Iran welcomed the Syrian regime’s declaration of its complete control over Aleppo on December 22nd 2016, after the last armed fighters evacuated the city. Iran perceived this victory for the Assad regime as a turning point, one which will have direct ramifications on the balance of power within Syria in the near future. However, this positive development does not negate Tehran’s fears regarding possible outcomes of the Syrian conflict. These outcomes may be impacted by the increasingly tense disputes over the role played by each party involved in Syria, such as the Hezbollah militias. Outcomes may also be impacted by Moscow and Washington reaching an understanding after Donald Trump's inauguration on January 20th, which may prove antithetical to Iran’s interests.
Many factions in Iran believe that regime control of Aleppo could have numerous positive outcomes for the Iranian-led axis. The axis currently includes the Assad regime and Hezbollah, as well as sectarian Shiite militias which Iran formed and trained to support Assad against the opposition forces. This perception is doubtlessly connected to the significance Aleppo holds for the Iranians, who consider the city to be a focal point in the conflict between the Assad regime and its allies, and the armed opposition and their benefactors. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed such a sentiment, stating that his country is defending itself from the front-line of Aleppo, and that the Iranians should not wait for the enemy to enter their homes in order to think about defending their lives, but should rather crush the enemy at their own borders. Khamenei’s statements indicate that Iran considers itself a target of the escalating conflict in Syria.
The taking of Aleppo by the Assad regime tips the balance of power on the ground in favor of the Syrian government before Donald Trump’s entry into the White House, which could strengthen the regime’s position before the possible commencement of negotiations in Kazakhstan. These negotiations were agreed upon by Iran, Turkey and Russia during talks that followed the Moscow Declaration on December 20th 2016.
Rekindling political negotiations after the regime’s conquest of Aleppo weakens the position of the Syrian opposition in any upcoming negotiations. Opposition demands, such as the ousting of Bashar al-Assad, are now deemed by Tehran to be outside the scope of any possible negotiations given the current realities on the ground.
In light of this, Turkey’s attempts to come to an understanding with Russia and Iran have weakened Turkish support for the Syrian opposition, and have thus widened the gap between the Turks and their Syrian allies. Such an outcome can only benefit the Syrian regime and its allied militias, given that Turkey was a regional patron of the opposition. This coincides with the pressures facing Turkey due to the escalating terrorist attacks on its soil, the latest being the assassination of Russian Ambassador Andrei Karlov in Ankara on December 19th 2016.
The Assad regime’s control over Aleppo could provide Iran with a new regional card in interactions with the incoming Trump administration, which is particularly significant given the likelihood of tensions escalating between Tehran and Washington under a Trump presidency. This likelihood stems from Trump’s hardline position towards Iran, which is not only focused on the nuclear deal but also extends to Iran’s alleged support for terrorism. A strengthened Iranian position would be beneficial in facing an administration which may see Iran as a significant factor in determining Washington’s interests and security.
Underlying Fears:
Despite the positive developments in Aleppo from an Iranian perspective, Iran’s ruling elites maintain fears towards the potential outcomes of the Assad regime’s retaking of the city. It was obvious that many factions in Iran expressed concern regarding the absence of the Assad regime during the talks between Iran, Russia and Turkey. This absence appears to have been insisted upon by the Turks without any visible protestations from Russia, which may indicate that Russia is attempting a sincere effort to maintain a positive rapport with the Turks. This is especially clear in Russia’s reconciliatory position after the assassination of its ambassador in Ankara, as it stated that the goal of the assassination was sabotaging Russian-Turko relations. Russia has also increased its coordination with Turkey over the crisis in Syria, which has not been welcomed by the Iranians, who appear to realize that such coordination may be temporary in nature and that it may give rise to disputes, and possibly actual conflicts in the future.
The disputes between the Turks and the Iranians are not centered on marginal issues, nor do they appear easily reconcilable. Indicators of trouble appeared during talks preceding the Moscow Declaration, during which the Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu called for cutting off aid to militias allied with the Syrian regime, specifically Hezbollah, in order to ensure a stable ceasefire. Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif responded to his Turkish counterpart by emphasizing that any talks would have to focus on organizations classified by UN Security Council resolutions as being terrorist organizations.
Hamid Reza Moghadam Far, advisor to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard leader Mohammad Ali Jafari, expressed Iran’s dismay at the Syrian regime’s absence from the Moscow talks. He stated that the absence of the Syrians raised serious questions, and that their presence in the talks was a necessity. Given this point of view, it can be understood why Iran was quick to fill in its allies, the Assad regime and Hezbollah, on the details of Iran’s negotiations with Ankara and Moscow. The Iranian Foreign Ministry’s Deputy for Arab and African affairs, Hossein Jaberi Ansarim, visited Damascus and Beirut on December 22nd and 23rd 2016 respectively, in order to meet with both Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and provide them with the necessary information.
It may be said that Iranian concerns over a possible strengthening of a Russian-Turko accord began before the Moscow Declaration, specifically during a time when Russia and Turkey opened channels of communication to reach an agreement over the evacuation of opposition fighters from Aleppo. This prompted Iran to insist on allowing its own allied fighters to evacuate the villages of al-Fu’ah and Kefraya, both Shiite majority villages which were being besieged by the rebel Islamist group Jaish al-Fatah (the Army of Conquest).
Iran has made no secret of its concern that the incoming American president Donald Trump may engage in bilateral relations with Moscow to reach a new understanding over Syria, which may jeopardize Iranian interests. This is especially pressing in light of numerous reports indicating that the Trump administration, as well as Congress, seek to prevent Iran from emerging victorious in the Syrian conflict. Many factions in Iran are closely following the interactions between Trump and Moscow and the possible outcomes of these interactions in the near future. These outcomes will no doubt impact both the nuclear deal and the Syrian conflict.
Numerous Steps:
In light of the aforementioned facts, it might be possible to explain two major messages the Iranian government seeks to impress upon the regional and international powers involved in Syria. These messages aim to illustrate that Iran is a major player in the Syrian conflict and cannot be ignored in any negotiations, as they are capable of causing any such negotiations to fail.
The first message was embodied in the visit of the leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, to Aleppo. Through this visit, Iran sought to confirm its presence and influence on the ground, and to confirm that this presence was a major factor in the latest turn of events in the Syrian civil war. Iran sought to emphasize that Russia’s military involvement would not have attained significant achievements without the presence of the Revolutionary Guard and the armed militias which Iran had formed and trained over the last five years.
The second message was the confirmation by the Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, of Iran’s establishment of a joint center in Syria with Russia. The center provides advice to the Syrian military and its allies, which means that coordination with Russia is still thorough despite the current differences between the two countries.
In light of this, it can be said that the Syrian regime’s victory in the battle for Aleppo could enhance Iran’s presence in the Syrian crisis. Yet it may also pose challenges in the long run, given the increasing possibilities of disputes between Iran, and other regional and international powers involved in Syria.
