With the turning of a new year, analysts and practitioners annually tend to determine upcoming challenges that must be addressed and opportunities that hopefully can be seized. 2023 is no exception. The last two years were replete with geopolitical tensions, challenged by global socioeconomic issues, and witnessed technological advancement creating the potential for numerous opportunities; they have not only provided ample food for thought but are in themselves catalysts for inspection and reflection about our domestic, regional, or global paradigms.
Numerous issues in 2023 will affect the parameters of the world order, or state of disorder, that we are going through and which will prevail for years to come. In terms of international relations, the actions and decisions of the United States, Europe, Russia, and China will be particularly consequential in this regard. And even as early as the first quarter of the new year, the Ukraine crisis will be a salient issue with consequential ramifications, especially on Russian-Western relations.
There are questions that the US and Europe need to address. Choosing between isolationism versus internationalization is one for America, while determining the prevailing identity, whether old or new, is one for Europe. And jointly, they must determine what they have in common as states members of a North Atlantic Alliance or the European Union. Many of these indications have come to the fore and will be addressed in how the Ukraine issue is dealt with in the coming months.
Divergent perspectives on relations with Russia before the Ukraine invasion were a case in point and could reemerge as the pathway moves closer to diplomacy. Some in the US and parts of Europe believe that Russia must not only not win but also be resoundingly defeated in Ukraine. Amongst these, some even suggest that fundamentally weakened Russian institutions must be the critical objective, including the very position of President Putin. Others believe there must be consequences for the Ukraine invasion but believe that Russia will remain contiguous to Europe and ultimately must be brought into an established order on the continent, even with strict preconditions. This will be determined through intellectual and political discussion, as well as on the battlefield.
On December 17, Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger published an article in Spectator magazine where he argued that the time is approaching to integrate the strategic change which has been accomplished in Europe into a new structure toward achieving peace through negotiations. He argued that a peace process should link Ukraine to NATO in one manner or another. He further stated that if the pre-war dividing line between Ukraine and Russia could not be achieved by combat or negotiation, recourse to self-determination could be explored through internationally supervised referendums in territories that have changed hands over centuries, and inferred that the Crimea area would defacto remain subject of negotiations.
Kissinger affirmed that the goal of the peace process would be to confirm the freedom of Ukraine and to define a new international structure, especially for Central and Eastern Europe. He interestingly added that, eventually, Russia should find a place in that European order.
While he seems to have taken a tougher stance against Russia, Kissinger reiterates that the dissolution of Russia or its capacity to undertake strategic policy could be a highly risky endeavor. Equally noteworthy and important is his explicit call for diplomatic engagement.
One can challenge some of the preferred options Kissinger mentions, like an “impotent Russia.” I believe some of his arguments should be complemented by a regional security framework, arms control, military deployment limitations, and early warning systems to diminish unanticipated attacks and provide crisis management capacities. Nevertheless, his call for diplomacy merits consideration.
I doubt holding an internationally managed referendum on territories already annexed by Russia would work, but this is an interesting proposition to consider. If it were to work, could these referendums also be emulated in the occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza as part of developing a new Middle Eastern security structure?
In previous articles, I suggested that the UN Secretary-General and several non-permanent members of the Security Council should initiate diplomatic efforts of different scopes between Russia, the United States, and Europe. I remain of this view, at least to be diplomatically well received by the conflicting parties and as a potential face-saving platform for a political movement. However, the crucial substantive negotiations will mostly be behind closed doors and backdoor channels.
Russia, on its part, has to very soon determine the strategic losses of continuing the current situation in Ukraine or its further de-prioritization. It must assess the potential gains of prolonging the ongoing conflict beyond this winter. Concurrently, beyond Ukraine, Russia must also determine what global posture it would want to pursue after the end of the military operations. As much as Europe must decide how it intends to cohabitate with its big neighbor, Russia must also determine how it will live with Europe. New world order or not, Europe and Russia will remain contingent and must develop a modus operandi.
From Russia’s perspective, this will have to come in a diminished capacity unless it can fundamentally change the situation militarily on the ground in Ukraine. This can only be achieved through the massive acquisition of new territories, which seems highly unlikely, or by using tactical nuclear weapons, which it has repeatedly denied it would resort to and against which it has heard public and private admonitions.
Several of Kissinger’s proposals will, needless to say, be found objectionable by Russia. Even those more agreeable will be the subject of endless tinkering. He does, however, in principle, implicitly and entirely obviously accept territorial gains for Russia, whether in Crimea or possibly due to referenda in contested territories, where most Russian speakers have resided in Ukraine.
Whether based on Kissinger’s proposals or those of others, the initiation of diplomatic efforts by spring at the latest is of the essence. In success or failure, these efforts will be consequential in Ukraine and lay the foundation for how the West and Russia deal with each other in the ever-evolving world order. In fact, it will have implications well beyond the European continent as China and others assess how best to defend their interests moving forward, particularly in their immediate geographical domain and beyond. In my opinion, what happens in the Ukraine crisis in the first half of 2023 will influence policies not only in Europe but also in Asia and the world at large. Such policies will plant the seeds for the New World Order paradigm.
