election following the nationwide demonstrations after the death of Mahsa Amini, the Kurdish girl who died in police custody after allegedly failing to correctly wear her hijab, can be attributed to various reasons. Many people did not believe that their vote would make a difference this time, particularly after reformist candidates, as well as candidates from other camps, were disqualified, leaving the choice primarily between hardline conservatives of different factions. Additionally, a significant portion of the population felt ignored by the government, for not only has it shown little ability to alleviate the increasing economic hardship faced by more and more Iranians, with over a quarter of the population falling below the poverty line, but it also appears to be increasingly resistant to popular demands for reform and improvement.
Cultural Clash and Resistance
Furthermore, although there are limited polling statistics available, the widespread participation in street celebrations across the country during the Iranian new year, No Ruz, which coincided with Ramadan this year, lends credibility to what the Financial Times has referred to as a "modern cultural clash" occurring in Iran. Last week, the country seemed to come alive with firelight and communal dancing, with women appearing without their hijabs - a clear defiance of government laws against public music and the mingling of the sexes, particularly through dancing. The current divide observed between a significant portion of the population and the government has never been wider since the 1979 revolution, and the resistance to the election was just another opportunity for the people to demonstrate their refusal to adhere to the current status quo.
Western Perspectives
In this regard, the West's perspective that the elections diminished the legitimacy of Iran's governing leadership aligns with the views of a significant portion of the population. However, the Iranian Constitution does not grant popular sovereignty, unlike the position of the Supreme Leader, whose role as the ultimate guide and representative of God is clearly defined. As a result, Western criticisms of the electoral process and its impact on the government's legitimacy in Iran carry little relevance for the ruling elite, for it is God that is sovereign, not the human beings that are His creation.
The Government’s Perspective on the Elections
What the West gets wrong, and what the Iranian people have learned through years of clerical repression, is that the government feels no shame in regards to the outcome of this elections. On the contrary, the rise of the radical hardline majority in the parliament is being seen as a success. Supreme Leader Khamenei expressed his delight in the increased diversity within the membership, as younger and less experienced majlis representatives now work alongside more seasoned and wiser individuals.
In 2020, a major shift occurred in the parliament following the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the JCPOA. Younger radical conservatives were elected as a group for the first time, joining sitting clerics and a contingent of ideologically hardline representatives who had fought in the 1979 revolution. This trend continued in the current election, as the so-called "second generation" of technocrats, laypeople, war veterans, and members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards replaced the politicized clergy of the first generation, who were less convinced of the Supreme Leader's approach.
To Khamenei and his tight cohort of advisors, as well as the many radical ultra-conservatives now in the majlis, their agenda to construct Iran as a society ideally suited to the practice of Islam has been proven effective. Iran is a country governed by Sharia law and practice, and it is Khamenei's vision, pursued over thirty years, that has made it so.
In contrast to his predecessors, President Raisi does not seem concerned about the impact of low voter turnout on his government's legitimacy. Instead, he aimed to use the elections to establish political stability and strengthen his hold on power. This perspective, supported by Khamenei, is based on the belief that the government is already Islamically legitimate. The recent Gaza war has further reinforced this stance, as Iran has positioned itself as the voice of the Middle Eastern public that supports the Palestinians. This position grants the Islamic Republic legitimacy and allows it to portray itself as bridging Shi’ite-Sunni divisions. Opposition figures and members of the public, such as women who remove their veils, fail to grasp that this is perceived by those in power as the will of God.
Potential for Power Consolidation and Succession
The main concern, as stated by the mainstream and clerical conservative factions, is for the already powerful Revolutionary Guard to seize control of the government in the course of Supreme Leader Khamenei’s succession. This could involve side-lining the clergy and using a clerical leader in name only, effectively transforming the Islamic Republic into a military dictatorship. Therefore, the true purpose of the elections was to solidify and establish ideological consistency within the government's core. This necessitated a limited number of pre-approved candidates who would not pose a threat to those already in power. Consequently, not only were moderates denied a voice in the elections, but the influential clerics in Qom who have spoken out against decisions made by Khamenei and Raisi were also silenced. These clerics have offered alternative interpretations on issues such as hijab wearing and the rights of individuals accused of treason and killed by the government during the protests.
The Assembly, composed mostly of elderly clerics, can in principle play a crucial role in Iran's leadership succession. Over time, these clerics have been co-opted into Khamenei's camp, while others who previously served have been ousted. In the latest election, Khamenei has tightened his control over his inner circle, resulting in the loss of positions for several close allies.
Internally and externally, Khamenei's succession has become a topic of discussion. Different groups are vying for influence and power, making the process increasingly uncertain. The longer the succession remains unscripted, the more significant the role of the Assembly will be once the Supreme Leader passes away. As the country faces structural upheaval due to the imminent loss of its long-time leader, a sense of stasis and rigidity prevails. Those in power prioritize continuity and resilience, viewing any substantive internal change as risky and dangerous.
