On Sunday, June 9, 2024, the Iranian Ministry of Interior announced the approval of six presidential candidates for the upcoming election scheduled for June 28, 2024. This announcement followed the endorsement of the nominations by the Council of Guardians. The confirmed candidates are current parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf; former Supreme National Security Council secretary and member of the Expediency Discernment Council, Saeed Jalili; Tehran Mayor, Alireza Zakani; Member of Parliament for Tabriz, Masoud Pezeshkian; former Minister of Justice, Mostafa Pourmohammadi; and former MP and conservative head of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi.
On May 21, the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Iran’s parliament) approved an amendment to the presidential election law, scheduling early elections for June 28, 2024—one year ahead of the originally planned date in 2025. This unexpected change follows the tragic death of President Ebrahim Raisi, who passed away in a helicopter crash on May 19.
Characteristics of the Candidate Landscape
Examining the recent presidential candidacy applications, several key observations emerge:
1- Fundamentalist dominance in elections:
Five out of the six approved candidates are fundamentalists, forming part of a faction that controls the levers of power. Except for Masoud Pezeshkian, all other candidates are conservatives. Moreover, most of these candidates belong to the Paydari (Endurance) Front, one of the most hardline fundamentalist parties. This party secured the majority of parliamentary seats in the March 2024 elections. They competed against the current speaker of the parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who eventually won the parliamentary presidency.
The candidates' profiles reflect a growing trend within the regime towards increasingly entrenched hardline policies and the empowerment of a new generation of fundamentalists. This is happening in anticipation of the possible selection of a third supreme leader to succeed the aging and ailing Ali Khamenei. The same trend was evident in the latest parliamentary elections, which some analysts view as heralding a new generation of radicals, such as MPs Mousa Ghazanfarabadi, Mahmoud Nabavian, and Hamid Rasaei. These individuals are expected to play significant roles in Iran's future political dynamics.
2- Exclusion of most moderate and reformist figures:
The Guardian Council, tasked with vetting electoral candidates, is composed of 12 members appointed by the Supreme Leader and the Chief Justice. This council has excluded the majority of moderate and reformist candidates. Notable excluded individuals include former Speaker Ali Larijani, former Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri, former Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati, former Transportation Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash, and former Culture Minister Mohammad Mehdi Esmaeili, among others. Additionally, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been barred from running, as he was in the 2017 and 2021 elections.
Often referred to as the regime's gatekeeper, the Guardian Council possesses the authority to disqualify any candidate without providing a rationale, sometimes acting inconsistently. For example, Pourmohammadi was disqualified from the Assembly of Experts election in March 2024 but was approved for the presidential race three months later; a similar pattern was observed with Pezeshkian.
The regime seeks to promote a candidate possessing qualities similar to those of the late President Raisi, whom conservatives regarded as an exemplary figure adhering to the regime's principles. Given the critical juncture Iran faces both domestically and internationally, the selection of a moderate or reformist candidate, who does not fully align with the government's hardline stance, is unlikely.
3- Female candidates Joining the race:
Reports indicate that nine women have applied to run for the presidency in Iran. Among them, former MP Zahra Elahian stands out for her hardline stance on hijab enforcement. Elahian, who has called for harsh measures against the mid-September 2022 protests, is under Western sanctions due to her position.
Elahian is not the first woman to seek the presidency in Iran. Previous female candidates include former MP and veteran journalist Azam Taleghani, who ran in every election from 1997 until her death in 2017. The debate continues over the constitutional provision that the president must be one of the "political men," which is sometimes interpreted to mean "political personalities," potentially allowing both men and women to run. However, the Guardian Council has historically barred women from presidential candidacy.
Elahian withdrew her candidacy before the Guardian Council's final announcement, citing the need to "preserve the unity of the revolutionary front." The participation of these women, even with no prospects of winning the elections, may suggest a regime strategy: promoting women who embrace fundamentalist and revolutionary principles to signal to both domestic and international audiences that it does not oppose women running for president.
4- Shadowy figures emerging:
General Vahid Haghanian's candidacy took many by surprise, as he is often regarded as the "shadow man" for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. A close confidant of Khamenei, Haghanian has served as the executive director of the Supreme Leader's Office and is frequently seen at his side. Notably, after the 2005 elections, Haghanian carried the presidential decree and handed it to Khamenei, who then passed it to the newly elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. According to protocol, this task should have been performed by Ahmadinejad's predecessor, former president Mohammad Khatami. The same deviation from protocol occurred after the 2013 elections when the decree was handed over to President Rouhani in Ahmadinejad's absence, underscoring Haghanian's significant influence within the Iranian regime.
Haghanian maintains strong connections with Khamenei's son, Mojtaba, who is rumored to be a leading candidate to succeed his father. His relationships with senior Revolutionary Guard leaders, including the late Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, underscore his deep integration into the regime's core. As Haghanian himself described, his rise is akin to "moving from the seventh and deepest layer of the regime's brain to the first and most visible layer."
