The Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal, Khalifa Haftar, launched an offensive on September 11 to seize Libya’s oil crescent. In an operation dubbed “Sudden Lightning,” his forces took control of four key oil export ports -- Al-Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Zuwaytina, and Brega -- ousting Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) forces commanded by Ibrahim Jadhran, who is allied with the country’s unity government.
Despite Haftar’s success in seizing the oil crescent without much resistance, fighting flared again when Jadhran’s PFG attacked Al-Sidra and Ras Lanuf, threatening to trigger a civil war between Libya’s east and west.
How were the ports seized?
Haftar’s assault on the oil crescent was sudden. On the dawn of September 11, his troops set off towards Ajdabiya and the four export ports. The next day they gained control of the eastern and southern roads to Ajdabiya and Al-Sham camp that served as the PFG’s headquarters. They further seized Al-Sidra and Brega, the whole of Ras Lanuf and the area around Zuwaytina including its port.
It was notable that Haftar’s forces faced little resistance from the PFG, which is allied with the Government of National Accord (GNA). That is partly due to the role played by the head of the Maghariba tribe, Saleh Al-Atyush. He set up a committee of tribal elder leaders and relatives of PFG fighters who spoke to Jadhran’s men and convinced them not to fight Haftar’s forces.
After seizing the oil crescent, Haftar handed it over to an eastern branch of the PFG led by Brigadier General, Muftah Al-Mugrayf, who allied with the interim government and the House of Representatives in the East.
The army issued a statement on September 12 announcing that the operation was intended to give the Libyan people control of their destiny, alleviate their suffering, protect their wealth and enable the people to reap its benefits. It further stated that the National Oil Company was responsible for running the ports, adding that it would not interfere in their work to resume exports or in trade deals, which it said were purely civilian affairs.
Haftar’s motives
Haftar’s move on the oil crescent was intended to achieve a number of economic, political and military goals:
1. To enable the interim government in the east, along with the Libyan army under Haftar’s command, to utilize the revenues from oil exports to tackle the worsening economic situation in the cities of eastern Libya. This would ease residents’ economic suffering and provide credibility to the eastern government. It would also help finance the army’s operations against extremist groups in the east, particularly the Benghazi Defence Brigade, the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna, both followers of Mufti Sadeq al-Ghariyani in Tripoli, and the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. That in return would strengthen the military, economic and political clout of the parallel authority in eastern Libya in its fight against the western-based GNA.
2. To prevent the GNA’s Presidential Council from resuming oil exports, which had long been stalled due to political and military conflicts between the eastern and western regions of Libya. That follows gains achieved by the GNA, notably its success on July 4 in unifying two rival branches of the National Oil Company (NOC) in Tripoli and Benghazi into a single institution, along with the signing of an agreement between Jadhran’s PFG and the unity government’s Presidential Council on 28 July to resume crude exports and re-open oil terminals across Libya. That would have strengthened the GNA politically by giving it control over more of Libya’s key assets, as well as offering an economic boost from oil revenues, enabling it to draft a budget that would tackle the country’s economic woes, raise its popularity and shore it up against the threat from the parallel authority in the east.
3. To exploit control of the oil crescent as a bargaining chip in negotiations over the creation of a new unity government. On August 22, the GNA of Prime Minister-designate Fayez Sarraj lost a vote of confidence in the House of Representatives. That is likely to strengthen the presence of eastern representatives in a future GNA, especially on the proposed five-member military command council. The council is likely to include house president Aguila Saleh, LNA commander Haftar and the two deputy presidents of the house, Mousa al-Kouni and Ahmed Meitig.
4. To prepare for the aftermath of the battle for Sirte. Haftar is anticipating that forces loyal to the GNA, which are currently fighting to oust ISIS its coastal stronghold, will gain full control of it following significant gains against the extremists in August. ISIS forces have been cornered in the third residential district of the town, where fighting continues. Haftar fears that once pro-GNA forces have liberated Sirte, some of their troops at least will head east along with Jadhran’s forces, to seize the oil crescent, and launch operations against Libyan National Army forces in the east in an attempt roll back Haftar’s influence. His fear is intensified by calls from leaders in the west of the country, notably Sadeq al-Ghariyani, for a move eastward to liberate the area from Haftar’s forces once Sirte has been seized from ISIS.
Impacts on Libya
Haftar’s control of the oil crescent has a number of actual and likely implications for Libya. Some have already become evident on the ground, while others can be expected over the coming period:
1. Resumed civil war between eastern Libya, represented by the Operation Dignity forces, and the West, represented by Libya Dawn. Early signs of this are already visible, notably the PFG’s attack on Al-Sedra and Ras Lanuf on September 18, which temporarily took over the port of Ras Lanuf until Haftar’s forces were able to seize it back. This demonstrates that the fighting between east and west will be limited, for the time being, to small attacks aimed at blocking oil exports and destroying some vital oil installations to prevent eastern forces from selling crude and benefitting from the proceeds.
This implies that the Libya Dawn forces and the Misrata militias have enough on their plates with the fight against ISIS in Sirte. It is possible that the fighting will spread after Sirte has been liberated and that the political divisions in the country will continue, along with the struggle for the country’s oil and the distribution of its revenues.
2. In light of the fact that western Libyan forces are preoccupied fighting ISIS, it may shift towards creating a new alliance in the east to fight Haftar. That coalition would likely include Jadhran’s PFG and some Islamist militias in the east, which announced their support for Tripoli-based Mufti Sadeq al-Ghariyani.
Those militias include the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna, which announced on August 21 that it considered Ghariyani its Imam, and the Benghazi Defence Brigade, which was formed on June 2 by Dar al-Ifta for the Defence of Benghazi, the Shura Council and the Operations Room of the Ajdabiya Revolutionaries. This move aims to distract and deplete Haftar’s forces, in addition to the fact that Haftar’s forces are now fighting on four fronts - Derna, Benghazi, Ajdabiya and in the oil crescent.
3. Misrata’s declaration that it would not interfere in business at the oil ports, referring that it was a matter for the Presidential Council of the GNA, was a tactical move based on Misrata’s desire to calm the situation in Libya for the time being. It fears that it will face increasing military and economic exhaustion if it enters into direct confrontation with Haftar’s forces at the same time as the battle to liberate Sirte from ISIS, in which it has suffered significant casualties.
Misrata is likely to limit its actions to providing military and material support to Jadhran’s forces to wear down Haftar’s troops in the oil crescent and prevent the resumption of oil exports. It may play a more active role in the military attacks if the process of political reconciliation in Libya falters and no agreed formula can be reached to manage Libya’s oil wealth.
In conclusion, these factors may obstruct the process of national reconciliation and efforts to arrive at a political agreement among Libya’s warring parties. This would push them towards setting more extreme demands and conditions, whether in relation to the formation of a future national unity government or to the terms of the Skheirat agreement signed in December 2015. In particular, the reconstruction of Libya’s army and security services and the question of who will manage Libya’s key institutions that could lead to yet more division.