Raisi, on the other hand, sought to capitalize on this election for multiple purposes. Among his objectives was to divert attention from his poor economic track record. Additionally, he aimed to strengthen his support in both the parliament and the Assembly of Experts. It is worth noting that Raisi is one of only two contenders for the Supreme Leader's position. The other is Mojtaba, Khamenei's son, who is more controversial but has influential allies in the Revolutionary Guard and within the Supreme Leader's Office.
The Neighbourhood’s Response
The Gulf states have a longstanding practice of refraining from passing judgment on the internal affairs of their neighbouring countries. This approach has proven beneficial for the region. Consequently, the Gulf states have observed the Iranian elections without much surprise. They had anticipated that the Raisi government and Khamenei leadership would seek to consolidate their control following the Mahsa Amini demonstrations last year, with the aim of restoring stability and order.
However, the Gulf states are more concerned about how the current government and newly elected parliament will shape their foreign policies, particularly amid the Gaza War. Three significant issues are at play. Firstly, it remains to be seen whether the ultra-hardliners of the Islamic Republic, who currently dominate the majlis, will continue to strengthen their relationship with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the rest of the GCC. This follows the trend set by the Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which shifted the neighbourhood agenda towards cooperation rather than divergence.
Secondly, there is a concern that the tension between Iran and Israel (as well as the US) could escalate, potentially leading to greater conflict in the region. Lastly, the question arises as to whether Tehran will escalate its nuclear plans. This possibility becomes more real as the likelihood of the JCPOA revival diminishes and the possibility of Donald Trump's re-election to the US presidency looms.
Iranian Parliament's Priorities and Foreign Relations
The newly elected members of parliament are firmly aligned with both Raisi and Khamenei in their efforts to enhance relations with neighbouring countries. Many of these parliamentarians are allies of the President, who has been in closer contact with Saudi Arabia regarding regional developments and specifically the Palestinian issue in comparison to his predecessors. From the perspective of the new parliamentarians, establishing warmer relationships with Arab and Muslim neighbours is crucial for achieving one of the Iran’s most cherished goals: diminishing the US presence and influence in the region. Additionally, they hope to attain much-needed economic benefits through these improved ties.
Both sides view this as a potential win-win situation. Iran has already demonstrated goodwill by reducing the militia activities of its Axis of Resilience, which previously posed a threat to regional stability. This has helped soften their animosity and build trust, paving the way for progress in terms of economic relief for Tehran.
The issue of regional escalation is complex. The newly elected members of the majlis have taken a strong stance against Israel, but they have not yet resorted to all-out war to achieve their goals. Given that all Gulf states aspire to prioritise economic growth, as outlined in their Visions, in order to achieve stability in the region, and considering that Iran shares this perspective, the focus of the relationship has shifted towards cooperation. This is particularly evident with states such as Qatar and Oman. Consequently, the recent election has had little impact on how Tehran addresses the Gaza War and its associated risks.
The Nuclear Issue and Concerns
The nuclear issue, although not the primary concern, is perhaps the most challenging. The current ruling party in parliament strongly opposes further negotiations with the US and is unwilling to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the international nuclear watchdog. As a result, Iran is likely to face sanctions from the European Union (EU) in the near future due to its excessive uranium enrichment, which exceeds the limits set by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These sanctions would further isolate Iran.
On the other side, the Gulf states are concerned about Iran's potential development of a nuclear weapon. The current ultra-hardline leadership in Iran may support the idea of acquiring a bomb as it aligns with their perspective of resilience and independence. However, the strength of the renewed relationships between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could potentially counterbalance this development. Improved communication among them regarding collective security and the possibility of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Gulf may potentially become feasible.
Contrasting Reactions to the Elections in Iran
The recent elections in Iran have generated divergent responses from different audiences, highlighting the complexity of the situation. For the West and its allies, the elections serve as yet another example of the Iranian leadership's failure to address the needs and interests of its population. The low voter turnout is seen as a reflection of the government's shortcomings and the growing disconnect between the people and their leaders. Some optimistic commentators even speculate that this could lead to further unrest and a potential overthrow of the clerical regime.
Undoubtedly, the elections have exposed the mounting tension within Iran, largely due to the Supreme Leader's ageing and the resulting inflexibility at the highest levels of government in Tehran. This has led to the rise of ultra-hard-line actors and a stagnation in the country's internal affairs. As a result, figures like Khamenei, Raisi, and their supporters are vying for power amidst a developing succession crisis.
On the other hand, neighbouring countries view the foreign policies of this group favourably, as they align with the growing trend of accommodation and community building between Iran and the Gulf states. Both sides share a common interest in maintaining a pragmatic approach to the Gaza War to prevent further escalation. The newly elected members of the majlis embrace the ideology that local actors, rather than international powers, should have control over their immediate surroundings.