4- Fewer candidates:
Eighty candidates have registered for the upcoming presidential election, a notable decrease from previous years (529 in 2021, with only seven approved; 1,636 in 2017; and 686 in 2013). This decline could suggest either a lack of preparedness for the unexpectedly early election following President Raisi’s sudden death or a fear among prominent moderates and reformists of disqualification by the Guardian Council, a recurrent issue in past elections.
Potential Implications
Based on the above, the potential implications for the electoral and political scene in Iran can be identified as follows:
1- Low voter turnout:
The last presidential race in 2021 saw a notably low turnout of 49%. Similarly, the Parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections held in early March recorded a turnout of just 41%. These precedents indicate the likelihood of weak participation in the upcoming presidential election. Historically, consecutive elections held within a short timeframe tend to experience lower voter engagement. To counteract this, the Iranian regime in the 1990s mandated that local elections be held concurrently with the presidential election to ensure widespread public participation. However, this alignment will not occur this time due to the advanced election date, a consequence of the exceptional circumstances following Raisi's death. As a result, the two events will be separated by a significant time gap.
2- Victory for a fundamentalist candidate:
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared on June 3, 2024 (the final day for candidate registration), that the next president must "believe in the principles of the revolution" and "continue what President Raisi started." Consequently, the final candidate list aligns with Khamenei's directive, predominantly excluding moderate and reformist figures, with the notable exception of Masoud Pezeshkian.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Leader retains the authority to reconsider the candidacy of moderate or reformist candidates, a factor that has historically lent some legitimacy to elections. For example, in the 2005 election, the candidacies of reformists Mohsen Mehralizadeh and Mostafa Moin were approved, leading to Ahmadinejad's eventual victory.
Given this context, it is anticipated that the upcoming election will feature a contest among fundamentalist candidates of varying degrees, such as the hardliner Saeed Jalili, the new fundamentalist Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, or the former fundamentalist turned moderate Mostafa Pourmohammadi.
3- Widening rift within the fundamentalist camp:
It is increasingly evident that the fundamentalist camp in Iran is on the brink of a significant split. This division became apparent during the recent parliamentary elections, which saw a clash between the hardline Paydari (Endurance) Front and the so-called new fundamentalists, represented by the current Speaker of Parliament and presidential candidate, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. This schism was particularly noticeable during the selection process for the Speaker of Parliament.
Given this context, it is improbable that the two leading candidates, Saeed Jalili and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, will withdraw in favor of one another. This situation marks a departure from the 2021 election, when fundamentalist candidates unified behind their nominee, Ebrahim Raisi. Consequently, Jalili and Ghalibaf are expected to advance to a second round of elections.
Regardless of the eventual winner, this development signifies a new phase of political strife within Iran. The political system is moving away from the dominance of a single faction, promoting diversity among political forces while remaining under the overarching control of the Supreme Leader and the regime's hardline orientation.
4- A lifeline for reformists:
The approval of Masoud Pezeshkian’s candidacy, a cardiologist of Turkish and Kurdish descent and an MP for Tabriz, the capital of the Azeri-majority East Azerbaijan Province, represents a significant opportunity for the reformist faction. If Pezeshkian garners support from the Reform Front, which has already announced its participation in the elections, and secures backing from minorities (with Azeris alone constituting about 20% of Iran’s population), he could present a formidable challenge to the fundamentalist candidates.
Former President Mohammad Khatami has announced his intention to participate in the election, contingent upon the Guardian Council's approval of the reformist candidate. This election, however, has notably lacked the presence of prominent reformist and moderate figures. Fear of disqualification by the Guardian Council has deterred individuals like Hassan Rouhani from running, while others, such as Ali Larijani, have been outright disqualified. Despite this, several second-tier reformist and moderate figures, including Mohammad Reza Aref, Mostafa Kavakebian, and Mohammad Shariatmadari, have submitted their candidacies. This indicates a concerted effort by moderates and reformists to re-enter the political arena.
Nevertheless, the reformists' prospects appear bleak. Their faction has yet to fully endorse Pezeshkian, with only individual parties such as the Mardom Salari (Democracy Party) showing support. Additionally, some members of the Reform Front have criticized Pezeshkian's performance following his first televised debate, further diminishing their chances.
In conclusion, the upcoming presidential election in Iran is likely to result in the victory of a fundamentalist president, as the regime seeks to fill the vacuum left by the sudden death of Ebrahim Raisi. The system aims to appoint a successor who embodies Raisi's perceived ideal qualities, particularly during this critical phase for the country. Domestically, Iran must grapple with the delayed selection of a potentially transformative third supreme leader. Simultaneously, it faces complex international issues such as the nuclear dossier, escalating tensions with Israel, and the pursuit of improved relations with neighboring countries. This situation necessitates a president who will adhere to and advance the deep structure of the Iranian regime, thereby avoiding a repeat of past experiences, such as those under former President Hassan Rouhani.
