The Ministry of Interior, Security Agency, and Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan announced in a joint statement on Tuesday, May 16, 2023, that nine individuals were arrested on charges of planning to overthrow the government by force, assassinate prominent figures and senior Azerbaijani officials. The statement indicated that they had connections to Iranian intelligence agencies, and that the cell was composed of a person named Ruhollah Akhoundzadeh and his son Mursal, along with seven others working under his supervision.
On his part, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, rejected the accusations in a statement on May 18, denying any official or unofficial relationship between these individuals and Iran. He affirmed that imprisoning individuals on the pretext of their connection to Iran is unacceptable.
Heightened Escalation
Tensions have recently escalated between Iran and Azerbaijan. The key indicators of this escalation can be observed as follows:
1- Exchange of accusations of supporting opposition:
Baku has repeatedly announced the arrest of Iranian-linked groups engaging in espionage operations and planning to overthrow the government and carry out sabotage operations. On April 6, 2023, Azerbaijani authorities announced the arrest of six individuals allegedly recruited by Iranian intelligence agencies and charged with "attempted military coup and destabilization of the country.” Additionally, Baku arrested 29 individuals on February 1, 2023, on charges of spying for Tehran. Furthermore, the Azerbaijani Azerbaijan's State Security Service (DTX), on November 2, 2022, announced the arrest of an armed group that received training and funding from Iranian intelligence to propagate and incite extremist religious ideas.
On the other hand, Tehran accuses Baku of allowing anti-Iranian groups to carry out terrorist operations within Iranian territory. Iranian authorities announced the arrest of Azerbaijani nationals on charges of participating in an attack in October 2022 on the "Shah Cheragh" shrine in the city of Shiraz, which resulted in the death of 13 people and injury of others.
2- The Attack on the Azerbaijani Embassy in Iran:
On January 27, 2023, the Azerbaijani Embassy in Tehran was attacked by an individual who killed the embassy's security director and the injured two guards. Baku described the attack as terrorist, accusing the Iranian authorities of failing to impose strict security measures in the perimeter of the embassy, which facilitated the incident. Tehran responded by stating that Baku sought to politicize the incident.
Furthermore, on April 6, 2023, Baku expelled four Iranian diplomats, indicating that their activities were not in line with their diplomatic status, suggesting that they were involved with the arrested group mentioned earlier. In response, Iran, on May 5, 2023, retaliated by expelling four Azerbaijani diplomats, two of whom worked at the embassy in Tehran and two at the consulate in Tabriz.
3- Azerbaijan opens its first-ever embassy in Tel Aviv on March 29, 2023:
Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, during the embassy's inauguration, emphasized the importance of forming a united front between Israel and Azerbaijan against Iran and strengthening relations between the two countries at all levels. Angered by the statements, Tehran demanded clarifications from Baku, stating that it "will not remain indifferent to this conspiracy," which indicates potential escalation.
In this context, Iran delivered a protest note to the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran in response to what it described as "inappropriate actions by some Azerbaijani media outlets that attack Iran.” This came in the aftermath of the opening of the Azerbaijani embassy in Israel. Baku also summoned the Iranian ambassador and provided a list of materials published in the Iranian media in criticism of Azerbaijan.
Motives for Escalation
The most prominent motives for the renewed escalation between Iran and Azerbaijan can be outlined as follows:
1- Iran’s Concerns about Azerbaijani-Israeli Relations:
Iran, which it shares a common border of 765 kilometers, views with apprehension the growing relations between Tel Aviv and Baku. Tehran accuses Azerbaijan of hosting Israeli forces and elements on its territory that carry out sabotage operations within Iran. Some of these operations originating from Azerbaijan targeted Iran's nuclear program, and resulted in stealing nuclear archives in 2018 and the assassination of prominent nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in 2020.
The visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister to Azerbaijan on April 19 further intensified Iranian concerns. Following a meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov, the Israeli top diplomat stated that Israel and Azerbaijan have entered a new era of strategic relations. Additionally, the Israeli official visited neighboring Turkmenistan, marking the first visit by an Israeli minister to Ashgabat in 30 years, and the opening of an Israeli embassy located just 20 kilometers from the Iranian border. He emphasized willingness to enhance economic and military relations with Azerbaijan, an attempt to send direct threats to Iran.
On the other hand, Israeli newspaper Haaretz published an investigation on March 5, 2023, revealing Israel's sale of weapons and military equipment worth billions of dollars to Azerbaijan. In return, Azerbaijan provided oil and a foothold for Israel in its territory.. The article also noted that Azerbaijan allowed Israeli intelligence agency Mossad to establish an outpost, enabling Israel to track and monitor activities taking place inside Iran.
The Israeli newspaper also claimed that Baku rehabilitated an airport specifically to assist Israel in the event Tel Aviv decides to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Additionally, following Cohen's visit to Baku, the newspaper indicated that the Israel Aerospace Industries would provide Azerbaijan with two satellites for $120 million to support the efforts of the Azerbaijani National Aerospace Agency in the field of communication and surveillance satellites.
2- Tehran’s fears of regional shifts:
Tehran is concerned by any changes to the geopolitics of the South Caucasus that could affect Iranian transportation routes. It has already opposed Azerbaijan's plan to create the Zangezur corridor on the border with Armenia in September 2022. This corridor would give Azerbaijan access its Nakhchivan region, located within Armenia's borders. If implemented, this plan would effectively block Iran from the north. Azerbaijan's control over this corridor would eliminate the need for Iran's territory for transit. Instead, Iran would have to pay potentially higher transit fees for the passage of its trucks heading to Azerbaijani territories or passing through the corridor on the border with Armenia.
In response, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on December 20, 2022, expressed the hope that Azerbaijan would respond to calls for a resolution with Armenia after its control over areas in the Lachin corridor, which connects Yerevan to the Karabakh Highlands, located entirely within Azerbaijan's borders. Iran wants to prevent Baku from doing again what it did earlier with the Zangezur border corridor with Iran.
3- Concerns about Nationalistic Tendencies:
Sources indicate that more than 20 million Azerbaijani nationals live in northern Iran, which is larger than the population of Azerbaijan itself, which stands at 10 million. Iran has traditionally accused Azerbaijan of supporting separatist movements in the north, home to Azerbaijani communities. These groups became active following Azerbaijan's victory in the war with Armenia in 2020 with support from Turkey. They have demanded the creation of "Greater Azerbaijan," which would include the current state of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani provinces in northern Iran. The situation has escalated to the point where fans of Azerbaijani descent raise Turkish flags and sing Azerbaijani songs during matches between clubs of Azerbaijani origins and other clubs in the Iranian league.
On the other hand, Azerbaijan is concerned about the Iranian regime's use of religious groups within Azerbaijan to establish sleeper cells that would be used to destabilize Azerbaijan's security and form armed movements affiliated with Iran, similar to Iranian militias in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. These concerns became even more evident after the the establishment of a Shia movement called "Husseiniyun" in 2021. Azerbaijan fears that these groups can pose a threat to its internal stability and security.
The conclusion is that Iran and Azerbaijan are likely to continue to exchange accusations in an attempt to threaten each other’s security, thereby perpetuating the existing mutual mistrust. However, tensions between the two states are unlikely to escalate to the point of a direct military confrontation, as neither state can bear the costs of such development, especially at a time when Iran is seeking to calm its external disputes and adopt an approach of normalization and openness to neighboring countries. This is evidenced by Iran's abstention from conducting operations targeting sites in Azerbaijan, despite its belief in the presence of Israeli elements there. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has postponed its plan to control the Zangezur corridor due to Iran's opposition.
However, that does not prevent continued limited escalation between the two states, which may involve conducting military maneuvers in the border areas. Baku may resort to enhancing its relations with Turkey and Israel to deter Iran, while Iran may respond by strengthening its relations with Armenia and other Central Asian countries.
