The June 7, 2017 twin attacks on the Iranian Parliament and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini in central Tehran killing 17 people and wounding 50 others, are set to have an impact on both the Iran’s domestic balance of power during President Hassan Rouhani’s second terms as well as its foreign policy. This is especially so because the attacks occurred amid escalating political conflicts that are expected to expand in the next four years. They also came amid mounting foreign pressures on Iran over its interference in the internal affairs of regional countries, its support for terrorism as well as playing a role in destabilizing the Middle East.
Multiple Indications
The recent attacks in Tehran bear three primary indications. First, the attacks took place inside the Iranian capital of Tehran and targeted both the regime’s political and religious establishments symbolized by Consultative Assembly, also known as Majlis of Shura Council, and the mausoleum of the leader of the 1979 revolution and the founder of the republic. This means the perpetrators sought to send across a direct message to the Iranian regime that its various establishments could be targets in the coming period, especially because the attacks occurred only three days after the anniversary of Khomeini's death of June 4, 1989.
Second, the modus operandi of the attacks reveals an evident security shortcoming disproving claims by the Iranian authorities that it is the most stable state amid a turbulent region. This shortcoming was evidenced in the Iranian authorities own narrative. They reported that the gunmen, who stormed the Majlis were disguised as women, and entered through a special gate for employees and citizens. The perpetrators further claimed that they were seeking to meet members of parliament, while a protest was being staged in front of the building by depositors who lost their savings with the Caspian credit institution.
This, perhaps, indicates the perpetrators planned the attack over a long time and took advantage of the protest to enable the attackers to break through the security checks. Moreover, they managed to create a cell of highly-trained elements, according to Chairman for the Committee for Foreign Policy and National Security of the Majlis.
Questions were raised as to how the attackers managed to reach Khomeini's burial place, which is considered as one of the most significant symbols of pride for Iranians.
Third, the Iranian authorities dealing with the attacks were, clearly, in a state of confusion. Some blamed the attacks on the opposition Mujahedeen-e-Khalq group (the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran), yet later withdrew the accusation to emphasize that ISIS carried out the attack. A statement issued by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security on June 8, 2017 revealed that an ISIS cell that was involved in operations outside Iran - in Raqqa, Syria and Mosul, Iraq, in particular- was behind the attacks after its members managed to enter Iran in July 2016.
It is perhaps safe to say that this confusion explains one reason why some opposition parties and ethnic groups have not excluded the possibility that the Iranian regime itself was involved in the attacks. One can possibly argue that the Iranian regime wanted to achieve certain goals including to reset its own internal balances and reduce foreign pressure put on it over its support for terrorism.
Potential Implications
The attacks appear to have several implications on Iran in the coming period. That the attacks took place at this time represents an opportunity for Rouhani’s opponents and the regime’s influential establishments to ratchet up pressure on the president during his second term. It is worth noting that Rouhani won re-election by a wide margin from the first round and defeated the conservatives’ candidate, the head of the Astan-e Quds Razavi foundation Ebrahim Raisi, whom they supported to increase his chances in taking the presidency from the moderates.
The regime’s establishments may exploit the attacks to impose more restrictions on political, social and media activities in the coming period to embarrass President Rouhani in front of his popular support base. That is, this base voted for Rouhani not only to enable him to defeat Raisi, but also to enhance his ability to open controversial issues such as the lifting of house arrest restriction on former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi and former chairman of the Shura council Mahdi Karroubi, broadening political and social freedoms and opening up to the world.
Hence, there were views that the recent attacks were reminiscent of an era of assassinations that targeted Iranian writers and journalists during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005). Conservatives and the regime’s key establishments exploited the assassinations to put more pressure on Khatami and block his political, economic and social programs.
In other words, the recent attacks will create another issue that will be exploited by President Rouhani’s opponents to put more pressure on him. Such pressures will be similar to what they did over the government’s failure to make gains from the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 group of world powers, find solutions to existing economic problems and counter rampant corruption.
Exploiting Attacks
Moreover, the Iranian regime might seek to exploit the attacks to send messages - in particular to regional and international powers involved in the war on terrorism - that these attacks were ISIS’ response to Iran’s participation in the war on it, in Mosul, northern Iraq in particular, which is drawing to a close.
Indeed, some Iranian officials rushed to promote such claims immediately after the attacks. This indicates that Tehran seeks to ease foreign pressure on it over its support to terrorism. In particular, pressure from US on Iran is likely to be ratcheted up as Tehran is playing an increasing role in destabilizing the Middle East.
However, these claims put forth by Iran are not consistent with facts on the ground of which two stand out. The first fact is that Iran’s support to its allied sectarian Shiite militias in northern Iraq, which have committed human rights violations, were among the factors that helped ISIS spread in northern Iraq and took control of major cities since mid-2014.
The second fact is that the relations between Iran and terrorist organizations has never been hostile, which is evidenced by the fact that Iran has never targeted these organizations although they are operating in neighboring countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, there were indications that Iran and these organizations have reached understandings or tacit truces stipulating that neither party will attack the interests of the other. In particular, this is demonstrated by the fact that Iran harbored, and allowed free movement for terrorist militants on its territory to cross over to Afghanistan and Iraq during the US war in Afghanistan in 2001.
In light of the above, it can possibly be concluded that the recent attacks will usher in a new stage in which Iran will witness new developments, in terms of internal balances of power as well as its interaction with the outside world.
